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1 A Readers Guide to Geography and Growth∗
Abstract
This Ph.D. thesis contains 4 chapters on economic geography and economic growth.
Chapters 2 and 3 explain the intuition behind the seminal Krugman (1991a) model
and develop a technique to analytically solve this model. Chapter 4 embeds this model
framework into a neoclassical growth model which explains a poverty trap. Chapter
5 tests this model empirically for Japan and the US using co-integration techniques.
JEL Classification: F12, O41
Keywords: agglomeration, economic growth
–––––––––––––––—
∗The author thanks Niels Blomgren-Hansen, Søren Bo Nielsen, and Pascalis Raimondos
Møller for their comments. The usual caveats apply.
1.1 Introduction
This Ph.D. thesis is centered around two major discussions that took place in eco-
nomics in the 90ies: the convergence debate in growth theory and economic geogra-
phy. In particular, I explore the relation between income growth of countries/ regions
relative to each other and the location of manufacturing industries across countries/
regions1.
How do agglomeration processes in the location of manufacturing industries
aﬀect the relative growth performance of countries/regions? How does diﬀerent growth
performance feed back on the location of manufacturing industries? Which role do
trade openness, integration processes, and globalization play for the relative growth
performance and manufacturing agglomeration processes? These questions will be
addressed both theoretically and empirically. I hereby follow the statement of Fujita
and Thisse (1996), p. 40:
“The potential connection between growth and agglomeration should be explored
more systematically.”
Before I explain how I address these questions and how I contribute to the
existing literature in this thesis, I want to state the most striking stylised facts both
covering the convergence debate and the economic landscape, and then give a very
crude overview of the existing literature as a point of departure of my own analysis.
1.2 Stylised Facts
Since I intend to merge two fields of research, two sets of stylised facts become relevant
- the stylised facts of the convergence debate and the stylised facts of the economic
landscape2. The convergence debate is based on the prediction of neoclassical growth
1Throughout this thesis I define regions as geographic areas such that goods trade is costless within
this area, but costly, whenever the border lines are crossed. Countries diﬀer additionally by lack of
factor (in particular labour) mobility, non-integrated capital markets, and diﬀerent jurisdictions.
2One may consider agglomeration phenomena on diﬀerent levels: cities, regions, and countries.
One may view regions as a system of cities, and countries as a system of regions in the sense of a
development towards ever higher complexity (Krugman, 1996). Since the same principle of agglom-
eration forces applies to the formation of cities, regions, and countries, I will restrict formal analysis
to the simplest form of agglomeration phenomena: the core-periphery pattern relating it to cities,
2
theory (Solow, 1956). Income of countries with the same structural characteristics
(savings rates, technologies, education, etc.), but diﬀerent initial conditions (initial
physical and human capital stocks) converges to a common steady state growth rate,
since countries with lower capital stocks have higher marginal products of capital, and
higher income growth rates. Also, capital flows from capital-rich to capital-poor coun-
tries are re-enforcing convergence of income. Another theoretical channel for income
convergence are international technology spillovers.3 The standard empirical conver-
gence literature tests β- and σ-convergence - the negative relation of average growth
rates of a country/region sample on initial income, and the dispersion (variance) of
income of a country/region sample over time, respectively.4
1.) Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992) find that the average country converges conditional upon structural char-
acteristics towards a common growth path. This supports the neoclassical growth
model (Solow, 1956) and endogenous growth models with diminishing returns to cap-
ital (Jones and Manuelli, 1990). This view finds support in the First Cohesion Report
(1996) of the EC-Commission for the regions of Europe.
Empirically, this view has been challenged by supporters of the club convergence
hypothesis such as Quah (1996) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995) who claim that initial
conditions matter additionally to structural characteristics. Rich countries converge to
a rich country steady state and poor countries to a poor country steady state (poverty
trap). The latter observation is explained theoretically in the big push and poverty
trap literature.5
2.) Lucas (1990) poses the puzzle that capital does not flow in suﬃcient
amounts from rich to poor countries contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical
growth and trade theory. A seperate literature emerged to explain this puzzle by po-
litical risk, and information asymmetries which gave rise to the interpretation of the
regions and countries in the same way.
3See Grossman and Helpman (1991) for the theory and Coe and Helpman (1995) for the empirical
evidence.
4See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 11.
5A survey is Azariadis (1996).
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mulinational firm as information intermediary.
3.) Ben-David (1993, 1996) and Sachs and Warner (1995) find that trade
liberalization has an impact on the convergence of countries. Countries which reduce
trade barriers among each other start converging to each other. This finding is in
line with dynamic gains of trade (Baldwin, 1992) in neoclassical trade and growth
models. Additionally, Lee (1997) notes that poorer countries start importing more
productive capital goods, if trade barriers are reduced. On the contrary, Rauch (1997)
reports capital outflows after trade liberalization in Chile from 1974 until 1978 and
notes the Italian Mezzogiorno case, where income of North and South Italy diverged
after political unification in 1861.
4.) The East -Asian tigers, in particular South-Korea and Taiwan, have been
taken as nutshell experiment to test the theories on economic growth and industrial-
ization. Whereas Young’s (1995) growth accounting supports the neoclassical model
emphasizing the role of factor accumulation, Rodrik (1995) challenges this view on
account of a thorough study of the political and economic environment of Taiwan and
South Korea. He argues that interventionist policy was useful to overcome a coor-
dination problem of investment to start the catch-up process. This finding supports
the big push theory of Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) which argues that scale
economies require a certain threshold size of the market for an industry, before this
industry uses modern mass production technology rather than traditional production
methods. Only if all firms can be coordinated to switch technology at the same time,
then this switch itself generates so much demand that it becomes profitable for any
single firm.
The literature on economic geography - the study of economic activity in space6
- is centered around four stylised facts which cannot be fully explained by neoclassical
location theory7 which explains location by endowments.8
6See Krugman (1991c) for this definition.
7The most recent and worked-out formulation of neoclassical location theory is Norman and
Venables (1995).
8Surveys on empirical tests of implications of economic geography models are Hanson (1998) for
America and Amiti (1998) for Europe.
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1.) The large manufacturing belts in the US9 - the rust belt at the East coast
and the Lakes and the sun belt in California - and the manufacturing belt of Europe
- the blue banana - are diﬃcult to explain by endowment diﬀerences alone (Krug-
man, 1991c). It rather seems that these agglomeration phenomena of manufacturing
industries as a whole occurred spontaneously by historical accident in a self-enforcing
process (cumulative causation)10. Accordingly, it remains diﬃcult to explain the emer-
gence of big cities. “With capital and labour mobile in the long run, there would need
to be an implausible concentration of immobile ressources to produce cities the size
of Chicago, Los Angeles, or New York.” (Hanson, 1998, p. 34) Another example is
the development of Mexico city. “Mexico city’s share of the national manufacturing
labour force rose from 19 per cent in 1930 to 46 per cent in 1960. Over that 30-year
period, manufacturing employment in Mexico city grew at an average annual rate of
6.7 per cent, compared to 2.7 per cent in the rest of the country.” (Hanson, 1998,
p.33)
2.) Specialization patterns are observed independent of endowment and factor
intensity diﬀerences across sectors. For example, the US states are known to be
highly specialized often without major diﬀerences in endowments.11 Additionally,
Amiti (1998) finds that manufacturing in the European regions has become more
specialized along with the European integration process. Along with specialization
patterns international trade occurs that is not based on endowment diﬀerences (intra-
industry trade). The puzzle of intra-industry trade is indeed that the bulk of trade
is undertaken in goods that have similar factor intensities of production and occurs
among countries that have similar endowments.12
3.) Economic integration, i.e. the reduction of trade barriers, may lead to
divergence of manufacturing distribution. For example, German unification led to
9Kim (1995) and Hanson (1998) give a detailed account on the development of the economic
landscape of the US.
10The notion of cumulative causation was brought into the discussion by Myrdal (1957) to explain
why some countries remain poor in spite of the contrary predictions of neoclassical trade theory.
11See Krugman and Venables (1996). Lau (1996) finds some manufacturing industries in Europe
that are highly specialized in regions.
12See Deardorﬀ (1984). Recently, Davis and Weinstein (1996) and Davis (1997) have challenged
this view.
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a dry-out of manufacturing in the underdeveloped East-Germany. Lange and Pugh
(1998) report a drop in manufacturing employment in East-Germany interpreting it
as “deindustrialization” (p. 80). Kim (1995) finds that regional specialization of
manufacturing fell after an initial rise in the beginning of the age of industrialisation
for the US states. The improvement of transport technology may thus have contributed
to less agglomeration.
4.) Puga and Venables (1996) argue that the spread of manufacturing in Asia
was not a uniform process. First, Japan developed. When the Asian market grew
bigger, industrialization spread over to the four Tiger economies. Recently, China
started the industrialization process. This contradicts the prediction of the neoclassical
growth theory that the countries with the smallest capital stocks are supposed to grow
fastest, if everything else is equal.
The main hypothesis of this thesis is to view the relative income development
among countries/ regions and the relative distribution of manufacturing industries as
two sides of the same coin: Those countries/ regions that capture the most manufac-
turing industries also grow fastest. Empirically, this hypothesis has recently gained
support by Gallup and Sachs (1998). They show that those countries are richer that
have good access to ports. This indicates that transport cost and market access -
important features of economic geography13 - matter for explaining income across
countries.
Further, growth and agglomeration are connected by history. “Industrial de-
velopment in Canada, Mexico, and the United States brought with it the geographic
concentration of economic activity.” (Hanson, 1998, p. 31f) Yet, the age of industrial-
ization also sees the introduction of modern mass production technologies and means
of transport like the steam engine, the railroads, and the assembly line to mention
just a few.
These stylised facts pose a puzzle. If growth and agglomeration are two sides of
13See Krugman (1998).
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the same coin, then there cannot occur income convergence according to neoclassical
growth theory and manufacturing agglomeration according to theories of self-driven
agglomeration processes at the same time (Fingleton and McCombie, 1998). A similar
argument can be found in Broadberry (1993). He shows in an empirical analysis of US,
UK and German manufacturing labour productivity from 1869 until 1989 persistence
of diﬀerences and concludes that convergence of income - to the extent that it exists
- cannot have occurred through the manufacturing sector.
To understand the contrary predictions of the neoclassical growth theory on
one side and theories of agglomeration on the other, the driving assumptions of these
separate fields have to be understood. Neoclassical growth theory is based on constant
returns to scale technology (CRS), whereas regional economists believe that agglom-
eration phenomena are caused by increasing returns technology (IRS).14 For example,
Krugman (1998, p.10) states: “Almost all of the interesting ideas in location theory
rely implicitly or explicitly on the assumption that there are important economies of
scale enforcing the geographic concentration of some activities.”
Because there is no general way of modelling increasing returns (Krugman,
1998) and the predictions may be sensitive to the specific ways, it is helpful to discuss
informally in a thought experiment, how one expects the two assumptions to generate
diﬀerent outcomes in growth and location theory, before thoughts are bounded by the
mathematical constructs available. This discussion follows next.
1.3 Constant Returns versus Increasing Returns to Scale
Increasing returns to scale have been discussed informally already by Adam Smith
(1776), Allwyn Young (1928), Kaldor (1966), and many others.15 In particular, it has
been noted that IRS is associated with manufacturing production16, although scientific
14Crudely defined, CRS implies that larger production plants are just a multiplication of smaller
scale production plants, whereas IRS implies that a larger production plant can exploit economies of
scale by methods of mass production and reduce average cost, as plant scale rises.
15A collection of seminal articles is Buchanan and Yoon (1994).
16See Carson (1998) or Fingleton and McCombie (1998).
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empirical evidence is mixed on this issue.17 Additionally, there is a diﬀuse belief that
manufacturing is somehow special.
“... many people still vaguely believe that manufacturing somehow matters more
than any other economic activity; ... Manufacturing, in this way of looking at things,
brings more growth, better-paid jobs, fatter export earnings and greater technological
progress than any other economic activity.” (Carson, 1998, p.2)
The diﬀerence in the importance of manufacturing may well become under-
standable, if manufacturing is characterized by mass production and economies of
scale, whereas other economic activities (services and agriculture) are not. To un-
derstand the importance of this assumption for diﬀerent predictions in international
trade, development economics, and growth theory, it is worthwhile undertaking a sim-
ple waiving hands thought experiment.
Suppose production technology has the constant returns to scale (CRS) prop-
erty, i.e. a complex production plant can be run in a nutshell without eﬃciency loss.
Suppose further that consumers are equally distributed on a real line (in space) with
some exogenous income. Finally, there are some costs of transportation for each con-
sumption good depending on the distance of the consumer from the production plant.
In such a scenario, one would expect that production is located directly at the place of
every single consumer. Every consumer is autark, since transport costs are minimized
this way and production is by assumption of CRS not cheaper, if operated on large
scale for many consumers. In such a scenario, there is no trade in the same good (intra-
industry trade), there is no specialization (other than by endowment diﬀerences across
space), firms are operated on family size; and economic activity is equally spread in
space (no agglomeration). This description fits well to agriculture in the middle ages.
How does this scenario change, if production has the increasing returns to scale
property, i.e. production on large scale (industrial mass-production) is cheaper than
production on small scale? Then a basic trade-oﬀ emerges between firm economies
17See Junius (1997) for a survey. More recent research confirms the existence of increasing returns
to scale (Fingleton and McCombie, 1998, and Jun, 1998).
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of scale and transport cost. Any production plant will produce for the consumers
located nearby the plant. If a firm serves an additional consumer further away as all
others, average production cost fall, but transport costs for the new consumer rise.
Hence, there are few plants operating in space. Plant size comprises more than just
one family. This constitutes a firm, since there is a need for control of the many
employees (theory of the firm).
Assume additionally that there are some transportation costs of customer-
workers to go to work. Then, there is an incentive for them to move close to the
production site. This explains the emergence of cities18 and the occurrence of migra-
tion due to agglomeration forces. In other words, workers move close to firms and
firms move close to worker-consumers in a cumulative process.19
Suppose, there are diﬀerent goods in an economy. Once, a plant is located
at a site surrounded by many worker-consumers, it pays for other firms producing
something else to locate also at this site, because there is already a large market that
can be served at low transport cost (agglomeration economies via demand spill-overs).
This explains agglomeration clusters of manufacturing as a whole like the rust and
sun belt in the US and the blue banana in Europe.
Suppose, there have emerged two cities of equal size. There are no consumers
any more located in between the two cities, and there are exactly two goods demanded
by consumers produced with identical technology. If transport cost are suﬃciently
low, it pays for the workers in one city to produce in a single large scale plant good 1,
whereas the second city of identical size produces good 2. This explains specialization
independent of endowment and technology diﬀerences of two sites.
Suppose, there are two sites one of which is bigger than the other in terms
of income. Furthermore, there is just one good and there are large transport costs.
Production will take place in both cities, since production in the big city at large
18There have always existed cities formed by various types of agglomeration forces, but the emer-
gence of large cities in the 19th century such as Chicago and New York is believed by regional
economists to rely on IRS production technologies emerging from the industrial revolution (Hanson,
1998). See also section 1.1.
19See Myrdal (1957).
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scale and low cost is still more expensive, if transport cost are added, than the more
expensive production in the small city without transport cost. If transport cost become
negligibly small, it pays in any case to produce at a single location for both cities, i.e.
production in one city ceases to exist, because the firms in the larger city can aﬀord to
pay higher wages attracting all workers of the smaller city, since large scale operation
is cheaper.
Suppose, there is a single owner of a certain product label delivering to both
cities which happen to be separated by a border line (e.g. Coca Cola). Then, the
question emerges, whether this firm produces in both cities (multi-plant operation of
a multi-national firm), or exports from a single production plant in the larger city to
the smaller city.
Suppose further, there is only one city. If a rise in production capacity lowers
cost, investment may become more profitable the more is invested (investment com-
plementarity). This process may accelerate growth. However, if the size of the market
is insuﬃcient, then industrial production may not be profitable at all and a country
continues producing in a traditional way (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).
Suppose next, there are two cities constituting two countries with complete
specialization in two diﬀerent goods produced with the same capital based technology.
Suppose one country invests more increasing its production capacity. With larger
production capacity production becomes cheaper and income of this country rises at
given international prices. This in turn may induce even larger savings and investments
in this country. Consequently, one country is growing faster than the other and the
other falls behind (poverty trap).
Suppose finally, there are productivity gains of specialization. A country that
has a large final goods market in a largely autarkic world can support more specialized
machinery producers, if those require some minimum scale in the presence of IRS to be
profitable. The larger variety of specialized tools renders in turn final good production
more profitable.20
20This story has been especially emphasised by Adam Smith, Allyn Young, and Nicholas Kaldor.
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This simple waiving hands story suggests that increasing returns technology
may potentially explain phenomena as diverse as agglomeration phenomena like the
emergence of large cities, or manufacturing belts, the existence of large firms, the exis-
tence of the multi-national firm, migration phenomena associated with agglomeration
of economic activity, specialization of economic activity, intra-industry trade, or the
emergence of underdeveloped regions (poverty traps).
Yet, economic theory was very hesitant to incorporate the assumption of in-
creasing returns to scale into general equilibrium theory. The reason was a logical
inconsistency of scale economies in a world with perfect competition. To see this sup-
pose a production technology with constant marginal cost and some fixed cost. Since
price equals marginal cost for a price taking firm, the fixed cost will never be coverd
by the price, firms will always make a loss, and IRS production would cease to exist.21
The first to circumvent this problem were Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). They
suggest a diﬀerent market form: monopolistic competition, and firm entry and exit.
This allows to model a monopoly premium mark-up of prices on marginal cost such
that the mark-up covers the fixed cost. At the same time, entry and exit keep firm
profits always at zero and determine the number of firms, since every firm produces
a diﬀerent good in a monopolistically competitive market. In other words product
space is endogenous in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) set-up, whereas product space is ex-
ogenously fixed in standard general equilibrium theory. Unfortunately, this model
has been formulated using specific functional forms. It turns out that firm size is
always constant. In other words, the eﬀect of decreasing production cost at increasing
production volume is not present in this set-up.
Still, this framework proved to be succesful to explain many of the phenomena
mentioned above: intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1979, 1980); agglomeration eco-
nomics (Krugman, 1991a); specialization patterns (Krugman and Venables, 1995,1996);
productivity gains of specialization (Ethier, 1982, and Venables, 1996); the theory of
21See Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), p. 142ﬀ. Fixed cost can co-exist with perfect
competition, if one production factor is fixed (rare management skill) and production occurs beyond
the minimum eﬃciency scale (see Viner, 1932).
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the multinational firm (Markusson and Venables, 1995, and Rodriguez-Clare, 1996);
big push (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989); accelerating growth (Romer, 1986,
1990); and poverty traps (Martin and Ottaviano, 1996, Baldwin, 1997, Baldwin and
Forslid, 1998, and chapter 4 of this thesis).22
1.4 Agglomeration Economics
In this sub-section, a brief introduction into the major formal theoretical contribu-
tions explaining agglomeration phenomena shall be made. Fujita and Thisse (1996)
distinguish three groups of theories explaining agglomeration of production activities:
Marshallian externalities, general equilibrium increasing returns to scale models, and
partial equilibrium spatial competition models.
Marshallian externalities build up on information spill-overs, large local spe-
cialized labour markets, and specialized non-tradable inputs (Marshall, 1920). Spatial
competiton models can be distinguished as shipping and shopping models. In Shop-
ping models consumers bear the transport cost (Hotelling, 1929); in shipping models
there is complete market segmentation of customers (Hoover, 1937, and Greenhut and
Greenhut, 1975). Increasing returns to scale models use two model vehicles of im-
perfect competition: the first and most popular one is the Chamberlinian model of
monopolistic competition - for short the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model. The second
is the Cournot oligopoly model (Venables, 1996). In this thesis only theories building
upon monopolistic competition are considered. A survey is found in Krugman (1998)
or the recent book of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1998). The most important
contributions within this class of models are briefly reviewed next.
Early contributions on this theme include Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita (1988),
and Rivera-Batiz (1988) who model non-tradable intermediate inputs with increasing
returns to scale and consumers enjoy the larger variety of non-tradable goods in big
cities compared to small cities. Englmann and Walz (1995) are an endogenous growth
version of these ideas.
22A broad survey on increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition is Matsuyama (1995).
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However, the seminal paper is Krugman (1991a). This model uses the obser-
vation of the new trade theory explaining intra-industry trade (Krugman, 1980) that
the region with the larger home-market has also higher wages, when there are trans-
port cost. If workers migrate to the region with the larger home-market, firms in the
smaller region cease to exist and new firms enter in the bigger region to employ the
additional workers. Wages become still higher in the larger region attracting even
more workers. Therefore, the model provides a microfoundation of Myrdal’s (1957)
cumulative process. Firms locate close to the consumer market (forward linkage) and
worker-consumers move close to firms.23 Agglomeration of firms is not the only pos-
sible outcome of the model. Since there is also an agricultural sector with immobile
farmers, there is also some localized domestic demand in the smaller region which
may be suﬃcient to pull back some of the firms. It depends on the relative strength
of the home-market eﬀect, the extent of competition eﬀect, and a price index eﬀect24,
whether firms agglomerate or disperse equally across the two regions. It can be shown
that lower trade costs trigger agglomeration by widening the wage diﬀerential. If
trade costs are lowered further the wage diﬀerential narrows again and factor price
equalization holds, whenever trade costs are zero.
Since labour is internationally immobile, a diﬀerent agglomeration process is
suggested by Krugman and Venables (1995a) for countries. Starting from two identical
countries producing both manufacturing and agricultural goods, one economy may
bifurcate to specialize in manufacturing and the other in agriculture, if trade costs are
lowered and labour is mobile inbetween the two sectors within a country.
Since one of the most striking empirical observations is that the US regions
are highly specialized in diﬀerent manufacturing industries, whereas Europe is not,
Krugman and Venables (1996) present a 2 region model with 2 IRS manufacturing
sectors, and labour is mobile across the sectors, but not across the regions. Then the
23In this sense historical accident matters, whether say a region captures a lot of manufacturing.
Krugman (1991b) and Matsuyama (1991) note that optimistic or pessimistic expectations about the
future may also lead to self-driven agglomeration processes.
24These eﬀects will be explained in detail in chapter 3. The seminal paper remains vague about
them to the extent that they are not related to the analytics of the model.
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two regions specialize, if trade costs are low (like in the US), or remain dispersed, if
trade costs are high (like in Europe).
If there are more than two regions, a hierarchy of agglomeration phenomena
may occur explaining the hierarchy of cities (Krugman and Fujita, 1995).
A backward linkage is introduced by Venables (1996) as additional agglomera-
tion force into the framework with forward linkages - namely: tradable intermediate
inputs produced with increasing returns to scale technology. A large market for final
good producers provides also a large market for intermediate goods. Hence, inter-
mediate good producers locate close to final good producers who locate close to the
largest final goods market. In this way intermediate inputs re-enforce agglomeration.
Martin and Ottaviano (1996) explain agglomeration by R&D location decisions
in an endogenous growth model. Audretsch (1998) shows empirically the importance
of R&D location for building agglomeration centers in the high-tech industry.
Krugman and Venables (1995b) provide a continuous space version arguing
that countries as natural units of observations vanish and international trade shall be
viewed as trade across space. This framework allows to discuss the density of city
distribution in space by meassuring the wave length of the agglomeration peaks.
Applications of the seminal model discuss policy issues like public infrastructure
investment (Martin and Rogers, 1995), or locational implications of customs unions
and hub and spoke agreements (Puga and Venables, 1995). Puga and Venables (1996)
use this model framework to explain, why industrialization did not spread uniformly
to the Asian countries, but started first in Japan, spilled over to the Tiger economies,
and finally to China, as the share of manufacturing employment grew in the entire
world in the course of history.
Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996) explain the emergence of metropolis in the
third world such as Mexico city by import substitution policy. If trade barriers are
large, manufacturing locates all at the capital, where the largest home-market is. If
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trade costs are low, there will be more manufacturing for overseas markets locating
closer to ports and border lines. Distribution of manufacturing is more dispersed.
Ricci (1998) argues in a 2-country model with monopolisitc competition and
stochastic demand and supply shocks that exchange rate flexibility increases special-
ization, because the country that is specialized in the sector that faces a positive shock
appreciates its exchange rate and dampens the volatility of firm profits. This in turn
attracts new firms.
Summing up, it is fair to say that all models rely on the same kind of mecha-
nism based on monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, and trade cost.
Therefore, it is crucial to have a closer examination of the seminal paper to understand
the results of the others.
1.5 Contributions of This Thesis
This Ph.D. thesis consists of 4 subsequent chapters which are each self-contained,
but successively building upon each other. Each of the chapters addresses a certain
scientific problem of the existing literature mentioned above.
Chapter 2 and 3 are complementary chapters. They originate from the fact
that the standard economic geography model (Krugman, 1991) is not analyzed in the
formal rigorosity that is found in traditional trade theory. Instead of solving the model
backward by using expenditure functions and revenue functions like in duality theory
to explore terms of trade eﬀects which in turn determine factor prices, the model is
solved diﬀerently. The question is posed, whether a firm can aﬀord to pay higher real
wages in a region that has no manufacturing. If they can, it is concluded that firms
do not agglomerate. If they cannot, then it is concluded that complete agglomeration
of manufacturing is an equilibrium. This is neither a complete analytical solution to
the model, nor does it reveal clearly the mechanics of the model.
Chapter 2:
Chapter 2 discusses the mechanics of the model by looking at the excess demand
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system and discussing, how a movement of workers from one region to another aﬀects
relative prices, and how this feeds through on relative (nominal and real) wages. In
looking at the model in this way, we reveal that the mechanics of the model are
not unlike a pure exchange economy which is well understood in economics. This
analogy helps forming a simple understanding of the Krugman (1991a) model. The
developed simple graphical apparatus allows to present the model and its mechanics
in an undergraduate textbook.
Chapter 3:
Chapter 3 provides a complete analytical solution of the Krugman model (1991).
The analysis allows to prove the existence of a poverty trap case at an intermediate
level of transport cost not mentioned in the seminal paper. Whenever there are suﬃ-
ciently many firms in one region, firms will tend to locate even in the plane. Whenever
there are less firms than a certain threshold level, even the remaining firms will leave
and complete agglomeration is the outcome. This phenomenon helps explain, why
economic integration of well developed EC-countries triggered income convergence
(Ben-David, 1993), and why unification of West- and Eastern Germany ended up
with a massive break-down of East-German manufacturing.
Whereas Krugman (1998, p. 11) claims that “... despite the best eﬀorts of
the theorist, all but the simplest models of economic geography usually turn out to be
a bit beyond the reach of paper-and-pencil analysis”, my solution technique can be
generalized to many geography and trade models.
Chapter 4:
Chapter 4 integrates economic geography (Krugman, 1991a) into a neoclassical
(exogenous) growth framework. I show that such a model captures the ideas of poverty
traps and cumulative processes of Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1966). I also show that
two regimes are possible: a neoclassical growth regime and a poverty trap regime. In
the neoclassical growth regime any two countries with identical structural character-
istics except a diﬀerent initial capital stock start converging to the same steady state
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income level and an equal distribution of firms. In the poverty trap regime, any two
countries start diverging in income level and manufacturing firms agglomerate incom-
pletely. This is my simple solution to the puzzle posed in section 1.1. The question is
not, whether there is income convergence or manufacturing agglomeration, but, when
there is income convergence (neoclassical regime) and when there is manufacturing
agglomeration (poverty trap regime).
Firm agglomeration occurs in this model not due to factor flows but through
internal growth in a region. Trade liberalization is shown to eliminate the poverty
trap and agglomeration pattern which is just opposite to what Krugman (1991a)
suggests. I obtain this result, because I exchange the convergence forces. Instead of
an immobile, specific factor, constant returns to scale farming sector, I use capital-
labor substitutability as convergence force in this model. This shows similar to Davis
(1998) that the role of the farming sector may cause robustness problems, if slight
assumption changes compared to the Krugman (1991a) model are undertaken.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 tests empirically an endogenous growth version of the model dis-
played in chapter 4 using time series data for Japan and the US. The testing procedure
is distinguished by two properties: 1.) the testing procedure is designed to specifi-
cally test the mechanics of the Krugman-type models: Chapter 2 has revealed that
the mechanics rely entirely on a terms-of-trade eﬀect. Therefore, one can consider
this chapter as an indirect test25 of the terms-of-trade eﬀect driving Krugman type
agglomeration processes. 2.) It is shown that a linearized growth model version of
Krugman (1991a) yields a reduced rank hypothesis of a vector error correction model
which can be tested using co-integration analysis (Johansen, 1988, 1991). In the Bret-
ton Woods era with fixed exchange rates, I find that income convergence in the sense
of cointegration and terms-of-trade eﬀect are not significantly present. The Japanese
and the US economy grow independently from each other with Japan being on a faster
25The test is indirect in that we use income data as proxy for “firm agglomeration”, since there is
no obvious and unambiguous meassure for the latter variable. The theoretical model justifies the use
of the income data.
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growth path. In the Post-Bretton Woods era with flexible exchange rates, I find that
income convergence and terms-of-trade eﬀect cannot be rejected, if one expects oil
shocks or other crises to occur in the future.
Possible reasons for the weakness of the evidence may be that 1) my data were
not suﬃciently disaggregated, 2) the growth link - improved terms of trade - does not
feed through on savings and capital accumulation, if capital markets are integrated,
3) Japan and the US are too distant from each other (and trade volume is too small)
for agglomeration forces to become meassurable, 4) exchange rate interventions and
exchange rate bubbles may have prevented the terms of trade meassure to follow its
“fundamental value”.
1.6 Open Questions
Many features of the Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz model can be criticized. Some features
rely on implausible assumptions used for the sake of analytical simplicity: the assump-
tion of iceberg-type transport cost implies that a rise in final goods prices does also
rise the transport cost (Fujita and Thisse, 1996). The number of farmers is normalized
to be equal to the income share of agriculture. Hence, the isolated impact of these two
factors on agglomeration cannot be discussed. Factor specificity of the farming sector
and manufacturing do not comply with the mass migration of farmers into cities in
the beginning of the age of industrialization. Yet, this assumption may be crucial to
constitute a convergence force.
Some features are of a methodological sort: specific functional forms and lack
of generality (Fujita and Thisse, 1996); The Marshallian migration process of this
model lacks a proper micro-foundation (Ottaviano and Thisse, 1998). There is some
unrobustness of slight assumption changes: Davis (1998) shows that transport cost on
agricultural goods may revert the home-market eﬀect; Chapter 4 of this thesis argues
that the exchange of convergence forces (diminishing returns of capital instead of an
immobile farming sector) reverses the role of transport cost. Agglomeration suddenly
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occurs, when trade costs are high rather than low.26 Since these observations are
counter-intuitive to what has been argued informally in section 1.2, one can take it as
an indication that the Krugman model does not quite capture the mechanics that are
described in this section, although it captures most of the predictions.
Some features are of a deeper economic deficiency: The agglomeration force
of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model does not support capital flows to form agglom-
eration centers, if 1) there is capital-labor substitutability, and 2) capital gains are
repatriated. The reason is obvious: if capital flows to a region, more varieties are
produced, but the extra income generated flows back to the other region and is largely
spent there. Hence, prices and rental rates fall in the region that attains additional
capital and capital has an incentive to flow back to its origin. Yet, capital movements
are at the heart of every firm relocation. Not labor moves to a region setting up a
new business, but a firm invests into a production plant employing local labor.
Along with globalization, (i.e. a reduction of trade cost boosting international
trade volume), manufacturing relocates towards the periphery as predicted by chapter
4 of this thesis, not towards the center as predicted by the Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz
model (Carson, 1998). Equivalently, Kim (1995) reports that specialization occured
in the US in the second half of the 19th century, when significant falls of transport
cost due to the establishment of a national railway system happened. But special-
ization decreased thereafter. This may support the view that at low transport cost
dillusion of manufacturing distribution occurs contrary to the predictions of Krugman
(1991a). Also, relocation is driven by cheap labor which indicates that capital-labor
substitutability or low-skill/ high-skill substitutability which is dismissed for the sake
of simplicity in most of the economic geography models27 may play a role. All three
stylised facts are captured by chapter 4 of this thesis rather than by the original
Krugman (1991a) model.
26This result also shines through in Puga (1998). His model contains the agricultural sector and
land-labour substitutability. With intersectoral mobility of labour high and low trade costs induce
convergence of manufacturing distribution, whereas agglomeration occurs at an intermediate level of
trade cost.
27An exemption is Puga (1998).
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Some features are simply not fully explored: a complete welfare analysis and
an analysis of welfare enhancing measures is still missing. For example the question
remains, whether agglomeration is good or bad? If agglomeration is bad, does it
happen? Only this constellation would justify policy measures to support the poor
region. It may instead be that convergence happens, if agglomeration is good justifying
the subsidization of the rich region.28
Some features require further exploration by supplementing the existing frame-
work of analysis: How does specialization in a 2 country model with 2 manufacturing
sectors aﬀect welfare, if there are diﬀerent rates of exogenous technological progress of
these two sectors. If specialization is spontaneous, and not based on endowments or
technologies, does such a model justify a subsidization war for the high-tech industry?
The production technology lacks a micro-foundation: If there are physical IRS
in the production technology explaining why manufacturing firms employ many work-
ers, whereas service firms employ substantially less, then social control and free rider
problems may oﬀset the advantages of scale economies giving rise to a U-shaped aver-
age cost curve. Consequently, agglomeration forces are only present, when firms have
not grown to their optimal firm scale, yet. This could explain, why agglomeration
phenomena are most striking in young and growing industries such as Silicon Valley
or the Bio-tech industry in California. Also, most of the agglomeration phenomena
occurred at the beginning of industrialization like the emergence of the large towns
New York and Chicago (Kim, 1995).
The Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model relies on complementarities generated by
the endogeneity of product space. I argued in section 1.2, the most obvious eﬀect
of IRS is a cost reduction due to larger scale operation possible in the region with a
larger home-market. Kim (1995) shows that firm scale can explain localization and
specialization patterns of US manufacturing over the course of history. Also firm
scale is an important variable explaining the relative growth performance of European
manufacturing (Fingleton and McCombie, 1998). This eﬀect of IRS does not show up
28Preliminary simulations suggest that this case is a possibility in the seminal model.
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in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model, because firm scale is independent of the size of
the home market due to the specific functional forms chosen.
Only recently, Ottaviano and Thisse (1998) have developed a framework, where
output of a firm depends on market size. They largely confirm the stylized facts
produced by the Krugman (1991a) model - but the mechanics of the model is diﬀerent:
Absolute number of firms in both regions, relative distribution of firms, and the degree
to which competition of foreign firms is sheltered on a local market (transport cost)
determine demand elasticities in the two countries and monopoly price mark-ups. A
rise in market size may thus increase competition, rise output of a single firm and thus
lower average cost.
To find out which of the two mechanisms - product variety or scale - dominate
in practise, one may want to test, whether an increase of wages in an industry goes
always along with a rise in prices (Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model and neoclassical trade
theory) or prices fall, although wages rise (scale eﬀect as described in section 1.2).
Finally, Venables (1996) productivity gains of specialization may be interest-
ing to be modelled in a 2 country growth model. Such a growth model captures the
ideas of Kaldor’s (1966) 4-stage growth theory. Germany and Japan may have spe-
cialized in exports of manufactures, because both countries developed a large market
of specialized machinery producers. Because of access to specialized machinery, the
manufacturing sectors in both countries gained a comparative advantage. Acceleration
processes, as described in section 1.2, may then have contributed to the extraordinary
growth performance of the two countries after World War II.29
Summing up, the above considerations show that this thesis rather rises new
questions, than delivers a final answer to the puzzles of growth and economic geography.30
29Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue that the destruction of physical capital should yield a
rapid catch-up in a model with human capital, but this does not explain why 1) Japan and Germany
performed better than, say the UK and many other developed countries up to the 70ies and 2)
why Japan and Germany ended up with larger shares of manufacturing sectors compared to other
developed countries.
30Krugman (1998) comes to a similar evaluation on economic geography.
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2 Understanding Geography and Trade∗
Abstract
This paper provides a simple graphical exposition and a rigorous analytical method
for monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale, geography and trade models
with transport costs which explain agglomeration or convergence of industries. In
the main text, the agglomeration and convergence forces are graphically displayed,
whereas the appendix provides the analytical treatment of the model. New light is
shed on the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model by an analogy to a heterogeneous agent
pure exchange economy.
JEL Classification: F12, R60.
Keywords: convergence, agglomeration, poverty trap.
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2.1 Introduction
The economic geography literature employs several “workhorses”. The most promi-
nent one is perhaps the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman monopolistic competition increasing
returns to scale model with transport costs explaining industry agglomeration in
space. There are two general versions of it: the regional economic model by Krug-
man (1980,1991) and the international trade model by Krugman and Venables (1995).
The regional economic model assumes migration of workers between regions dragging
industries with them. Across nations, however, labour is less mobile. Hence, the inter-
national trade model assumes that labour is intersectorally mobile and agglomeration
of industries occurs, if labour moves from a constant returns to scale agricultural sec-
tor to an increasing returns to scale manufacturing sector. However, the models are
otherwise identical in structure and the driving forces for the diﬀerent kind of labour
mobilities are very similar, too.
These models have two complications. They are non-linear in structure and may
entail multiple equilibria. Hence, most of the analysis is numerical with some sugges-
tive analytical treatments. Rigorous algebra is in particular important for defining
conditions for which an even distribution of workers and industries turns into an un-
even one (agglomeration condition). Krugman (1991) gives such a condition for total
agglomeration, Venables (1995) and Krugman and Venables (1995) give a condition,
for which the equal distribution is not a stable equilibrium (“algebra of symmetry-
breaking”).
Still, the analysis is far from both the rigour and the economic intuition of
the driving eﬀects which is for example provided in the Heckscher and Ohlin type
of economic geography models.31 I provide in chapter 3 of this thesis a complete
analytical solution to the Krugman (1991) model and detect a “poverty trap” that was
overlooked by the seminal article. Because chapter 3 does not provide any economic
31See, for example, Norman and Venables (1995).
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intuition for its results, it is supplemented by this companion paper giving a simple
graphical exposition of the model.
The graphical exposition gives a clear-cut intuition for the agglomeration and
convergence forces embeded in the model, whereas the analytics of the seminal paper
do not reveal this intuition. In particular, the seminal paper argues on the basis of the
home market and the extent of competition eﬀect. We confirm the mechanics of the
home market eﬀect, but show that the extent of competition eﬀect is better described
as a regional composition eﬀect of goods (number of goods eﬀect). Indeed, the model
deviates from a standard neoclassical model only because of the endogeneity of product
space. The graphical apparatus provides an exposition of the seminal model suitable
for undergraduate classes.
A need for a clarification of the mechanics of the Krugman (1991) model may
also be derived from Davis (1998). He shows that a minor change in the model
set-up - transport cost for agricultural goods - undermines the home market eﬀect
unexpectedly. Unfortunately, his formal proof - though elegant - adds little to the
understanding of the mechanics of the model. Instead of his proof by contradiction,
we follow the standard approach in general equilibrium theory focusing on the excess
demand system and the comparative static eﬀects of worker migration on relative
prices and wages. This approach allows us to compare the Krugman increasing returns
to scale model directly with a standard neoclassical pure exchange economy.
The analogy to a pure exchange economy sheds new light on the interpretation
of trade costs and region size in the model. The analogy may suggest a rethinking of
the role of increasing returns in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model. This is somewhat
in contrast to Fujita and Thisse (1996) who attribute a major role in the explana-
tion of agglomeration economics to increasing returns. Whereas we will show that
the mechanism of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model is analogous to a pure exchange
economy with two types of heterogeneous agents and three goods with the following
properties: 1) each type of consumer is equally endowed with one good, owes the world
endowment of the second and nothing of the third. 2) The consumer strictly prefers
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the good he is well endowed with to the good he is not endowed with. Furthermore, we
obtain the corollary that agglomeration occurs in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model
even without transport cost, if a parameter of preference bias towards domestically
produced manufacturing goods is introduced into the utility function.
The main text gives an almost entirely graphical treatment to facilitate intu-
ition, whereas the appendix contains the analytical treatment of the model. Section
2 repeats the familiar model set-up for convenience; section 3 gives the equilibrium
conditions; section 4 draws an insightful analogy to a pure exchange economy; section
5 explains why there is agglomeration or convergence; and section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Model Set-Up
In this section, the basic structure of a typical geography and trade model as developed
by Krugman (1991) is presented. The model has two regions with one increasing
returns to scale sector (industry) and one constant returns to scale sector (agriculture)
in each region. The increasing returns to scale sector is monopolistically competitive.
Furthermore, transport costs for industrial goods introduce a geographical dimension
into the model.
There are two types of consumers j = 1, 2, which are only diﬀerent by there
place of residence. Home region’s consumers are indexed by 1, foreign region’s con-
sumers by 2. Regions are defined as areas for which it is costless to trade industrial
goods within them, but costly to trade industrial goods across the border. Further-
more, there is no short run mobility of production factors across borders. However, a
long run mobility of labour across borders is considered.
The two types of consumers j have identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions of
the form
Uj = C
μ
MjC
1−μ
A , 0 < μ ≤ 1, (1)
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where CA is consumption of the agricultural good produced with constant returns to
scale and CMj is an aggregate basket of industrial goods produced in both regions
under monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. The industrial goods
basket CMj is further specified by a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) subutility function:
CMj =
"
n1+n2X
i=1
c(σ−1/σ)ij
#σ/(σ−1)
, σ > 1. (2)
The demand of consumer j for a single industrial firm i’s product is denoted cij. There
are n1 firms in the home region and n2 firms in the foreign. The number of firms is
assumed to be suﬃciently large. The elasticity of substitution between the industrial
goods is denoted σ.
There is factor specificity for industrial production by workers and agricultural
production by peasants. Peasants work according to a constant returns to scale tech-
nology in perfectly competitive markets. The price for agricultural products serves as
numeraire and price equals wage.
Industrial workers have an increasing returns to scale technology of a simple
structure: there is a fixed cost α and a constant marginal cost β for each firm i. The
firm i uses LMi units of labour for producing xi goods:
LMi = α+ βxi. (3)
Every firm produces a diﬀerent variety in order to exploit potential monopoly profits.
In equilibrium, firms will not succeed, however, because free costs of firm entry and
exit will assure zero profits. Because firms are assumed to be symmetric, we drop
the firm index i for convenience. However, we will use the index i = 1, 2 in order to
distinguish the home and the foreign firms, respectively.
The number of industrial workers in region 1, L1, and in region 2, L2, are for
simplicity assumed to add up to μ :32
32See Krugman (1991), footnote 1, for a justification of this assumption.
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L1 + L2 = μ. (4)
Without loss of generality, I define the domestic region (region 1) to be the smaller
one, i.e. there are less industrial workers than in the foreign region (region 2). The
total amount of peasants is 1− μ, they are assumed to be equally distributed in both
regions, and they are not mobile. Every worker and peasant supplies one unit of work
and earns a salary 1, if peasant, and wi, if worker in region i.
Finally, there are trade costs of the Samuelson iceberg-type τ , such that only a
fraction τ of one produced unit of an industrial good arrives at its foreign destination
(0 < τ ≤ 1). There are neither trade costs for goods delivered to domestic customers,
nor trade costs for agricultural goods.
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, we state some well-known economic relationships that stem from firm
optimization, consumer optimization, the zero-profit condition, the labour market
equilibrium condition and the goods market equilibrium conditions.
Given the usual assumption that the firm takes into account the impact of its
pricing decision on its own demand, but not on other firms’ pricing decisions, then the
well-known pricing rule for the firm holds:33
pi = γ · β · wi, (5)
where γ ≡ σ/ (σ − 1), and pi denotes the mill price of region i firms’ goods34. Prices
are constant mark-ups over wages due to the assumptions of constant elasticities of
substitution and constant marginal cost. Prices and wages are proportional. An
33This equation is only an approximation which is fairly good for a large number of firms. (It does
not imply that ni has to be large, because ni is normalized to number of firms per country population.)
See the discussion in Yang and Heijdra (1993), Dixit and Stiglitz (1993), and d’Aspremont et al.
(1996).
34The pricing decision for export goods pExport
i
requires the firm to demand the domestic price
plus the additional transport cost: pExport
i
= γ · β · wi/τ, i = 1, 2
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increase in wages drives up prices and vice versa. Therefore, prices and wages can be
used interchangeably, henceforth.
The optimal output of the firm is known to be determined by the zero profit
condition:
xi =
α · (σ − 1)
β
≡ x, (6)
The equilibrium output of the firm is independent of the number of workers or the
number of firms in a region. In fact, it is an exogenously given constant x. All the
interesting eﬀects, which drive the agglomeration or convergence process stem from
the demand side. This is again a result of the simplifying assumption of constant
marginal cost.35
The equilibrium number of firms per region follows from the labour market
clearing conditions and the output decision:
ni =
Li
ασ
. (7)
This is the third important economic relationship to be kept in mind. If the number
of workers increases in a region, workers drag industries with them, and the number
of goods increases proportionally.
Since profits are zero, aggregate income in a region is the sum of the income of
all workers and peasants in that region:
yi (wi, Li) = wi · Li + 1− μ
2
. (8)
This implies also that the wage bill of all firms in a region equals the sales of all firms
in that region.
yi (pi, ni) = pi · ni· x +1− μ
2
(9)
35Hence, one eﬀect, which one might think of, is missing in the model: the larger region does
not have larger firm sizes and hence lower production cost under increasing returns to scale. See
Krugman (1980), footnote 3, on this issue.
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These economic relationships are useful, because every behavioural equation of the
model can be interchangeably expressed in terms of the two prices pi and the number
of goods per region ni or equivalently in terms of the two wages wi and the labour
distribution Li36. Hence, it will be completely suﬃcent to describe the model in
terms of prices and number of goods which will be determined by the goods market
equilibrium conditions. Another example is the CES-price index Pj that can be written
in both ways as function of prices and number of goods or wages and the worker
distribution:37
Pj = Pj (p1, p2, nj) = Pj (w1, w2, Lj) . (10)
An increase in the number of domestic goods will lower the price index even at
given prices, because there will be less goods to pay transport costs for than be-
fore (∂Pj/∂nj < 0 and ∂Pj/∂Lj < 0). With these ingredients, a short run equilibrium
can be defined as an equilibrium of the goods market, the labour market and zero
firm profits at a given distribution of labour. Such an equilibrium can be found as
the solution of the excess demand curves of the domestic firms f(p1, p2, n), the foreign
firms f∗(p1, p2, n), and the agricultural sector g (p1, p2, n)38,39:
f(p1, p2, n) = D (p1, P1) · y1 + E (p1, P2) · y2τ − x= 0 (11)
f∗(p1, p2, n) = D (p2, P2) · y2 + E (p2, P1) · y1τ − x= 0
g (p1, p2, n) = (1− μ) (y1 + y2)− (1− μ) = 0,
where
D (pi, Pi)
36From now on L denotes the amount of domestic workers and μ−L the amount of foreign workers.
Respectively, n denotes the number of domestic goods, whereas the number of foreign goods is given
by: μασ − n.
37The explicit functional forms are given in appendix A.
38The agricultural sectors can be merged into one equilibrium condition, because there are no
transport cost for agricultural goods.
39The explicit functional forms of the equation system (11) are given in appendix B.
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Figure 1: Short Run Equilibrium
describes the fraction of region i’s income spent on region i’s firms and
E (pi, Pj) , i 6= j
describes the fraction of region j’s income spent on imports from region i’s firms.40
The home regions’ income y1 and the foreign regions’ income y2 are defined according
to equation (9), and the price indices are defined according to equation (10). These
functions describe the excess demand in the three goods markets. The two industrial
goods excess demand functions add up domestic demand and exports of a firm and
subtract its output. The agricultural goods demand is a constant fraction of world
income, whereas supply equals the number of peasants.
Urban (1996) proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the system (11).
Therefore, we can depict the equilibrium of the goods markets in figure 1. Figure
1 shows the three implicit functions f(p1, p2, n), f∗(p1, p2, n) and g(p1, p2, n) in the
p2-p1-space for a given n. The three schedules show the equilibrium in the domestic
industrial goods market, the foreign industrial goods market and the market for agri-
cultural products, respectively. The intersection of the three curves is the short run
40The explicit definition for D (pi, Pj) is:
D (pi, Pi) =
ασp−σi
P 1−σi
and the explicit definition for E (pi, Pj) is:
E (pi, Pj) =
ασ(pi/τ)−σ
P 1−σj
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equilibrium. One of the equations is redundant due to Walras law. I drop the excess
demand function for the foreign industrial goods market f∗(p1, p2, n).
The equilibrium condition for domestic firms (f -schedule) is upward sloping,
because any increase in domestic prices for given foreign prices reduces demand for
domestic industrial products (∂f/∂p1 < 0)41. In order to restore equilibrium at a
given constant supply, foreign prices must also rise (because ∂f/∂p2 > 0).
The equilibrium condition for agricultural products (g-schedule) is downward
sloping. A constant fraction of world income is spent on agricultural products. Supply
is proportional to the number of peasants in the world and thus a constant in this
model. If industrial wages in one region rise, world income is rising, thus raising
demand for agricultural products at constant supply. In order to restore equilibrium,
the industrial wages in the other region must fall, until world income is back at the
original level. As mentioned above, prices follow wages.
The way economic geography papers are written does in our opinion not entirely
clarify as to how the mechanics of the model operates. Before we analyze this system,
we will depart from the previous model by setting up a completely diﬀerent well-known
microeconomic three goods and two heterogeneous agents pure exchange economy.
This new set-up will lead to the same demand system as (11). It will be this analogy
which sheds new light on the geography and trade models. In particular, it will
contribute to the question, how to interprete trade costs and region size in this model.
2.4 What are Trade Costs?
As motivation for this section, we pose the question, whether a small open economy
like Denmark in the vicinity of both Sweden and Germany is a big or a small country
and whether such a country has a relatively high or a low parameter τ . The answers to
these questions will be crucial for deciding, whether Denmark is subject to an increase
or a decline of the manufacturing sector according to the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model
41The rigorous mathematical derivation of the derivatives in this paragraph is part of appendix C.
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We set up a well-known pure exchange economy and show that this problem
yields the goods market equilibrium conditions (11) under the following two conditions:
1) the consumer j is equally endowed with one good, owes the world endowment of
the second and nothing of the third. 2) The consumer strictly prefers the good he is
well endowed with to the good he is not endowed with.
There are two heterogeneous types of agents j = 1, 2 in a pure exchange econ-
omy with three goods x1, x2,XA, where the total endowments of the economy are
normalized to x1≡ α(σ−1)n1β , x2≡
α(σ−1)n2
β , and XA≡ 1 − μ. The endowments are
distributed in the following way to the types of consumers: Consumer j is only en-
dowed with good xj, but not with good xi, whereas XA, the numeraire good, is equally
distributed among the two types of consumers. This gives rise to the wealth constraint
yj = pj xj +
1− μ
2
, (12)
where yj is consumer wealth of all consumers of type j. Finally, the utility function
for consumer j is given by the following expression:
Uj (cjj, cij, CAj) =
³
αjc
σ−1
σ
jj + αic
σ−1
σ
ij
´ σ
σ−1μ
C1−μAj , j 6= i, (13)
where cij denotes consumption of consumer j for good xi, CAj is consumption of
consumer j for good XA and
αj ≡
µ
nj
n1 + n2
¶ 1
σ
(14)
αi ≡
µ
niτσ−1
n1 + n2
¶ 1
σ
(15)
are some weighting factors in the utility function such that a consumer j prefers the
good xj to the good xi. In other words, the consumer prefers the good which she
ownes to the good that has to be bought from the other type of consumer (bias of
preferences towards domestic goods). We can think of the following interpretation:
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the two consumers live in diﬀerent regions and the preferences are biased towards the
domestically available goods. The parameter τ is then a proxy for the degree to which
preferences are biased towards domestic goods. The lower the τ, the stronger are
domestic goods preferred. Additionally, the weighting factor includes also the size of
the country as proxied by the number of goods in the Krugman (1991) model. To yield
the same set of equilibrium prices (and wages) country size can be traded oﬀ with the
degree of preference bias. For instance, China can aﬀord to have more specific tastes
than Denmark, and can still achieve higher relative prices (and wages).
The utility function (13) is maximized according to the budget constraint:
c1jp1 + c2jp2 + CAj = yj (16)
It is straight forward to show that exactly the demand system (11) emerges.42 It is this
analogy that sheds new light on the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model. The immigration
of a worker and the corresponding increase of the number of goods nj in the Dixit-
Stiglitz-Krugman model acts as if there is an increase in the bias of demand towards
domestic goods aj (see equations (14) and (15)). If there is a stronger preference for
goods of consumer j, then prices pj are rising. In the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model,
the rise of prices feeds through on wages. In this sense, the analogy helps to form a
simple intuition for the price eﬀects of worker migration.
Further, the analogy suggests that the intuition is somewhat in contrast to Fu-
jita and Thisse (1996) who attribute a major role in the explanation of agglomeration
economics to increasing returns, whereas we achieve similar eﬀects in a neoclassical
pure exchange economy. The production side of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model
seems not so important for its eﬀect on agglomeration economics than the demand
42The analogy holds only for the short run equilibrium of the model in Krugman (1991). The long
run equilibrium could be replicated by our pure-exchange economy, if preferences are endogenous.
For example, some type 1 consumers turn into type 2 consumers in the next generation (next time
period), if type 2 experiences higher utility in the short run equilibrium today. These consumers
will not only change their preferences, but also the endowment. This simple example shows that the
application of the Krugman (1991) model is not restricted to economic geography, but also applies
to heterogeneous social groups within one economy.
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side.43
Additionally, we obtain the corollary that the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model
will yield the same results, if transport costs are assumed zero (τ = 1) and the utility
function (2) is replaced by:
CMj =
⎡
⎣X
i∈Nj
c(σ−1/σ)ij +
X
i∈Nk
αc(σ−1/σ)ij
⎤
⎦
σ/(σ−1)
, σ > 1, (17)
where Nj denotes the set of firms in country j, Nk denotes the set of firms in the other
country, and α ≡ τ (σ−1)/σ < 1 is a parameter of preference bias towards domestically
produced manufacturing goods.
Now, we return to the question, whether a small open economy like Denmark
is a big or a small region. On the one hand, if trade costs are taken literally to be
transport costs as Krugman (1991) seems to suggest, then Denmark is a big region.
This is so, because Denmark has a relatively high population density. I.e. a firm finds
a relatively large market in its surroundings.44 Furthermore, Denmark should not be
considered a homogeneous region independent of South Sweden and North Germany,
because transport costs e.g. from Kolding to Flensburg are not substantially diﬀerent
from transport costs from Kolding to Skagen.
On the other hand, if trade costs are interpreted as a parameter of preference
bias towards domestic goods, then the question arises, how diﬀerent are Danish tastes,
relative to European tastes. Clearly, Denmark should then be regarded as a homo-
geneous region with a unique cultural background and relatively homogeneous tastes
inside, but (maybe) somewhat diﬀerent tastes relative to people in other countries.
For example, Danish books are strictly preferred by Danish people relative to, say,
Swedish people (who can read Denish books with some inconvenience). Furthermore,
Denmark would be a small region, because the absolute number of inhabitants is the
relevant meassure of region-size in this case.
43What matters in the Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz model is the endogeneity of product space (see
Matsuyama, 1995).
44This statement requires just one qualification. Transport costs are higher for the islands. Still,
it is not obvious that products are more expensive, for example, in Copenhagen than in Kolding.
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After having clarified some interpretations of the model, we will return to the
original set-up of sections (2.1) and (2.2), analyze the system (11), and clarify the
agglomeration and convergence forces in the model.
2.5 Why is there Agglomeration or Convergence?
Suppose for the moment that a worker changes for some arbitrary reason her residence.
What is going to happen to the wages and prices? If wages rise in the immigration
region and fall in the emmigration region, there will be an incentive for more workers
to follow (agglomeration). If wages fall in the immigration region and rise in the em-
migration region, there will be an incentive for this worker to go back (convergence)45.
Because of equation (5), wages are proportional to prices. Hence, we have to examine,
how prices change, if a worker moves thereby changing the regional distribution of
firms and goods. We will begin with the impact of a movement of a worker on the
equilibrium condition for domestic industrial goods.
If an industrial worker moves from the foreign to the domestic region at a
given level of prices and wages, then the demand-change for domestically produced
industrial goods will be described by the following expression:
∂f
∂L
= w1D (p1, P1)− w2 · E (p1, P2)τ (18)
+y1
∂D (p1, P1)
∂P1
· ∂P1
∂L
+
y2
τ
· ∂E (p1, P2)
∂P2
· ∂P2
∂L
,
where we made use of (9), (10), and (11). A movement of labour from the bigger to
the smaller region has two eﬀects on domestic demand for industrial goods.
The income eﬀect: There is one worker more in the domestic region, who spends
her income on domestic goods and hence there is one person less in the foreign region,
45In the context of economic geography, convergence means the tendency of increasing returns to
scale industries to allocate equally in plane, whereas convergence in the growth literature means the
tendency of growth rates of GDP of poorer countries to be bigger than the one in richer countries (This
is absolute convergence as defined by Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) The two notions are interrelated,
if increasing returns industries have higher technological progress than agriculture. An agglomeration
process of industries would then also imply divergence of growth rates and a convergence process of
industries would also mean convergence of growth rates.
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who could spend some income on exports. Note that the price for the domestic good
is reduced for this person due to the absence of trade costs in intra-regional trade.
This means that this person now spends relatively more on the domestic good than
before. This eﬀect is captured in the first and second term of equation (18).
The number of goods eﬀect: If a worker moves from the foreign to the domestic
region, firms will relocate, too. Because there are now more firms in the domestic
region and less in the foreign, the composition of the price index also changes. At
given prices, domestic consumers have fewer import goods to pay transport cost for
(and vice versa for the foreign consumer). This lowers the domestic price index for
industrial goods and rises the foreign one. If the domestic price index is lowered,
the relative price of domestic goods to the price index is increased. This decreases
ceteris paribus domestic demand for products of domestic firms. The reverse holds for
exports. This eﬀect is captured in the third and fourth term of equation (18). Because
these two eﬀects are the key to the understanding of agglomeration and convergence
in this model, we will repeat them looking from a diﬀerent ankle that coincides with
the graphical exposition that follows in this section.
Suppose that a worker moves from the smaller domestic to the bigger foreign
region (rather than vice versa as in the explanation above). On the one hand, the
migrated worker increases total income in the foreign region and reduces total income
in the domestic region. This typically reduces demand for the domestic firm, because
the migrated worker buys less goods from the former home region. This is an agglom-
eration force, because it raises domestic prices and wages at given foreign prices and
wages.
On the other hand, the decrease in the number of workers in the domestic
region reduces the number of firms and goods produced. The domestic CES price
index accounts for this eﬀect by an increase, because the composition of the index
changes towards foreign goods, which are more expensive because of the transport
cost and because of the higher labour cost in the bigger foreign region. The increase
in the domestic price index reduces the relative price for domestic goods. This increases
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Figure 2: Comparative Statics of Worker Migration
domestic demand for industrial goods and is thus a convergence force in the model,
because a decrease in domestic demand lowers domestic prices and wages at given
foreign prices and wages. It is ambiguous, i.e. dependent on the parameters of the
model, which force dominates (∂f/∂L ≶ 0). This can be demonstrated in figure
2. Figure 2 shows in panel (a) the agglomeration case. Suppose that starting from
the equal distribution equilibrium, workers move out continuously from the domestic
region making it the smaller region. If the emmigration causes a reduction in demand
for domestic goods, this causes prices and wages in the domestic region to fall at given
prices and wages in the foreign region. Hence, the f -schedule shifts leftward.
Additionally, the g-schedule twists anti-clockwise around the (w1 = 1, w2 = 1)-
point. If wages in the domestic region are smaller, than the emmigration will cause
a rise in world income which leads to excess demand in the market for agricultural
goods. In order to restore equilibrium, domestic wages have to fall at given foreign
wages. Both movements of the f - and the g-schedule lead to a fall of domestic wages
relative to foreign wages. Hence, the emmigration is self-enforcing. The economy ends
up at complete agglomeration (L=0).
Figure 2 shows in panel (b) the convergence case. Now, emmigration causes a
rise in domestic industrial goods demand which increases domestic prices and wages at
given foreign prices. Hence, the f -schedule shifts rightward. If wages in the domestic
region are higher than in the foreign region, then the emmigration causes a fall in
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Figure 3: Short Run Equilibrium Condition
world income which leads to excess supply in the market for agricultural products.
In order to restore equilibrium, domestic wages have to rise at given foreign wages.
The movements of both schedules together induce a rise in domestic wages relative to
foreign wages. Hence, the incentive to move out is reversed and the equal distribution
equilibrium is stable in the long run.
The last conclusion can graphically be demonstrated more clearly in figure 3.
Figure 3, panel (a) repeats the arrowed line from figure 2 (b). Panel 3 (b) is con-
structed from panel 3 (a) by drawing a ray through the origin to the equilibrium wage
combination for a specific worker distribution. Taking the tangens of the angle of this
array gives the relative nominal wage
³
w2(L)
w1(L)
´
at this labour distribution. Repeating
this procedure for every possible labour distribution gives a schedule depicting the
relative nominal wage as a function of the labour distribution. This curve is drawn in
panel (b) and describes the short run equilibrium condition.46 The points A,B,C
and D correspond in the two panels of figure 3. The schedule is either upward or
downward sloping.
Still, this is not the end of the story, because so far only relative nominal wages
are considered. A migration decision is rather based on relative real wages. Let’s look
at the long run steady state condition: equal real wages.
46The mathematical derivation of this line is found in appendix D and denoted h (W,L).
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Figure 4: Agglomeration or Convergence
'1 ≡
w1
P1 (p1, p2, n)
μ =
w2
P2 (p1, p2, n)
μ ≡ '2 (19)
Let’s suppose that all nominal wages and prices are equal in both regions.
Does this guarantee equal real wages, too? The answer is no. If the domestic region
is smaller, i.e. has less workers and less industrial products, more industrial products
have to be imported. This raises the domestic CES price index above the foreign one,
because the transport cost mark-up has to be paid for more products.But then the
domestic real wage is smaller than the foreign. Hence, the domestic nominal wage
needs to be bigger than the foreign nominal wage for the real wages to be equal, if
the domestic region has less workers. The equal real wage condition is downward
sloping in the
³
w2
w1
;L
´
-space and is depicted in figure 4 as the solid line.47 Real wages
are bigger in the foreign region above this line (agglomeration) and bigger in the
domestic region below this line (convergence).
Chapter 3 of this thesis proves that three cases are possible. The short run
equilibrium condition is always above the equal real wage condition; then real wages are
bigger in the bigger region and workers of the smaller region have an incentive to move
to the bigger region thus self-enforcing the agglomeration process (see figure 4, panel
a). The short run equilibrium condition is always below the equal real wage condition;
then real wages are bigger in the smaller region and the equal distribution equilibrium
47The mathematical form of the equal real wage condition is derived in appendix E and is denoted
k (W,L).
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is dynamically stable (see figure 4, panel c).48 The equal real wage condition cuts the
short run equilibrium condition from above (see figure 4, panel b). There will be an
unstable intermediate steady state equilibrium S1 next to the symmetric steady state
equilibrium S2. For any labour distribution smaller than the one corresponding to
S1, there is an agglomeration process going on. For any labour distribution greater
than the one corresponding to S1, the system converges to the equal distribution
equilibrium.49 This case can be considered a “poverty trap”, because it depends on
the initial distribution of industries, whether a region becomes industrialized or not.
The precise conditions for each of these cases will be given in chapter 3, propo-
sition 2. If an economy starts out with low scale economies (low σ), a big agricultural
sector (high μ), and high transport costs (low τ), then the economy is likely to be
described by the convergence scenario (figure 4 (a)). As transport costs are falling,
industries are developing, and economies of scale are rising, the economy will most
likely end up in the agglomeration scenario (figure 4 (c)). Whether the “poverty trap”
scenario is passed on the way of development (figure 4 (b)), depends on whether the
first industries started to be spread even in plane or were already clustered in a few
places. Then, the tendency of clustering might have appeared in some regions, whereas
it might not have appeared in others. This intermediate stage (poverty trap) might
explain diﬀerent stages in the degree of agglomeration.
2.6 Summary
This paper analyses the reasons for agglomeration or convergence in a typical geog-
raphy and trade model such as Krugman (1991). There are two agglomeration forces
(income eﬀect or home market eﬀect and price index eﬀect) and one convergence force
(number of goods eﬀect).
Income eﬀect: If one worker moves from the smaller to the larger region,
then this worker will spend more on goods produced in the larger region than before,
48These two cases are reported in Krugman (1991).
49This case is found in Urban (1996).
45
because there are no transport costs to be paid for these goods anymore. Hence, there
is ceteris paribus excess demand for goods produced in the larger region. This will
raise producer prices and wages and ceteris paribus attract even more workers to the
larger region.
Number of goods eﬀect: If one worker moves from the smaller to the larger
region, then output of the existing firms in the larger region rises. Profits increase,
since fixed cost are spread over more units of a good, new firms enter, and the number
of goods increases in the larger region, whereas the number of goods falls in the smaller
region. Next, the price index falls in the larger region, because trade costs have to
be paid for less goods than before. Conversely, the price index rises in the smaller
region. Hence the ratio of the producer price divided by the consumer price index falls
in the larger region and rises in the smaller at given producer prices. This induces
excess supply in the goods markets of the larger region and excess demand in the
goods markets of the smaller region. Therefore producer prices and wages rise in the
smaller region and the worker has an incentive to move back.
The price index eﬀect: Since the consumer price index is ceteris paribus
larger in the smaller region (see above), real wages will be smaller in the smaller
region attracting workers to the larger region.
Agglomeration occurs, if the income eﬀect and the price index eﬀect over-
compensate the number of goods eﬀect; convergence of manufacturing distribution
occurs, if the number of goods eﬀect overcompensates the income and price index
eﬀect.
There exists an interior equilibrium for some parameter range. If a region has
a certain critical mass of industries, industries tend to spread equally in space. If a
region has not this critical mass of industries (“poverty trap”), this region is going to
dry out of industries completely.
Finally, it is shown that the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model behaves like a pure
exchange economy with two heterogeneous types of consumers, three goods and the
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following properties: 1) Each type of consumer is equally endowed with one good,
owes the world endowment of the second, and nothing of the third. 2) The consumer
strictly prefers the good he is well endowed with to the good he is not endowed with. A
corollary of this analogy is that agglomeration can occur in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
model even at zero transport cost, if consumers prefer domestically produced goods.
47
References
d’Aspremont, Claude, Rudolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, and Louis-Andre´ Ge´rard-Varet,
(1996), On the Dixit-Stiglitz Model of Monopolistic Competition, American
Economic Review, Vol. 86, p. 623-629.
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, (1995), Economic Growth, McGraw Hill,
New York.
Davis, Donald R., (1998), The home market, trade, and industrial structure, Ameri-
can Economic Review, forthcoming.
Dixit, Avinash K., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, (1977), Monopolisitic Competition and
Optimum Product Diversity, American Economic Review, Vol. 67, 297-
308.
Dixit, Avinash K., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, (1993), Monopolistic Competition and
Optimal Product Diversity: Reply, American Economic Review, Vol. 83,
No. 1, p. 302-304.
Fujita, Masahisa, and Jacque-Francois Thisse, (1996), Economics of Agglomeration,
CEPR-Discussion Paper No. 1344.
Krugman, Paul R., (1980), Scale Economies, Product Diﬀerentiation, and the Pattern
of Trade, American Economic Review, Vol. 70, p. 950-959.
Krugman, Paul R., (1991), Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 3, p. 483-499.
Krugman, Paul R., and Anthony J. Venables, (1995), Globalization and the Inequality
of Nations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 4, p. 857-880.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, (1995), Complementarities and Cumulative Processes in Mod-
els of Monopolistic Competition, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 33,
p. 317-334.
Norman, Victor D., and Anthony J. Venables, (1995), International Trade, Factor
Mobility, and Trade Costs, The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, p. 1488-1504.
Venables, Anthony J., (1995), Economic Integration and the Allocation of Firms,
American Economic Review, Vol. 85, No. 2, p. 296-300.
Yang, Xiaokai, and Ben J. Heijdra, (1993), Monopolistic Competition and Optimal
Product Diversity: Comment, American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No.
1, p. 295-301.
48
Appendix
Appendix 1: Definition of Price Indices
The explicit functional forms for the price indices are:
P1 (w1, w2, L) = γβ
µ
L
μ
w1−σ1 + τ
σ−1
µ
μ− L
μ
¶
w1−σ2
¶ 1
1−σ
(20)
P1 (p1, p2, n) =
³
np1−σ1 +
³ μ
ασ
− n
´
(p2/τ)
1−σ
´ 1
1−σ
P2 (w1, w2, L) = γβ
µµ
μ− L
μ
¶
w1−σ2 + τ
σ−1L
μ
w1−σ1
¶ 1
1−σ
P2 (p1, p2, n) =
³³ μ
ασ
− n
´
p1−σ2 + n (p1/τ)
1−σ
´ 1
1−σ
.
Appendix 2: The Excess Demand Functions
The equation system (11) is written in explicit functional form:
p−σ1
¡
p1n x +1−μ2
¢
np1−σ1 + τσ−1
¡ μ
ασ − n
¢
p1−σ2
+
p−σ1
¡
p2
¡ μ
ασ − n
¢
x +1−μ
2
¢
np1−σ1 + τ 1−σ
¡ μ
ασ − n
¢
p1−σ2
=
x
μ
(21)
τσ−1p−σ2
¡
p1n x +1−μ2
¢
τσ−1np1−σ1 +
¡ μ
ασ − n
¢
p1−σ2
+
p−σ2
¡
p2
¡ μ
ασ − n
¢
x +1−μ
2
¢
np1−σ1 + τσ−1
¡ μ
ασ − n
¢
p1−σ2
=
x
μ
p1 · n+ p2 ·
³ μ
ασ
− n
´
=
μ
x
.
Appendix 3: Partial Derivatives of Excess Demand Functions
This part of the appendix calculates the signs of the partial derivatives of the excess
demand functions of equation system (11) which is written in explicit functional form
in appendix B.
1) The determination of the sign of ∂f∂p1 :
We will first rewrite the first equation in (21) in the following way:
f =
f1
f2
+
f3
f4
− x, (22)
where we used the notation n1 and n2 and defined
f1 ≡ μ
µ
x +
1− μ
2p1n1
¶
> 0,
f2 ≡ 1 + τσ−1
µ
n2
n1
¶µ
p2
p1
¶1−σ
> 0,
f3 ≡ τσ−1μy2 > 0,
f4 ≡ τσ−1n1p1 + n2p1−σ2 pσ1 > 0.
49
The partial derivatives are thus:
∂f1
∂p1
= − 1− μ
2p21n1 x
< 0, (23)
∂f2
∂p1
= τσ−1 (σ − 1)
µ
n2
n1
¶
p1−σ2 p
σ−2
1 > 0,
∂f3
∂p1
= 0,
∂f4
∂p1
= τσ−1n1 + σn2p1−σ2 p
σ−1
1 > 0.
The partial derivative of f is then given by the following expression:
∂f
∂p1
=
∂f1
∂p1
f2 − f1 ∂f2∂p1
f22
− f3
f24
∂f4
∂p1
< 0, (24)
which is readily checked to be negative. Q.E.D.
2) The determination of the sign of ∂f∂p2 :
First, we slightly rewrite (22) by defining
∼
f3 and
∼
f4 to replace f3 and f4, respectively:
∼
f3 ≡ μτσ−1p−σ1
µ
p2 · n2· x +1− μ
2
¶
> 0, (25)
∼
f4 ≡ τσ−1n1p1−σ1 + n2p1−σ2 > 0.
Then, we can formulate the following partial derivatives:
∂f1
∂p2
= 0, (26)
∂f2
∂p2
= τσ−1 (1− σ)
µ
n2
n1
¶
p1−σ1 p
−σ
2 < 0,
∂
∼
f3
∂p2
= μτσ−1p−σ1 n2 x> 0,
∂
∼
f4
∂p2
= (1− σ)n2p−σ2 < 0.
The partial derivative of f is then given by the following expression:
∂f
∂p2
= − f1
f22
∂f2
∂p2
+
∂
∼
f 3
∂p2
∼
f4 −
∼
f3
∂
∼
f 4
∂p2
∼
f
2
4
> 0, (27)
which is readily checked to be positive. Q.E.D.
The sign of the partial derivative ∂f/∂L is ambiguous. The signs of the partial deriva-
tives of g (p1, p2, L) can be readily seen from the 3rd equation of (21).
Appendix 4: Goods Market Equilibrium Condition
This part of the appendix derives an implicit functional form of the goods market
equilibrium condition in W -L-space which is repeatedly shown in figures 3 and 4.
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Reformulating the first two equations from appendix B by using (5) and (6) and (7)
yields the following equation system which guarantees goods market equilibrium for
domestic industrial products and agricultural products:
μ = w1L+ (μ− L)w2, (28)
1 =
w−σ1
¡
w1L+ 1−μ2
¢
L
μw
1−σ
1 + τσ−1
³
μ−L
μ
´
w1−σ2
+
τσ−1w−σ1
¡
w2 (μ− L) + 1−μ2
¢
τσ−1Lμw
1−σ
1 +
³
μ−L
μ
´
w1−σ2
.
Expressing this system of equations in relative wages W = w2w1 and rearranging yields:
³
L+ 1−μ
2w1
´
³
L
μ + τ
σ−1
³
μ−L
μ
´
W 1−σ
´ + τσ−1
³
W · (μ− L) + 1−μ
2w1
´
³
τσ−1Lμ +
³
μ−L
μ
´
W 1−σ
´ = 1, (29)
L+W (μ− L)
μ
=
1
w1
.
Plugging the second into the first equation of (29) allows to define an implicit function
h (W,L) in the relative nominal wage W and the labour distribution L, which fully
characterises goods market equilibrium in both sectors:
h (W,L) ≡ 2μL+ (1− μ) (L+W (μ− L))
(L+ τσ−1 (μ− L)W 1−σ) (30)
+
τσ−1 (2μW (μ− L) + (1− μ) (L+W (μ− L)))
(τσ−1L+ (μ− L)W 1−σ) − 2 = 0.
The implicit functional form h (W,L) can be solved for L giving two solutions. Only
one of them can be in positive prices because of the uniqueness of the short run
equilibrium (Proof see Urban (1996), proposition 1). Hence, the short run equilibrium
condition must be either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing inW−
L-space. By inspection of the algebraic form of the solution to L that is a rational
function, the schedule of h (W,L) must also be continuous.
Appendix 5: Equal Real Wage Condition
This part of the appendix gives a functional form for the equal real wage condition in
figures 3, 4 and 5. The definition of the relative real wage can be rewritten in terms
of the nominal real wage and the labour distribution by using (20) and (19):
' (L,W ) =
(τσ−1L+ (μ− L)W 1−σ)
μ
1−σ
W (L+ τσ−1 (μ− L)W 1−σ)
μ
1−σ
. (31)
In the steady state, the relative real wage needs to be equal to one (' (L,W ) = 1).
This equation is solved for L and an implicit function k (W,L) in W and L is defined
for which the real wage is one:
k (W,L) ≡ −
μ
³
W 1−σ − τσ−1W (1−σ)(1+
1
μ)
´
τσ−1 −W 1−σ −W
1−σ
μ + τσ−1W (1−σ)(1+
1
μ)
− L = 0. (32)
This is the implicit functional form for the equal real wage condition used in figure 4.
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3 Increasing Returns and Economic Geography: An
Analytical Note∗
Abstract
This paper provides an analytical solution to the Krugman (1991a) model explaining
industry agglomeration. It is shown there exists a unique short-run equilibrium and
multiple long-run equilibria. The latter proves the existence of a “poverty trap” in
this model: depending on the initial level of industries we will either see industries
spreading evenly in the plane,or moving away from one of the regions. However, it is
also shown that this “poverty trap” will not appear if the economy starts developing
from an equal distribution of industries.
JEL Classification: F12, R60.
Keywords: convergence, agglomeration, poverty trap.
–––––––––––––––—
∗The author thanks Niels Blomgren-Hansen, Karsten Junius, Jeﬀrey Nilsen and Pascalis
Raimondos-Møller for their comments. Usual caveats apply.
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3.1 Introduction
The economics of agglomeration have become a growing field of theoretical research.50
Problems of industry agglomeration are also attracting more and more attention by
applied economists. An explanation of agglomeration processes is provided by geog-
raphy and trade models of the Krugman (1991a) type. These models are appealing,
because (i) they endogenously generate a cumulative process, similar to the one infor-
mally described in Myrdal (1957), (ii) they do not rely on (unobservable) exogenous
externalities, and (iii) they are based on internal increasing returns to scale that is
thought to be an important source for agglomeration among regional economists (see
Fujita and Thisse, 1996).
Yet, these models lack the analytical rigor that can be found in corresponding
models with constant returns to scale production.51 The reason is that these models
are based on a non-linear equation system which does not necessarily obey the standard
convexity assumptions and may therefore yield multiple equilibria. A consequence is
that the literature is often either based on numerical simulations (e.g. Venables, 1996),
or on the analysis of corner solutions (e.g. Krugman, 1991a). If geography and trade
models are analytically rigorous, then they usually rely on factor price equalization
ruling out some agglomeration and convergence forces (e.g. Helpman and Krugman,
1985, and Martin and Rogers, 1995).
The purpose of this paper is to give a complete analytical treatment of the sem-
inal geography and trade model by Krugman (1991a). In doing so, we uncover some
interesting properties of the model that explain the existence of a “poverty trap”. In
Krugman’s model, the relocation of industries between two regions is driven by worker
migration due to real wage diﬀerences. Krugman (1991a) concentrates on the case, in
which it pays for a firm to attract workers to a region that had no industries before
(total agglomeration). Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1995) analyze
the case, in which it pays for a firm to defect from an equal distribution of industries
50A recent survey on the economics of agglomeration is Fujita and Thisse (1996).
51See, for example, Norman and Venables (1995).
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(symmetry-breaking). The contribution of this paper is to find analytically all steady
state industry distributions in between these two extreme cases. Furthermore, we are
able to describe the industry reallocation dynamics at any initial distribution of in-
dustries. In doing so, we identify a particular parameter range for which a “poverty
trap” arises: if a region has a certain initial threshold level of industries, they tend to
spread evenly in the plane (convergence); On the contrary, if a region does not have
this threshold level, all its industries move away (total agglomeration). In this sense,
the model shows that initial conditions matter in Krugman’s (1991a) model not only
for which region is drying out of industries (determination of the “winner” region), but
also whether industries agglomerate or converge (threshold property of the agglom-
eration process). The integration of “similar” regions (e.g. European Community)
causes convergence of industry distribution, the integration of a region with a lot of
industries and one with just a few (e.g. German unification) causes agglomeration.
Finally, we show that the “poverty trap” case will not appear if the economy
starts developing from an equal distribution of industries. In this particular case, the
analysis of symmetry-breaking, as described in Venables (1995) and Krugman and
Venables (1995), is suﬃcient to fully characterize the model.
The mathematical problem solved in this paper is the determination of the exact
number of equilibria in a simple fixed point problem with multiple solutions. The well-
known fixed point theorems provide little help for this problem, because they prove
the uniqueness (non-uniqueness) of an equilibrium. We find a specific solution to this
problem for models based on polynomials (i.e. models with CES or Cobb-Douglas
functional forms). This solution applies not only to economic geography models, but
also to models that exhibit poverty traps and growth (chapter 5 of this thesis).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the
Krugman (1991a) model. Subsection 2.1 proves the uniqueness of the short-run equi-
librium and subsection 2.2 analyzes the long-run equilibrium and proves the existence
of a “poverty trap”. Some conclusions can be found in section 3.
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3.2 The Krugman (1991a) Model
The model has two sectors, two regions and two consumers. The two sectors — agricul-
ture and industry — diﬀer by their market form: the market for agricultural goods is
perfectly competitive; the market for industrial goods is monopolistically competitive.
Regions are defined as areas for which it is costless to trade industrial goods within
them, but costly to trade industrial goods across them. Consumers j = 1, 2 diﬀer
only by their place of residence. It is assumed that there is no short-run mobility
of production factors from one region to the other. However, mobility of production
factors is allowed in the long-run.
Consumers have identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions containing the agri-
cultural good and the aggregate basket of the industrial goods. The income share
attributed to the industrial goods basket is denoted by μ. The industrial goods basket
is further specified by a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) subutility function with σ denoting the
elasticity of substitution between varieties (σ > 1). The agricultural good is taken
as the numeraire. Based on these standard utility functions, the price index is well
known and it is given by the following expression:
Pj =
µ
ni
n1 + n2
(pexi )
1−σ +
nj
n1 + n2
p1−σj
¶ μ
1−σ
, i 6= j, (33)
where the number of goods in region i is denoted by ni; the domestic prices of firms in
region j are denoted by pj; and the c.i.f.-prices for export goods are denoted by pexi .
Both goods are produced using only labour. Furthermore, it is assumed that
there is factor specificity for industrial production by workers, and for agricultural
production by peasants. Peasants work according to a constant returns to scale tech-
nology. Workers work according to an increasing returns to scale technology, where
marginal cost is constant and where there exists some fixed cost. Firms are assumed
to have zero profits.
The sum of workers in both regions (L1 + L2) is normalised to μ. Thus, the
total amount of peasants is 1− μ and they are assumed to be equally distributed in
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both regions and immobile. Every peasant and worker supplies one unit of work and
earns a salary of 1, if peasant, and wi, if worker in region i.
Finally, there are transport cost of the Samuelson iceberg-type, such that only
a fraction τ of one produced unit of an industrial good arrives at its foreign destination
(0 < τ < 1). There are no transport cost for goods delivered to domestic customers
or for the agricultural goods.
3.2.1 The Short-Run Equilibrium
Having described briefly the model, we now present the economic relationships that
result from consumer optimization, firm optimization, labour market clearing, product
market clearing, and the zero profit condition.
Under the standard assumption that a firm does not take into account the
impact of its pricing decision on other firms’ pricing decisions and on regional income,
the pricing rule for the firm will be: 52
pi =
σ
σ − 1 · β · wi and p
ex
i =
σ
σ − 1 · β · wi/τ, (34)
where σ/ (σ − 1) is the mark-up of prices over marginal cost, and β is the reciprocal
of the marginal product of labour. Note, that the pricing decision for export goods
pexi requires the firm to take into account the additional transport cost.
The optimal output of the firm is determined by the zero profit condition:
xi =
α · (σ − 1)
β
≡x, (35)
where α is the fixed cost parameter. It is seen that the equilibrium output of the
firm is independent of the number of workers or the number of firms in a region.
The equilibrium number of firms per region follows from the labour market clearing
52This equation is an approximation which is only fairly good for a large number of firms (see the
discussion in Yang and Heijdra (1993), Dixit and Stiglitz (1993), and d’Aspremont et. al. (1996)).
The latter authors show that the mark-up of prices over marginal cost is underestimated by the above
approximation. Any correction for this would not change the principle story as long as there is a
positive relationship between prices and wages and a positive relationship between number of firms
and number of workers.
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conditions and the output decision:
ni =
Li
ασ
. (36)
If the number of workers increases in a region, workers drag industries with them and
the number of goods increases proportionally. Since profits are zero, aggregate income
yi in a region i will be the sum of income of all workers and peasants in that region:
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yi = wi · Li + 1− μ
2
= nipi x +
1− μ
2
. (37)
Finally, the conditions for equilibrium in the goods market are as follows: 54
μp−σ1 y1
n1p1−σ1 + tn2p
1−σ
2
+
tμp−σ1 y2
tn1p1−σ1 + n2p
1−σ
2
= x, (38)
(y1 + y2) (1− μ) = 1− μ, (39)
where, for notational simplicity, we write t = τσ−1. Equation (38) gives the market
clearing condition for the domestic industrial goods, adding up domestic demand and
exports of a firm and setting it equal to output. Equation (39) gives the market clearing
condition for the agricultural good: the demand for the agricultural good (which is
a constant fraction of the world income) equals the supply of the argicultural good
(which equals the total number of peasants).
The short-run equilibrium is described by (34), (36), (37), (38) and (39) that
determine wi, ni, yi, and pi for a given labour distribution Li and the parameters of
the model (τ, μ, σ).55 However, the above system might yield several solutions at a
given distribution of labour.56 In what follows, it is shown that only one of them is in
positive prices and quantities.
53The second equality sign holds, because workers income – or, in other words, labour cost –
equals firms sales in a region.
54The equilibrium condition for the foreign firm is omitted due to Walras’ law. This is the first
step, where we diﬀer from Krugman (1991a). He drops the equilibrium condition for the agricultural
sector instead. Our proceeding will allow us to summarize the whole model in a single equation.
55The parameters α and β will drop out on the way.
56To find an indication for multiple equilibria, insert first equation (37) into equations (38) and
(39). Second, suppose σ = 2. One of the two emerging equations entails a polynomial of degree 3
in prices. It is known that an equation system with such a polynomial does not necessarily entail a
unique solution. However, some solutions can be complex and thus economically irrelevant.
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Proposition 1: The equation system (34), (36), (37), (38) and (39) has a unique
solution for wi, ni, yi, and pi at a given labour distribution Li.
Proof: First, we note that (38) and (39) can be rewritten as a system of excess demand
functions g and f, where g ≡ g1+g2− x (with g1 and g2 being respectively the first and
second term at the left hand side of (38)) and f ≡ x1p1n1+x2p2n2−μ. It is easily seen
that the excess demand functions g and f fulfill the gross substitute property. This
means that g depends positively on the industrial price p2, and f depends positively
on both industrial prices p1 and p2 (at a given number of goods). However, for any
excess demand system that fulfills the gross substitute property there exists a unique
equilibrium price vector for a given number of goods in both regions (see proposition
17.F.3 in Mas-Colell, et.al. (1995), p. 613). Having shown that, all other endogenous
variables are linear transformations of prices and the number of goods and must thus
be unique, too. Q.E.D.
To facilitate the analysis, we define the relative nominal prices as p ≡ p2p1 and
the relative distribution of industries as n ≡ n2n1 . Because the relative distribution
of industries equals the relative labour distribution according to equation (36) and
relative prices of industrial goods equal relative industrial wages according to equation
(34), p describes also relative wages (p = w2w1 ) and n describes the relative distribution
of labour (n = L2L1 ). The system (38) and (39) can then be rewritten by using (37) as
follows:
μ
³
1 + 1−μ
2
· 1n1p1x
´
(1 + tnp1−σ)
+
tμ
³
np+ 1−μ
2
· 1n1p1x
´
(t+ np1−σ)
= 1 (40)
1
n1p1 x
=
1 + np
μ
Substituting the second equation into the first, and solving for n, we obtain a condition
that describes the goods market equilibrium as an implicit relationship of the relative
labour distribution n and the relative nominal wages p. We call this condition, the
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short-run equilibrium condition h (p, n):
h (p, n) : n =
1− μ+ (1 + μ) t2 − 2tpσ
p [1− μ+ (1 + μ) t2 − 2tp−σ] (41)
The h(p, n) function can be drawn in the p-n space.57 The symmetry point (p = 1, n =
1) will be a point of this function. The function can be either upward or downward
sloping in the p-n space.
3.2.2 The Long-Run Equilibrium
In the long-run workers are allowed to be mobile, moving to the region which pays the
highest real wage.58 To characterize the migration process at any labour distribution,
and thus the firm reallocation incentives, we write the arbitrage condition for the
steady state equilibrium:
'1 ≡
w1
P1
=
w2
P2
≡ '2 (42)
Using (33), (34), (36) and the definitions for p and n, we can rewrite this condition as
an implicit function k (p, n):
k (p, n) : n =
t− p
1−σ
μ
p1−σ
h
tp
(1−σ)
μ − 1
i (43)
We call the above the equal real wage condition. The symmetry point (p = 1, n = 1)
will be a point of this function. Furthermore, the k(p, n) function is always downward
sloping in the positive orthant of the p-n space.
Whether a worker will migrate or not depends on whether the short-run equi-
librium condition lies above or below the equal real wage condition. All cutting points
of the two curves are interior steady state equilibria. It is obvious that the symmetry
point is always a steady state. In what follows we derive the exact conditions un-
der which workers will migrate towards the one region or the other. A diagrammatic
illustration is provided later on.
57Without loss of generality, we define region 2 to be the region with the fewest workers (or an
equal number of workers). Then, we only need to consider the range 0 ≤ n ≤ 1.
58Real wage rates are identical to the value of the indirect utility function of a worker given a
distribution of workers. This follows immediately from the definitons of the CES-price index and the
indirect utility function, respectively.
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The full characterization of the long-run equilibria is approached in several
steps. First, a condition is derived that determines the parameter values for which the
symmetry point is a stable steady state.
Lemma 1: The symmetry point p = 1, n = 1 is a stable steady state equilibrium if
and only if csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0, where
csb (μ, τ, σ) = τσ−1 − 1− μ− σ (1− μ)
2
1 + μ− σ (1 + μ)2
Proof: See appendix 1.
If the symmetry point is a stable steady state, then there will occur convergence
of industry location in the neighbourhood of this point. If the symmetry point is
unstable, i.e. csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0, there will occur “symmetry-breaking”59 and the firms
and workers start relocating unevenly in the plane (agglomeration).
Second, we examine the condition for the existence of a corner solution, i.e.
L1 = 0 or L2 = 0. A corner solution is a stable equilibrium if and only if real wages
are lowest in the region where all industries have disappeared.
Lemma 2: Total agglomeration (either L1 = 0 or L2 = 0) is a stable steady state
equilibrium if and only if cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0, where
cta (μ, τ, σ) = 2− τμσ
£
(1 + μ) τσ−1 + (1− μ) τ−(σ−1)
¤
. (44)
Proof: See appendix 2.
The total agglomeration condition describes the set of parameters for which a
region dries out of industries completely.60 If the opposite inequality sign holds, i.e.
59Conditions for symmetry breaking are given in other models of the same type (see Venables,
1995, and Krugman and Venables, 1995).
60This condition, although diﬀerently derived, is identical to equation (26) in Krugman (1991a).
The economic meaning of the parameters μ, τ, and σ in this condition is the same as in Krugman
(1991a) and therefore we do not discuss it further.
60
cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0, then there will be convergence at n = 0, i.e. some firms will start
relocating from the region with the industries to the region without the industries.
Third, a relationship between the agglomeration/convergence conditions from
lemmas 1 and 2 is found.
Lemma 3: The parameter space fulfilling the condition for symmetry-breaking is a
subset of the parameter space fulfilling the condition for total agglomeration. Thus,
for any (μ, τ, σ) with 0 < μ ≤ 1, σ > 1, and 0 < τ < 1, the following is true:
csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0 =⇒ cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0 and
cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0 =⇒ csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0
Proof: See appendix 3.
The importance of this lemma is that there is agglomeration at n = 0 and
convergence at n = 1 for some parameters, but there are no allowed parameter values
for which there is convergence at n = 0 and agglomeration at n = 1.
Finally, the maximum number of interior steady states is determined.
Lemma 4: The system (41) and (43) has at most one interior steady state n∗ with
0 < n∗ < 1.
Proof: See appendix 4.
Using these four lemmas, the long-run equilibria can be fully characterized.
Proposition 2 does exactly that.
Proposition 2: (i) Workers and firms tend to agglomerate completely in one of the
two regions independently of the initial labour distribution, if
csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0.
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(ii) Workers and firms tend to spread even in both regions (convergence) independently
of the initial labour distribution, if
cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0.
(iii) There is an unstable intermediate steady state equilibrium at a firm distribution
n∗ with 0 < n∗ < 1 and two stable steady state equilibria at n = 0 and n = 1, if
csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0 < cta (μ, τ, σ) .
Proof: (i) If csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0, then there is agglomeration at n = 1 (lemma 1).
However, if that happens, then cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0 (lemma 3) and thus there must also be
agglomeration at n = 1 (lemma 2). But then there cannot exist any convergence in
between 0 < n < 1, because this would require at least two interior steady states. This,
however, contradicts lemma 4. Hence, if csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0, there must be agglomeration
for any labour distribution n.
(ii) If cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0, then there is convergence at n = 0 (lemma 2). However, if that
happens, then csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0 (lemma 3) and thus there must also be convergence
at n = 1 (lemma 1). But then there cannot exist any agglomeration in between
0 < n < 1, because this would require at least two interior steady states. This,
however, contradicts lemma 4. Hence, if cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0, there must be convergence
for any labour distribution n.
(iii) If csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0, there is convergence at n = 1 (lemma 1); then the schedule
of h (p, n) lies below the schedule of k (p, n) in p-n space for n slightly below 1. If
cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0, there is agglomeration at n = 0 (lemma 2). Then the schedule of
h (p, n) lies above the schedule of k (p, n) in p-n space for n = 0. Hence, there must
be at least one cutting point n∗ of the two schedules in between 0 and 1 (intermediate
value theorem). Because of lemma 4, there is exactly one. n∗ is unstable, because
n = 0 and n = 1 are stable at this parameter constellation. Q.E.D.
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Figure 5: Long Run Equilibria
Proposition 2 can be most easily demonstrated in figure 1. The three cases
in proposition 2 correspond to the three panels of figure 1. Panel (a) shows that
the short-run equilibrium condition h (p, n) is below the equal real wage condition
k (p, n) for all labour distributions. Real wages are higher in the larger region and
workers and firms of the smaller region have an incentive to move, reenforcing thus
the agglomeration process. This corresponds to case (i) in proposition 2.
Panel (b) shows that the short-run equilibrium condition h (p, n) is above the
equal real wage condition k (p, n) for all labour distributions. Real wages are higher
in the smaller region and the workers and firms tend to spread evenly in the plane
(convergence). This corresponds to case (ii) in proposition 2.61
Panel (c) shows that the short-run equilibrium condition h (p, n) is below the
equal real wage condition k (p, n), if the initial labour distribution n is below a critical
mass n∗. Then real wages are higher in the bigger region and the few industries in the
smaller region relocate to the bigger region (total agglomeration). On the contrary,
the short-run equilibrium condition h (p, n) is above the equal real wage condition
k (p, n), if the initial labour distribution n is above the critical mass n∗. Then, real
wages are higher in the smaller region and industries start to relocate evenly in the
plane (convergence). This corresponds to case (iii) in proposition 2.
61The cases (i) and (ii) are reported in form of simulations in figure 1 of Krugman (1991a). Note
that we derive the schedules of the functions h (v, z) and k (v, z) analytically. The precise curvature
of the two schedules in figure 1 is suggestive.
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The third case will be called a “poverty trap”. In the “poverty trap”, regions
that lack the critical mass of industries are stuck in this state because there is no
market force that could foster industrialization. If the region had more industries to
begin with, market forces would enforce a convergence process.62
The “poverty trap” shows that the location of industries might depend on initial
conditions. Even if all parameters — like preferences and technology — are the same,
convergence or agglomeration may take place depending on the initial distribution of
industries. History matters, not only in the determination of the region to be the
“winner”, but also in the determination of whether industries tend to agglomerate
or spread evenly in the plane.63 For example the rather underdeveloped Eastern
Germany lost a large proportion of its industries and its workers after unification
with West Germany.64 However, the integration of the rather homogeneous European
countries seems to enforce a convergence process.65 This observation may justify that
the EU requires new members to have a suﬃcient stage of development.66
Finally, the “poverty trap” case will not appear, if the economy starts develop-
ing with a symmetric distribution of industries. It follows from proposition 2 that the
condition of “symmetry-breaking” is then suﬃcient to fully characterize the model.
62The “poverty trap” is usually discussed in the context of growth models (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995, p. 49ﬀ, for an overview.) There, a poverty trap means that some countries are stuck
with a low level of the capital stock. If they had enough capital to begin with, they would converge to
the advanced nations. The reason is the switch from a diminishing returns to scale to an increasing
returns to scale technology. This is somewhat related to the result in this model. Here the poverty
trap arises, if a certain share of the increasing returns to scale and the constant returns to scale
sector is prevailed in the economy. A “poverty trap” arises also in Matsuyama (1991). His economic
interpretation of the “poverty trap” is similar to the one in this paper. However, the underlying story
is very diﬀerent.
63Krugman (1991b) shows that history or expectations might matter for the determination of the
“winner” region, if a forward looking migration process is assumed.
64See Lange and Pugh (1998).
65See Ben-David (1993).
66The model predicts also that an integration process which lowers trade cost may cause the
economy to move from the convergence case to the “poverty trap” case. This finding follows from
proposition 2. To see this, start from the convergence case (ii). Note that a suﬃciently small increase
in τ (decrease of trade cost) induces a rise in cta (μ, τ, σ) and a violation of the condition cta (μ, τ, σ) <
0 (which is most easily seen by simulating numerically equation (44)), but not necessarily a violation
of csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0, because we proved that the parameter set of case (iii) is non-empty. Therefore, a
decrease in trade cost τ may lead to a move from case (ii) (convergence case) to case (iii) (poverty
trap case) for some parameters μ and σ and some initial conditions n0 with 0 ≤ n0 ≤ 1.
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3.3 Conclusion
This paper gives a complete analytical solution to a monopolistic competition, increas-
ing returns to scale model with transport cost and mobile labour (Krugman, 1991a). It
is shown that this model has a unique short-run equilibrium. Furthermore, it is shown
that the long run equilibrium is characterized by three groups of parameter ranges:
(i) industries agglomerate completely in one of the two regions; (ii) industries tend
to spread evenly in the plane; (iii) it depends on the initial distribution of industries
whether agglomeration or convergence occurs (“poverty trap”).
The later finding shows that initial conditions matter in Krugman’s (1991a)
model not only for the determination of the “winner” region, but also for the de-
termination of agglomeration or convergence. However, the “poverty trap” case will
not appear, if the economy starts developing with a symmetric distribution of indus-
tries. The condition of “symmetry-breaking” is then suﬃcient to fully characterize
the model.
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Appendix
Appendix 1:
Taking the derivative of (41) and evaluating at the symmetry point, yields the following
expression:
dn
dp
¯¯¯¯
h(1,1)
=
1− μ+ (1 + μ) t2 − 2t (1− 2σ)
(1− t2)μ− (1− t)2
Taking the derivative of (43) and evaluating at the symmetry point, yields:
dn
dp
¯¯¯¯
k(1,1)
=
(1− σ) [1− μ+ t (1 + μ)]
(1− t)μ
The equal distribution is stable (convergence), if
dz
dv
¯¯¯¯
h(1,1)
<
dz
dv
¯¯¯¯
k(1,1)
.
Equalizing the two derivatives dndp
¯¯¯
h(1,1)
= dn(p)dp
¯¯¯
k(1,1)
and solving for t yields three
solutions. One is always negative (t = −1) and therefore economically irrelevant. The
other is t = 1, i.e. factor prize equalization holds in the absence of transport cost.
And the third is:
t =
1− μ− σ (1− μ)2
1 + μ− σ (1 + μ)2
This expression used in the conditions above gives the lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2:
The equal real wage condition for L1 = 0, L2 = μ is given in equation (43):
1
z
=
p1−σ
h
tp
1−σ
μ − 1
i
t− p
1−σ
μ
or equivalently by using (1/n) = L1/L2 = 0 and the definition of p = w2/w1 and
t = τσ−1:
w2
w1
= τμ
Using the definition for real wages of equation (42) and noting that the relative real
wage is one gives the condition for the relative price indices:
P2
P1
= τμ
From the short-run equilibrium condition (41), it follows that
1
n
=
p [1− μ+ (1 + μ) t2 − 2tp−σ]
1− μ+ (1 + μ) t2 − 2tpσ ,
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which yields for (1/n) = 0:
w2
w1
= p =
¡
0.5 (1− μ) t−1 + 0.5 (1 + μ) t
¢−(1/σ) .
The relative real wage at the total agglomeration point can thus be written as:
w1P2
w2P1
= τμ
¡
0.5 (1− μ) τ−(σ−1) + 0.5 (1 + μ) τσ−1
¢1/σ
By definition of total agglomeration the real wage in region 1 needs to be smaller than
the real wage in region 2, i.e.:
w1P2
w2P1
< 1
Consequently the condition can be stated as in lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3:
First, it is shown that the boundary planes of the two conditions from lemmas 1 and
2 do not intersect for allowed parameter constellations of τ, σ, μ:
cta (μ, τ, σ) = 0
csb (μ, τ, σ) = 0
The second equation is solved for τ and then plugged into the first expression to give:µ
(1− μ)[1− σ (1− μ)]
(1 + μ)[1− σ (1 + μ)]
¶ μσ
σ−1
µ
(1− μ)[1− σ (1− μ)]
1− σ (1 + μ) +
(1 + μ)[1− σ (1 + μ)]
1− σ (1− μ)
¶
= 2
This condition is dealt numerically. A grid search procedure in Mathematica shows
that μ = 0 or σ = 0 are the only two solutions to this equation. This implies that
there is no cutting point of the two equations for 0 < μ ≤ 1, and σ > 1.
Second, it is readily checked that there exist parameter constellations of τ, σ, and μ,
such that the three sets defined by
cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0 and csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0
cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0 and csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0
cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0 and csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0
are non-empty. If the boundary planes do not intersect, there can only be three non-
empty sets. See the illustration in figure 2. Figure 2 depicts the boundary planes
cta (μ, τ, σ) = 0 and csb (μ, τ, σ) = 0 for any arbitrary value of τ in the μ-σ space such
that they do not intersect. Then there can only be defined three distinct subspaces
by these two boundary planes. This implies that the joint conditions cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0
and csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0 describe an empty set. Hence, for any (μ, τ, σ) in the parameter
range holds:
csb (μ, τ, σ) ≥ 0 =⇒ cta (μ, τ, σ) > 0 and
cta (μ, τ, σ) ≤ 0 =⇒ csb (μ, τ, σ) < 0
Or in words: the condition for symmetry-breaking is a subset of the condition for total
agglomeration. (If symmetry-breaking occurs, then the system always ends up with
total agglomeration.) Q.E.D.
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Figure 6: Parameter Range
Appendix 4:
If the short-run equilibrium condition (41) and the equal real wage condition (43) are
set equal to each other and some terms are rearranged, a function in the variable p
emerges which needs only to be defined for positive wages (p > 0).
3X
i=1
aipbi + a4 = 0, (45)
where
a1 = −a2 = (1− μ)
¡
1− t2
¢
> 0
a3 = −a4 = t (1 + μ)
¡
1− t2
¢
> 0
b1 = −σ < 0
b2 =
1− σ
μ
< 0
b3 =
1− σ (1 + μ)
μ
< 0
If this equation was a polynomial, Descartes’ rule of sign67 would imply that this gives
at most 3 solutions for p > 0. However, Descartes’ rule of sign can still be applied in
the following way: Suppose the bi; i = 1, 2, 3 are rational numbers and N ∈ N is the
common denominator of them. Then set
∧
bi= biN and define a ξ such that p = ξN .
The equation (45) can thus be rewritten as
3X
i=1
aiξ
∧
bi + a4 = 0 (46)
which is a polynomial and Descartes’ rule of sign applies. If the polynomial (46) has at
most three solutions for ξ, then it must also have at most three solutions for p (because
there is a one to one mapping between p and ξ). One of them is p = 1. Suppose that
the other two were both interior solutions, i.e. p ∈ (0, 1). If that was true, then there
should also exist two solutions for p > 1, as any interior solution for p ∈ (0, 1) must
have a corresponding steady state for p > 1 (the result must be independent of the
label of the region). However, then there would exist more than 3 solutions. Thus, at
most one solution is interior.
Q.E.D.
67See Itoˆ (1993), p. 36 for a statement of Descartes’ rule of sign.
69
4 Neoclassical Growth, Manufacturing Agglomer-
ation, and Terms of Trade∗
Abstract
This paper presents an integrated view of economic growth, development traps, and
economic geography. We explain why there is income convergence among some coun-
tries (neoclassical regime) and income divergence among others (poverty trap regime).
Income convergence (divergence) and manufacturing industry diﬀusion (agglomera-
tion) are re-enforcing each other in a cumulative process. Moreover, trade openness
may trigger a catch-up process of an economy that is stuck in a “poverty trap”. This
catch-up is characterized by an increase in the investment-to-GDP ratio and an im-
provement of the terms of trade.
JEL Classification: F12, O41
Keywords: convergence, agglomeration, poverty trap, terms of trade, complemen-
tarities
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4.1 Introduction
Economic geography is the subfield of economics that explains the location of produc-
tion factors in space. Growth theory is the subfield of economics that explains national
or regional income both across time and across countries or regions. The theory of
development traps explains why some countries or regions lack behind. In this paper,
we will explore the interrelation of these three subfields.68,69
Such an interrelation between growth theory, the location of manufacturing
industries, and the backwardness of some regions or countries has been discussed in-
formally among others by Myrdal and Kaldor. In particular, Myrdal (1957) observes
and explains disparities both in regional and in national incomes. Additionally, Kaldor
(1967) builds his growth theory upon Myrdal’s work being more explicit about un-
derlying assumptions and transmission channels. We consider five stylised facts that
may capture the main theses of Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1967).
1) The same force that explains the agglomeration of economic activity in space
also explains national diﬀerences in income.
“The international inequalities are, of course, not dissimilar from the regional
inequalities within a country. We will also find that there is a close causal relation
between the two.” (Myrdal, 1957, p. 10)
2) This force is based on the “principle of circular and cumulative causation”
(Myrdal, 1957, chapter 2). Myrdal describes this principle as a self-enforcing pro-
cess that is explicitly thought of as an unstable equilibrium of a dynamical system
that drives one country or region into a best position and another country or region
68Lucas (1988) also accounts for all three subfields at once. He starts out with a theory that fits
the stylised facts of the US growth experience and explains within this setting 1) why income diﬀers
among countries, and 2) why international trade is not insuring convergence of income. Lucas (1988)
finally points out that “a national economy is a completely arbitrary unit to consider” (p. 37) and
accounts in his setting for the formation of cities by human capital externalities. We will base our
model on an endogenous explanation, rather than an externality, to explain many of the same stylised
facts.
69 Thereby we will follow a modeling approach that tries to capture many stylised facts in a model
mechanism that is as simple as possible. Of course, none of the stylised facts will be exclusively
explained by our model.
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into a worst position. Myrdal (1957, p. 27 ﬀ) notes further that migration, capital
movements, and trade may keep regional disparities growing.
3) The crucial assumption deviating from neoclassical theory is increasing re-
turns to scale production technology (Kaldor, 1967, lecture 1). Increasing returns
to scale applies, according to Kaldor, particularly to a wide range of manufacturing
industries and might become eﬀective not so much in terms of firm size, but in terms
of process and product diﬀerentiation.
“Economies of scale are derived not only from the expansion from any
single industry but from a general industrial expansion ...” (Kaldor, 1967,
p.14)
4) A possible transmission channel may be a terms-of-trade eﬀect.
“A cumulative process of the same general character, ..., will also be generated
by a change in the terms of trade of a community or a region, if the change is large
and persistent enough ...” (Myrdal, 1957, p. 26)
5) Another possible part of a transmission channel may be internal capital
accumulation of a region or country that drives up the return on investment in the
faster growing regions relative to the slower growing regions. In this sense investment
projects may be complements, rather than substitutes.
“The establishment of a new business or the enlargement of an old one widens
the market for others, as does generally the increase of income and demand. Rising
profits increase savings, but at the same time investments go up still more, which
again pushes up the demand and the level of profits. And the expansion process creates
external economies favourable for sustaining its continuation.” (Myrdal, 1957, p. 25)
We conclude: If the same force explains manufacturing industry agglomeration
and income disparities, this calls for a unified approach of growth theory and economic
geography. We will set up a model that captures all the above five theses. This raises a
question: Why should one try to model income divergence? After all, the neoclassical
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view of economic growth, i.e. (conditional) convergence of income at least among some
countries, has found large approval among mainstream economists.70
The recent empirical convergence literature is inconclusive of the (conditional)
convergence hypothesis (Barro, 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, and Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil, 1992 and Cohen, 1996) or the club convergence hypothesis (Bau-
mol, et. al., 1989, Durlauf and Johnson, 1996, and Quah, 1996) for both country and
regional data sets. On the one hand, Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992),
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and Cohen (1996) find that the average country or
region converges conditionally on structural characteristics of the economies. On the
other hand, Quah (1997) notes that the population of the converging regions/countries
might be double peaked, thus supporting the club convergence hypothesis which says
that initial conditions also matter. Additionally, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) re-
ject the conditional convergence hypothesis in favour of multiple regimes or stages of
development in a cross section analysis.71 Quah (1993) notes also that conditional
convergence of the average country in a regression analysis is compatible with outlier
countries that do not converge.72
The theory of development traps explains income of these countries that do not
converge to a “rich country” steady state.73 However, given that there is a theory on
economic growth that predicts conditional convergence, and a theory on development
traps that predicts some sort of divergence, one may pose the following question:
When is a country described by the first theory and when by the second? To answer
this question, a unified approach may prove helpful having a “neoclassical regime”
that has all the properties of a neoclassical growth model, having a “poverty trap
70Independently of the empirical convergence literature, there is other empirical evidence support-
ing the neoclassical growth model. Jones (1995) and Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the time
series properties of endogenous growth models are inconsistent with the data and that the growth
regressions are unrobust with respect to most independent variables except investment. Furthermore,
Young (1995) shows that the East Asian growth miracles can be explained by factor accumulation in
the spirit of the neoclassical growth model, rather than by total factor productivity growth. However,
Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) claim reduced empirical relevance of the Solow model on basis
of GMM-estimation.
71Jones (1997) adds that the relatively rich countries tend to converge, whereas the relatively poor
countries tend to converge from the US per capita income levels.
72The classical example is the Italian Mezzogiorno - a region of relative and absolute decline over
decades. See Rauch (1997).
73Surveys on poverty trap models are Azariadis (1996) and Galor (1996).
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regime” that explains backwardness, and having a testable condition under which
one or the other regime prevails. This paper attempts to provide such an approach.
Our first contribution will be to integrate Myrdal’s and Kaldor’s view on eco-
nomic growth, development traps and the location of production factors - summarized
in the five theses above - into mainstream economics without any sacrifice of neoclas-
sical theory. Additionally, we will state a testable condition under which the one or
the other regime applies.
Our second contribution will be to focus on a new agglomeration process of
manufacturing industries among countries that is based on a mutual interaction with
capital accumulation and growth. Agglomeration of economic activity on diﬀerent
levels like city, region, or nation may be explained by diﬀerent agglomeration forces.74
Cities may be formed by localized intermediate inputs (Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita
(1988), Rivera-Batiz (1988), and in a growth setting Englmann and Walz (1995)).
Disparities among regions may be caused by factor movements such as worker mi-
gration (Krugman, 1991a), or forward and backward linkages caused by intermediate
goods (Venables, 1996). Internationally, frictionless factor movements are less likely
to happen than interregionally.75 But what causes then an unequal distribution of
manufacturing industries among countries? One answer is specialization of countries
in diﬀerent sectors (e.g. Krugman and Venables, 1995); another one is information
externalities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991); and a third answer is R&D location
decisions (Martin and Ottaviano, 1996). The simplest explanation is, however, that
there are more manufacturing firms in one country relative to another, because this
country has accumulated more capital. This alone does not suﬃce for an explanation.
The missing part is how firm agglomeration feeds back on diverging capital accumu-
lation. How does an increase of agglomeration lead to higher growth of a country
relative to another, and higher growth to even higher firm agglomeration? We will
74Fujita and Thisse (1996) survey the literature on agglomeration economics. We consider only
endogenous explanations in cumulative processes, such that completely identical countries end up
diverging from each other if there is just a small disturbance (idiosyncratic shock).
75See Krugman and Venables (1995).
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explain this feed-back with a terms-of-trade eﬀect.76
Our third contribution will be to explain how trade-liberalization triggers a
catch-up process. It is obvious that the agglomeration forces depend crucially on
the costs of bridging distances (e.g. transport cost, tariﬀs, information costs, etc.),
because otherwise location does not matter. If agglomeration happens at a high level
of trade costs and convergence at a low level, and manufacturing agglomeration or
convergence feed through on growth, then we have established a (new) nexus between
trade-liberalization and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief verbal
description of the model and its mechanics, and compares related literature; section
3 gives the formal model set-up; section 4 solves the model for the steady states;
section 5 provides a stability analysis; section 5.1 discusses the neoclassical growth
regime; section 5.2 discusses the “poverty trap” regime; section 5.3 gives the model
implications for economic geography; and section 6 concludes.
4.2 A Brief Model Description
Our model is a synthesis of an economic geography model (Krugman, 1991a) and a
neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956, and others). There are two countries that have
a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition production sector with increasing
returns on plant level. Labour and capital are immobile. Capital is a durable goods
composite of all varieties. Investment is taken literally as foregone consumption. There
is intra-industry trade, although trade costs segment the product markets in the two
countries and trade is assumed to be balanced. Consequently, the only linkage between
the two countries are the terms of trade.
The mechanics of the model are best understood in a thought experiment.
Suppose two identical countries grow symmetrically having a capital stock of identical
size. For some reason (idiosyncratic shock), country 1’s capital stock grows faster than
76An alternative nexus is given recently in Ben-David and Loewy (1998) based on cross-country
technology spillovers embedded in trade flows.
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country 2’s at one time period. This will increase the number of firms in country 1
relative to country 2 given that output per firm remains constant.77 Because of trade
costs, there is a home market bias in consumption of goods. Additionally, income
is higher in country 1, because there is more capital. Hence, there will be stronger
demand for any typical variety in country 1 relative to any typical variety in country
2, whereas relative supplies for a typical variety do not change. This will increase
country 1’s producer price of a typical variety relative to country 2’s (terms-of-trade
eﬀect).
The savings and investment decision in each country is based on the present
and future real interest rate which is equal to the real rental rate of capital. The real
rental rate in each country at a given point in time is influenced by three eﬀects: (i)
The higher producer prices in country 1 allow ceteris paribus for higher rental rates in
country 1 (agglomeration force I). (ii) There are less goods to be imported in country
1. Therefore, there are less trade costs to be paid and the consumption price index is
thus lower in country 1. This means - everything else equal - that the real interest rate
is higher in country 1 (agglomeration force II). (iii) The capital-labor ratio is higher
in country 1. By capital-labour substitutability, this implies a higher wage-rental rate
in country 1 (convergence force). The net eﬀect of the three forces turns out to be
ambiguous and depends on the level of trade costs.
Suppose the real rental rate in country 1 decreases faster than the one in country
2 over the entire transition path towards the steady state (spatial substitutability of
investment). Then, investment will be lower in country 1 over the entire transition
path and the two capital stocks will eventually converge over time. This implies income
convergence and describes thus the neoclassical regime. Suppose, on the contrary, that
the real rental rate decreases slower in country 1 than in country 2 over the entire time
path (spatial complementarity of investment). Then, future investment will be higher
77This is a standard result in a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) set-up due to the assumption of CES utility
functions and constant variable cost. Suppose there is an expansion in total income. Then demand
for each single good is rising. This rises profits for all (symmetric) firms, because the fixed cost can
be spread over a larger output. However, the increase in profits causes new firms to enter, such that
the original increase in income is now spread over more goods. The amount of income spent on a
single good falls back to the original level. Therefore, output of a single firm is a constant in this
set-up.
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in country 1. This increases further the terms of trade in country 1. Thus, the real
rental rate gap might become even bigger self-enforcing the faster capital accumulation
in country 1. The cumulative process will eventually stop as the convergence force will
begin to dominate at some degree of divergence. This implies income divergence and
describes thus the “poverty trap” regime. If in this regime the capital stock is higher in
country 1 at any point of time, then a fixed firm size implies an agglomeration of firms
in country 1. Hence, a new explanation for manufacturing industry agglomeration is
found that is based both on national capital accumulation and a terms-of-trade eﬀect
in a cumulative process.
Our model builds upon the literature on big push and poverty traps which was
promoted in an influential formal model by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). We
share the features of increasing returns technology and demand spillovers to trigger
self-enforcing growth processes. However, we pose this idea into an international
context allowing us to discuss the importance of trade barriers, and home-market size,
and the role of neighbouring countries in boosting or inhibiting growth.
Gali (1995) builds into a model with monopolistic competition an investment
complementarity by a competition eﬀect that drives a wedge between the physical
marginal product of capital and the marginal revenue product of capital. Instead
of the competition eﬀect in a closed economy, we use a terms-of-trade eﬀect in a
two country model to generate a relative investment complementarity rather than an
absolute one.78
Our model is also related to Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1995) which in-
spired our model set-up and Baldwin and Seghezza (1996). These models have similar
production, consumption and market structures as ours. However, their focus is on
dynamic gains of trade and on the investment creation of trade liberalization in the
symmetric country case. They rule out terms-of-trade eﬀects and exclude the cumu-
78That is a rise in the relative capital stock of two countries rises the ratio of real rental rates,
whereas in Gali (1995) an absolute rise in the capital stock rises (locally) the absolute value of the
real rental rate.
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lative process that we focus on.79
4.3 The Model Set-up
There are two consumers which diﬀer only by their place of residence in two countries
(j = 1, 2). A standard logarithmic intertemporal utility function Uj is assumed80 that
is defined on a consumption basket Cj:
Uj =
∞Z
0
e−λt lnCjdt, (47)
where λ is the time preference rate, and t is a time index in continuous time.81 The
consumption basket Cj of a consumer j is of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type and is
defined on all domestic and foreign produced varieties with an elasticity of substitution
denoted σ (σ > 1):
Cj =
⎛
⎝
njX
ij=1
c
σ−1
σ
ijj
n1 + n2
+
nkX
ik=1
c
σ−1
σ
ikj
n1 + n2
⎞
⎠
σ
σ−1
, (48)
where the number of goods produced in country j are indexed ij = 1j, ..., nj, and
cijj and cikj, j, k = 1, 2, k 6= j, are consumer j’s consumption of the varieties ij and
ik produced in country j and k, respectively. Additionally, there is no international
borrowing and lending and trade will have to be balanced.82
79Very recently, Baldwin (1998), Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano (1998), and Baldwin and Forslid
(1997,1998) expell the same idea of bifurcation of income convergence/divergence behavior of two
economies in dependence of trade cost in a model with monopolistic competition and increasing
returns. However, our engine of growth is capital accumulation, and our convergence force Solow’s
(1956) capital-labor substitutability assumption, whereas the papers above use technological progress
as engine of growth and the extent of competition eﬀect of economic geography models (Krugman,
1991a) as convergence force. Consequently, trade openness triggers income divergence in Baldwin,
Martin, and Ottaviano (1998), whereas in our model trade openness triggers income convergence.
Also, a larger home market increases firm profits and R&D activity in the papers mentioned above,
whereas a larger home market induces a demand bias towards domestic goods and rises the domestic
terms of trade in our model.
80All results remain valid, if an isoelastic intertemporal utility function is used. However, mathe-
matical proofs would be more complicated.
81We suppress the time index whenever obvious.
82The assumption of balanced trade has a long tradition in the trade and growth literature: e.g.
Stiglitz (1970) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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With monopolistic competition, each variety ij will be produced by a diﬀerent
firm ij. Firms diﬀer only by their location. Therefore, firms within a country j are
symmetric and the index ij for firm i in country j can be collapsed to j denoting a
typical firm in country j. The production technology is a Cobb-Douglas production
function with fixed cost that gives rise to increasing returns to scale at plant level. In
particular, α units of inputs vj in form of a basket of labour lj and capital kj are used
to install the production process every day (maintenance work) and β units of the
input basket are used to produce each unit of goods for the domestic and the foreign
market xj:
vj = α+ βxj and vj = kδj l
1−δ
j , (49)
where δ (0 < δ < 1) denotes the income share of capital.83
We assume as in Baldwin, Forslid and Haaland (1995) that investment and
capital are the same composite of industrial goods as is consumption and goods can
be used both for consumption and investment:
Ij =
.
Kj=
⎛
⎝
njX
ij=1
ι
σ−1
σ
ijj
n1 + n2
+
nkX
ik=1
ι
σ−1
σ
ikj
n1 + n2
⎞
⎠
σ
σ−1
, (50)
where Ij is the investment aggregate used by the firms in country j to increase the
capital stock Kj of country j, a dot denotes the time derivative of a variable, and ιijj
and ιikj, j, k = 1, 2, k 6= j, are demand of the firms in country j for investment goods
produced by a firm ij and ik in country j and k, respectively. A unit of capital, i.e. a
machine, may be assembled at zero cost in diﬀerent ways from time-varying product
spaces, but once it is assembled it performes the same service. A larger product
space does not allow for more productive capital (no Smithian growth).84 Note that
we do not allow for the usual depreciation of capital. One can think of capital as a
83It will be this particular type of the production function that guarantees both constancy of factor
shares (Kaldor, 1963), and constant returns to scale on industry level (Burnside, 1996).
84Smithian growth, i.e. the cost reduction from larger market size and increased specialisation, is
discussed in Kelly (1997) in the context of economic geography and growth.
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durable composite of intermediate input goods that is permanently maintained. The
maintenance cost will show up in the fixed cost parameter α of the production function.
Additionally, we assume free firm entry and exit which keeps profits at zero.
Production factors are immobile.85 For simplicity, labour supply is inelastic, equally
distributed among countries, and normalized to one86. Finally, there are trade costs
of the Samuelson iceberg-type, such that only a fraction τ of one produced unit of a
good arrives at its foreign destination (0 < τ < 1).
4.4 Equilibrium
The consumption maximization problem of the typical agents in country 1 and 2 may
be solved in two stages. First, the demand for any variety is determined for any given
time path of expenditure on consumption goods. The corresponding unit expenditure
function or ideal CES price index Pj is found to be:87
Pj =
Ã
njp1−σj
n1 + n2
+
nkp
ex(1−σ)
k
n1 + n2
! 1
1−σ
, (51)
where pj and pexk are the domestic producer prices and export prices of firms in country
j and k charged for consumers in country j, respectively. Then, the individual budget
constraint can be written as follows:88
·
Kj= Ij =
rjKj
Pj
+
wj
Pj
− Cj, (52)
where rj and wj denote nominal rental and wage rates. Investment expenditure equals
wage income and rents minus consumption expenditure. Second, the optimal con-
85We make this assumption, because we want to distinguish our agglomeration process from that
of Krugman (1991a), Krugman and Venables (1995), Venables (1996), and Martin and Ottaviano
(1996). These papers rely on interregional or intersectoral factor (in particular labour) movements
and R&D location decisions.
86If we did not assume this normalization, then the capital stocks would simply be replaced by the
capital-labor ratios. None of the qualitative results obtained in this paper would change, of course.
87Note that we take here the symmetry of firms within a country into account.
88We use the definition of the expenditure function (and an analogous equation for the investment
aggregate Ij):
PjCj ≡
njX
ij=1
pjcijj+
nkX
ik=1
pexk cikj
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sumption expenditure is determined by maximizing utility (47) taking the individual
budget constraint (52), a price vector, and the initial condition as given. We assume
that private agents do not foresee the impact of their behaviour on decisions of agents
in the other country. This assumption excludes strategic interaction and is in line with
the monopolistic competition conjecture. The optimization yields the familiar Euler
equation:89
.
Cj= (ρj − λ)Cj, (53)
where ρj ≡ rj/Pj denotes the real rental rate of capital. Additionally, the familiar
transversality condition completes the description of the dynamical system. Note that
the steady state condition of the emerging dynamical system will involve equalization
of real rental rates of capital across countries.
Firms maximize profits and use a mark-up pricing rule given the imperfect
competition conjecture of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that firms take the direct impact
of their price decision on goods market demand into account, but not the indirect
eﬀects on income and the price index:90
pj =
σ
σ − 1βc (wj, rj) and p
ex
j =
σ
σ − 1βc (wj, rj) /τ. (54)
It is important that prices for foreign consumers contain a transport-cost mark-up on
prices for domestic consumers. Furthermore, c (wj, rj) denotes the unit cost function
which is given by the following expression:
c (wj, rj) = (1− δ)δ−1 δ−δrδjw1−δj . (55)
Finally, the relative input demand determines after aggregation the wage-rental ratio
for a given capital-labour ratio (Recall that labour endowments are normalized to
one.):
wj
rj
=
1− δ
δ
Kj. (56)
Capital letters denote aggregates (e.g. Kj ≡ njkj and Vj ≡ njvj). Additionally, the
zero profit condition njpjxj = rjKj +wj holds due to free firm entry and exit. Hence,
89We follow the standard procedure as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
90For a discussion of this conjecture see d’Aspremont, et. al. (1996).
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we find from the zero profit condition and equation (56) that the rental payments are
a constant fraction of income:
rjKj = δnjpjxj. (57)
Using the zero profit condition, we derive the following equation for firm output:91
xj =x= 1, (58)
where we normalized without loss of generality β = 1−α and ασ = 1.92 Factor market
equilibrium requires:
nj = Kδj = Vj . (59)
Thus, the number of firms and goods depends on the capital stock of a country. The
goods market equilibrium condition for a typical firm in country 1 at any point of time
is the last equilibrium condition to be imposed:93
p−σ1 (r1K1 + w1)
n1p1−σ1 + qn2p
1−σ
2
+
qp−σ1 (r2K2 + w2)
qn1p1−σ1 + n2p
1−σ
2
= 1. (60)
where q ≡ τσ−1 proxies the reciprocal of trade costs for notational simplicity. Using the
zero profit condition and defining relative producer prices (terms of trade) p ≡ p2/p1
and relative firm agglomeration n ≡ n2/n1, equation (60) can be reformulated in the
following way:
1
1 + qnp1−σ
+
qnp
q + np1−σ
= 1, (61)
which can be solved for n to give two solutions n = 0 and
n =
q − pσ
p (q − p−σ) with 0 < n <∞. (62)
This simple equation gives a relationship between the terms of trade and relative firm
agglomeration.
91For the derivation, we use the definition of Vj , equations (49) and (54), and c (wj , rj)Vj =
rjKj+wj which is obtained by plugging (57) and its counterpart for labour demand into the definition
of Vj , deviding through by c (wj, rj), and applying the zero profit condition.
92All results of the model are independent of α and β.
93Note that we exploit here the fact that the composition of consumption good and investment
good demand is irrelevant for goods market equilibrium, because we assumed investment and the
consumption basket to be of the same functional composite of goods.
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Defining K ≡ K2/K1, equation (59) may be restated in the following way:
n = Kδ. (63)
The degree of firm agglomeration is determined by the relative size of capital stocks.
From now on, we can use firm agglomeration n and relative capital stocks K inter-
changeably. Next, the relative consumption price index P (real exchange rate) of the
two countries can be written after some manipulations as:
P = p
σ
1−σ , (64)
where we used (51) and (62). Define relative (nominal rental rates) r ≡ r2/r1. Then,
it follows from (57), (59) and (63) that
r = pKδ−1 (65)
The relative (nominal) rental rate depends on two factors: the relative capital stocks
and the relative producer terms of trade. Now, we can summarize the factor and goods
market equilibrium conditions in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: For 0 < K ≤ 1 holds: the correspondence p = p (K) is an upward sloping
function below 1; P = P (K) is a downward sloping function above 1; r = r (K) is
bounded from below by p (K); Finally, lim
K→0
r (K) =∞.
Proof: See appendix 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 can be shown in figure 1 that depicts the terms of trade p (K), relative
rental rates r (K), and the relative consumption price index P (K) as dependent on
the degree of relative capital stocksK. Note additionally that relative capital stocksK
and firm agglomeration n are proportional (equation (63)). If industries are partially
agglomerated in country 1 (K < 1), then the terms of trade p (K) are bigger in country
1, whereas the consumption price index P (K) is smaller. However, the relation of
rental rates r (K) to relative capital stocks K may be ambiguous.
These results reflect the interplay between terms of trade and agglomeration of
industries that is implicit in Krugman (1991a). Suppose the economy starts from an
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Figure 7: Relative Prices, Wages, and Rental Rates
equal distribution of industries. Then, the relative distribution of production factors
changes, because one country is accumulating more capital. Consequently, there will
be more purchasing power in the larger country than in the smaller one. Because of
trade costs, demand for goods of a typical firm is biased towards domestic firms. This
implies that demand for goods of a typical firm in the larger country exceeds the one
in the smaller country. However, supply of firms is the same across all firms in the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework (see equation (58)). Thus, goods market clearing
requires that relative producer prices fall in the smaller country. The price movement
induces the exit of firms in the smaller country and the entry of new firms in the larger
(see equation (63)).
The consumption price index of a typical consumer in the large country is below
the one in the small country, although (factory gate) producer prices are higher in the
large country and a larger share of income is spent on domestic goods (See equation
(64)). This is so, because less goods have to be imported in the large country. Hence,
there are less goods for which a transport-cost mark-up has to be paid. (See equation
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(54)). In this sense, transport costs drive a wedge between relative (factory gate)
producer prices and relative consumption price indices.
The ambiguous impact of the distribution of the capital stock on rental rates
arises from a convergence force, i.e. capital substitutability, and from an agglomer-
ation force, i.e. the terms-of-trade eﬀect due to the agglomeration of manufacturing
industries. The rise in the capital-labour ratio will lower the rental rate relative to
the wage rate in the country with more capital; the rise in industrial agglomeration
rises the terms of trade in the bigger country and rises the overall factor payments in
factor market equilibrium including - in particular - rental rates (see equation (65)).
We close the model by combining the goods and factor market equilibrium
conditions and the conditions from firm optimization with the dynamical equations
from consumer optimization. Note that the intertemporal budget constraint (52) can
be reformulated to yield
·
Kj=
njpj
Pj
− Cj =
rjKj
δPj
− Cj, (66)
where equation (58) is used and the second equality sign follows from equation (57).
We note from (51), (57), (58), and (59), and Lemma 1 that the real rental rate of
capital in a country depends on the level of the two capital stocks in the two countries
K1 and K2 (ρj ≡ rj/Pj = ρj (K1,K2)). Then the model may be summarized in
the following 4-dimensional, non-linear diﬀerential equation system with the control
variables C1 and C2, the state variables K1 and K2, the national budget constraints
(66), and the Euler equations (53):
.
K1 =
ρ1 (K1,K2)
δ
K1 − C1 (67)
.
C1 = (ρ1 (K1,K2)− λ)C1 (68)
.
K2 =
ρ2 (K1,K2)
δ
K2 − C2 (69)
.
C2 = (ρ2 (K1,K2)− λ)C2, (70)
where the transversality conditions are
lim
t→∞
Kj (t)μj (t) = 0 (71)
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with the co-state variables μj (t) for (67) and (69), and the initial conditions are
Kj (0) = Ki0 (72)
for j = 1, 2.
Next, the steady states are calculated. Combining (68) and (70) requires ρ ≡
ρ2/ρ1 = r (K) /P (K) = 1 in the steady state. First, we define a benchmark value for
the reciprocal transport cost proxy q, such that
q∗ ≡ (2σ − 1) (δσ + 1− σ)
δσ − (1− σ) . (73)
Then, we can formulate the following proposition on the equalization of real rental
rates of the two countries.
Proposition 1: (i) The steady state condition ρ (K) = 1 has the (trivial) symmetry
solution K= 1, if q > q∗; moreover, it holds that dρ(1)dK < 0 in this case.
(ii) The steady state condition ρ (K) = 1 has the solutions K= {K∗, 1/K∗, 1}, if
q < q∗, where 0 < K∗ < 1; moreover, it holds that dρ(1)dK > 0,
dρ(K∗)
dK < 0, and
dρ(1/K∗)
dK < 0 in this case.
Proof: See appendix 2.
There are two regimes depending on the level of trade costs, and one of the
two regimes exhibits multiple equilibria. The first regime will be called neoclassical
regime; the second regime will be called poverty trap regime, henceforth.
Trade costs drive a wedge between relative producer prices and consumption
price indices. If this wedge widens suﬃciently (q < q∗), the intermediate solution K∗
arises (see figure 1). In this case, an increase of the capital stock in the largest country
raises the real rental rate above the one in the smallest country in the neighborhood
of a symmetric distribution of capital (dρ (1) /dK > 0). In this sense investment
projects are local complements in the poverty trap regime (spatial complementarity
of investment). If the wedge between producer prices and consumption price indices
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is not suﬃciently large (q > q∗), then an increase of the capital stock in the biggest
country leads to a lower real rental rate than in the smallest country (dρ (1) /dK < 0).
In this sense investment projects are global substitutes in the neoclassical regime
(spatial substitutability of investment).
The steady state variables K1, C1,K2, C2 can be obtained as functions of K.94
However, we will not focus on their values. For future reference, we will denote the
set of steady state vectors x≡ (K1, C1,K2, C2) and the particular steady state vectors
associated with K= 1, K= K∗ and K= 1/K∗ by x∗, x∗∗, and x∗∗∗, respectively. If an
equation holds for any steady state vector, we will also use the notation x.
Finally, we shall point at two interesting properties of the model. First, the
model relies on constant factor shares which is one of the stylised facts of growth theory
(Kaldor, 1963). Second, the aggregated industry production function njxj = KδjL
1−δ
j
exhibits constant returns to scale. Hence, the increasing returns to scale assumption on
plant level is in line with empirical evidence on the production technology on industry
level such as Burnside (1996).
4.5 Stability Analysis
We will not follow the standard procedure of a local stability analysis as in Dockner
(1985) for 4-dimensional, non-linear diﬀerential equation systems, because the Jaco-
bian of the linnearized system cannot be signed unambiguously. Instead, we will find
a first-order approximation function for the system (67)-(70) that has (i) the same
steady state values, (ii) the same Jacobian matrix at the steady state values, and (iii)
the Jacobian matrix is unambiguously signed for any single entry. Finally, we use the
fact that the qualitative behaviour of the approximation system is equivalent to the
original system.
We take the diﬀerence in the growth rates of the capital stocks and consumption
94Bars denote steady state values of a variable. Caveat: K denotes the set of all steady state
capital stocks (because there are multiple equilibria), whereas K∗ denotes a certain value for one
particular steady state capital stock.
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using (67)-(70).
·
K2
K2
−
·
K1
K1
=
1
δ
(ρ2 (K1, K2)− ρ1 (K1,K2))−
C2
K2
+
C1
K1
(74)
·
C2
C2
−
·
C1
C1
= ρ2 (K1,K2)− ρ1 (K1, K2)
We would like to express these equations in terms of relative capital and consumption.
For this purpose, we “guess” the following approximation function to the system (74):
·
K
K
=
a1
δ
ln ρ (K)− a2 lnC + a2 lnK (75)
·
C
C
= a1 ln ρ (K) ,
where we defined C ≡ C2/C1, a1 ≡ρ1, and a2 ≡C2 / K2. This approximation is
entirely suﬃcient to describe the behaviour of the terms of trade around the steady
state and to pin down the relation of all state variables (capital, income, and firm
distribution) between the two countries around the steady state values.95 However,
for the approximation to be valid, we need to show that the approximation (75) is
chosen such that this system has the same steady states and the same qualitative
dynamic behaviour as the original system (74). The first property is easily confirmed,
whereas the second is proven in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system (75), (67), and (68) eval-
uated at any of the steady states has the same eigenvalues as the Jacobian matrix of
the dynamical system (67)-(70).
Proof: See appendix 3. Q.E.D.
This lemma will be used for the local stability analysis that is summarized in
the next proposition.
Proposition 2: Consider the dynamical system (67)-(72). Assume that the eigenval-
ues are distinct. Then, this system is locally asymptotically stable if either
95To recover the absolute values of the state variables, two more equations are necessary: e.g. the
dynamical equations governing country 1. We skip them to focus on the idea of the solution method,
but use them in the rigorous mathematical derivation in Lemma 2 and appendix 3.
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Figure 8: Bifurcation Diagramm
(i) q > q∗ and K= 1 or
(ii) q < q∗ and K= K∗ or
(iii) q < q∗ and K= 1/K∗.
Furthermore, there exist three corresponding two-dimensional local stable manifolds
W sloc (x
∗) , W sloc (x
∗∗) , and W sloc (x
∗∗∗). On the contrary, the dynamical system (67)-
(72) has a one-dimensional local stable manifold W sloc (x
∗), if
(iv) q < q∗ and K= 1.
This local stable manifold is described by K1 (t) = K2 (t) and C1 (t) = C2 (t) for
0 ≤ t ≤ ∞.
Proof: See appendix 4.
Proposition 2 resembles a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation with the bifurca-
tion parameter q and the bifurcation point q = q∗. We illustrate this in the following
bifurcation diagram. The vertical axes shows the position of steady state equilibria
in terms of the relative distribution of capital; the horizontal axes shows the level of
trade costs. At a high level of trade costs (low q), there are three steady states with
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the symmetric one (K= 1) being unstable (poverty trap regime). At a low level of
trade costs (high q), there is only one stable steady state equilibrium at a symmetric
distribution of capital (neoclassical regime).
The poverty trap regime emerges if and only if investment projects become
locally complementary in the neighborhood of a symmetric distribution of capital and
firms.96 Around a symmetric distribution of capital, an increase of investment in
one country relative to the other increases, rather than decreases, the relative real
marginal productivity of capital in terms of the consumer price indices inducing more
investment to take place in the former than in the latter country. At some degree of
divergence in capital stocks and firm distribution the divergence process stops, because
investment projects have become local substitutes. A further rise of investment in
the booming country lowers the real marginal productivity of capital relative to the
declining country. Therefore the divergence process remains incomplete and a certain
asymmetric distribution of capital and firms is a stable equilibrium.
The neoclassical regime emerges on the contrary, if investment projects are
global substitutes, i.e. a relative rise in investment of one country above investment in
the other lowers the real marginal product of capital in the former relative to the latter
country. Therefore, only the symmetric distribution of capital can be a stable steady
state. Given that there can exist multiple stable local manifolds, it is important to
examine one aspect of global stability.
Proposition 3: Consider the dynamical system (67)-(72) and the case q < q∗. For any
given combination of initial conditions K10,K20 ∈ R+, there exists a unique perfect
foresight path for the two control variables C1 and C2. Furthermore, x∗ is reached, if
K10 = K20; x∗∗ is reached, if K10 > K20; x∗∗∗ is reached, if K10 < K20;
Proof: See appendix 5. Q.E.D.
This proposition ensures that there exists a unique perfect foresight path. Only
96This follows immediately from the proof of proposition 2 in appendix 4, equations (117)-(120).
Note that the investment complementarity is referring to the ratio of capital stocks and the ratio of
real rental rates rather than to their absolute values as in the closed economy model of Gali (1995).
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one of the three steady states can be reached for any given combination of initial
conditions. Therefore, this model does not exhibit expectations driven agglomeration
processes as have been found in other dynamic models with increasing returns to scale
like Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991b), and Kaneda (1995). In particular, we do
not need any additional coordination mechanism of expectations as Kaneda’s (1995)
assumption of “euphoric expectations” to select among multiple perfect foresight path.
4.5.1 The Neoclassical Growth Regime
In this section we discuss in detail the neoclassical regime, i.e. the case where trade
costs are relatively low (q > q∗). Recall that there is one steady state distribution of
capital K= 1. We summarize our results:
Result 1: The neoclassical regime (q > q∗) exhibits outphasing growth and convergence
of income.97
The dynamic adjustment path is shown in figure 3. The figure presents the
unique stable manifold of the 4 dimensional diﬀerential equation system (67)-(72).
In particular, there is a unique mapping from the state space K2 −K1 to the control
variable space C2−C1 which follows from the stable manifold theorem (see proposition
2). Even if two structurally identical countries start out with dissimilar capital stocks,
i.e. one country is poor and the other is rich, there will be convergence of capital
stocks and per capita income. The poorer country will grow faster than the richer
country in the transition period to the steady state.
Our neoclassical growth regime diﬀers from, e.g., a Solow or a Ramsey model
(without technological progress and population growth) by a diﬀerent adjustment
path. Thus, countries that catch-up do not follow the same path as the leading
countries. History does not repeat, as is the case in the Solow and Ramsey model.
Once some country is ahead, the catch-up process will change terms of trade and the
real marginal product of capital. This will foster income growth of the country lacking
97This follows from proposition 2: the steady state is stable and the relative capital stock approaches
one. However, income is a monotone, increasing function of the capital stock.
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Figure 9: Neoclassical Regime
behind beyond what is predicted by a model with two isolated Ramsey economies. In
this sense, the speed of convergence is higher in our neoclassical regime than in the
isolated Ramsey economies.
Empirically, it is hard to “detect” the terms-of-trade eﬀect caused by an invest-
ment boom, because any terms-of-trade eﬀect due to total factor productivity growth
(which is excluded in our model) has to be controlled for. Note that in our model the
country that is growing fastest improves its terms of trade, because the home market
eﬀect together with trade costs causes a demand bias towards domestic goods at a
given supply. If total factor productivity growth were the reason for diﬀerent growth
rates, then the faster growing economy is deteriorating its terms of trade, because a
rise in total factor productivity rises output and decreases its relative price.98 In a
complementary study, the terms-of-trade eﬀect is tested for the US and Japan from
1957 until 1990 in chapter 5 of this thesis. Weak evidence is found in favour of our
98This is, for example, the case in Osang and Pereira (1997) which is a two-country, human capital
driven endogenous growth model with two sectors, balanced trade, and complete specialization.
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model during the flexible exchange rate regime after Bretton-Woods using cointegra-
tion techniques.99
Furthermore, our model predicts that trade-liberalization triggers a convergence
process eliminating poverty traps, if q passes the threshold q∗. This adds qualitatively
a new dimension to the relation between trade openness and growth as described by
dynamic eﬃciency gains (Baldwin, 1992, and Baldwin and Seghezza, 1996). The bi-
furcation property of trade openness is in line with the finding of Ben-David (1993)
who shows: 1) There is absolute convergence of income in an economy with trade lib-
eralization (EEC6100 from 1959-1968, EEC3101 after the mid-sixties, USA and Canada
after the Kennedy Round Agreement), or with trade and factor market integration
(the convergence of the US states). 2) There is no absolute convergence of economies
that are not integrated (e.g. the EEC6 and the EEC3 before trade liberalization, the
25 most developed countries, or the “whole world”).102 Therefore, this evidence points
to a two regime scenario with trade liberalization being the bifurcation parameter as
suggested by our model.103
Next, our model explains the catch-up process by increased capital accumula-
tion that is triggered by trade liberalization. It has been noted by Young (1995) that
factor accumulation rather than total factor productivity growth explains the East
99A positive relation between GDP and international price levels can also be inferred from the
cross-country price data of Summers and Heston (1991). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that
GDP growth and terms of trade are positively correlated. (Note that the original estimates in Barro
and Lee, 1994, are revised.) Because Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) try to capture all structural
characteristics of the economies, we may take this as weak evidence that not diﬀerences in structural
characteristics that may influence total factor productivity explain the impact of terms of trade on
growth. However, the estimates of Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) may fail the robustness test of
Levine and Renelt (1992).
100This is the group of countries consisting of France, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and Italy.
101This is the group of countries consisting of Denmark, Ireland, and UK.
102If there is conditional convergence among the EEC6 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), but not
absolute convergence, then factors other than capital accumulation must drive income convergence.
If trade liberalization causes absolute convergence, then trade liberalization must have caused a
catch-up in capital stocks. This is the transmission channel in our model.
103The role of trade openness as bifurcation parameter may be reversed, if diﬀerent convergence
forces are chosen (see section 5.3). Rauch (1997) gives the examples of Chile 1974-79 and of Italy’s
political unification 1861, and explains the subsequent economic slumps in an endogenous growth
model.
In the relation of trade liberalization and growth, our model deviates in spirit from Myrdal (1957).
“The hampering of industrial growth in the poorer southern provinces of Italy, caused by the pulling
down of internal tariﬀ walls after Italy’s political unification in the last century, is a case in point
which has been thoroughly studied ...” (p. 28)
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Asian growth miracles. Furthermore, Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the im-
pact of openness on growth stems from investment promotion, not from productivity
growth. Finally, Moreno and Trehan (1997) find an empirical link between market
size and investment supporting the theoretical link between home-market eﬀect and
capital accumulation of our model.
4.5.2 The Poverty Trap Regime
In this section we discuss in detail the poverty-trap regime, i.e. the case where trade
costs are relatively high (q < q∗). Recall that there are three steady state distributions
of capital, one of which is unstable. We summarize our results:
Result 2: In the poverty trap regime (q < q∗), income levels tend to diverge mono-
tonically up to some relative ratio Y ∗ = K∗δ, if country 2 is taken to be the smaller
country.104
The poverty trap case is graphically exposed in figure 4 which is drawn in
line with propositions 2 and 3. The figure shows the map of the state space (initial
capital distribution) on the control variable space (consumption choices) belonging
to the three local stable manifolds W sloc (x
∗) , W sloc (x
∗∗) , and W sloc (x
∗∗∗) which are
related to the three steady-state vectors x∗, x∗∗, and x∗∗∗, respectively. Proposition
3 ensures that, for K1 (0) = K2 (0) , consumption is chosen in line with the stable
manifold W sloc (x
∗) that leads to the symmetric steady state x∗; if K1 (0) > K2 (0) ,
consumption is chosen in line with the stable manifold W sloc (x
∗∗) that leads to the
steady state x∗∗ with more capital in country 1; if K1 (0) < K2 (0) , consumption
is chosen in line with the stable manifold W sloc (x
∗∗∗) that leads to the steady state
x∗∗∗ with more capital in country 2. Because W sloc (x
∗) is one-dimensional, any slight
disturbance of this symmetric growth path, in the sense that one country accumulates
more capital at some time period (idiosyncratic shock), will leave the symmetric steady
state unachievable. Capital stocks and income will diverge governed by one of the
104The statement follows from proposition 2 that shows the divergence of the capital stocks and
from the fact that national income is a monotonic function of capital.
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Figure 10: Poverty Trap Regime
other two stable manifolds depending on which country received a positive or negative
idiosyncratic shock.105
Our model can be distinguished from most of the poverty trap models in a
growth setting by explaining income divergence of two countries even though initial
conditions are the same except for an idiosyncratic shock. In other words, the ratio of
initial conditions matters, not the initial conditions themselves. This has two implica-
tions. First, poverty trap models where absolute values of initial conditions matter106
have diﬃculties explaining how the rich countries left the poverty trap, whereas the
poor countries did not, if all countries started from roughly the same income levels,
say in the 17th/18th century.107 Our model allows some countries to become rich,
105We cannot accomplish a global dynamic analysis, but numerical simulations suggest that a typical
divergence path would stay close to the symmetric growth path for a long time after an idiosyncratic
shock has occured and will eventually lead to a drastic relative and absolute decline in the country
that was originally hit.
106These are the poverty trap models corresponding to the club convergence hypothesis. A definition
and an overview of convergence hypotheses is given by Galor (1996).
107“The very fact that the world at present is so sharply divided between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries
is, in the context of the broad sweep of history, something relatively new: it is the cumulative result
of the historical experience of two or three hundred years. If we go back a few hundred years for
95
and others, that are hit by some negative idiosyncratic shock, stay poor. Second, our
model is especially suited for explaining the fall-back of highly developed countries like
the United Kingdom and Argentina after the turn of the century relative to countries
that had initially the same state of development.108 A wide range of “leapfrogging”
models exist that are often based on endogenous growth settings.109 We show that a
neoclassical growth setting can also account for the fall-back of nations, if they are hit
by some suﬃciently large exogenous shock. There is still one observation to be made
concerning the terms of trade.
Result 3: In the poverty trap regime (q < q∗), there is a worsening of the terms of
trade p (t) over time in the country that lags behind vis a vis the country that is ahead,
where terms of trade are defined in fob-manufacturing-producer prices.110
There has been an extensive discussion in the 50ies, whether developing coun-
tries faced a persistent worsening of their terms of trade from 1870 til 1938.111 Al-
though - strictly speaking - our model is only suitable to developing countries whose ex-
port goods are produced with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition112,
our model suggests that a worsening of the terms of trade was in principle explicable,
whenever investment projects were locally complements and capital accumulation was
poor.113 Our model suggests that the appropriate policy meassure was not to close
national markets (import substitution) despite that trade seemed to harm developing
countries, but to open national markets in order to eliminate the underlying poverty
example, to 1700 or 1750, we do not find, as far as we can tell, such large diﬀerences in real income
per capita between diﬀerent countries or regions.” Kaldor (1967, p.3)
108We may then interpretate the idiosyncratic shock as political turmoil, unfavourable price move-
ments of primary products, and import substitution policy in the case of Argentina and as the loss
of colonies in the case of the United Kingdom.
109An example is Grossman and Helpman (1991).
110Suppose country 2 lacks behind. From proposition 2 follows that the relative capital stock K (t)
approaches assymptotically K∗ < 1. From numerical simulations can be inferred that K (t) changes
monotonically. From Lemma 1 follows that p (t) is monotonically increasing with K (t). Therefore,
the time path for p (t) has the same qualitative properties as the time path for K (t) .
111An empirical survey is Spraos (1980).
112Spraos (1980) indicates: “Perhaps more important than any of these is the processing of primary
products before shipment (for instance, cocoa beans turned into cocoa butter and cocoa paste) which
has been increasing all the time, though in developing countries it had gained great momentum only
in the last twenty years.” (p. 118) Additionally, mining and agro-business may not a priori be less
likely described by increasing returns to scale than manufacturing industries.
113Of course, we do not doubt that other explanations can be found. We just want to point out that
the terms of trade eﬀect in our poverty trap regime does not run counter to the empirical literature.
96
trap - a recommendation that finds broad consensus nowadays.
4.5.3 Economic Geography
Having shown the interdependence between real marginal product of capital, capital
accumulation, and terms of trade, we focus now on the aspect of agglomeration of
manufacturing industries. From the analysis so far it follows immediately (by equation
(63)) that the faster growth in the country with more capital causes a larger number of
firms which we take as a proxy for manufacturing industry agglomeration. A relative
increase in domestic capital increases domestic income, which in turn increases demand
for any existing domestic variety. The latter increases domestic producer prices relative
to foreign (terms-of-trade eﬀect), which leads to positive profits of domestic firms and
thus the entry of new domestic firms.
Result 4: At high trade costs (q < q∗), there will be partial agglomeration of manu-
facturing industries in one country.114
Hence, a low growth rate is associated with a decline of manufacturing indus-
tries. Indeed, slower growth and a decline of manufacturing industries self-enforce each
other in a cumulative process. Conversely, agglomeration of manufacturing industries
is explained by faster capital accumulation in one country relative to another. This
explanation diﬀers from other explanations in papers on agglomeration and growth
- as Bertola (1992), Englmann and Walz (1995), and Martin and Ottaviano (1996).
In these papers, agglomeration processes in growth models rely on migration, capital
flows with technological spill-overs, and R&D location decisions.
The role of trade costs for triggering agglomeration is reversed compared to
Krugman (1991a). This is so, because we exchanged the convergence forces. Krug-
man’s (1991a) convergence force is based on ambiguous terms-of-trade eﬀects caused
by an immobile farming sector. As trade costs increase from a very low level, terms
of trade increase in the larger country. (We observed the same eﬀect in our model.)
114This follows from result 2 and from equation (63).
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However, as trade costs increase further in Krugman (1991a), terms of trade may start
to decrease. This eﬀect is not present in our model. We conclude therefore that the
role of trade costs is not robust with respect to the specific convergence force used in
geography and trade models.
4.6 Conclusion
We argued that relative income growth and manufacturing industry distribution among
countries are mutually influencing each other. This hypothesis has been formulated
by Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1967). They argue that a cumulative process may keep
some countries poor and others rich, because an expansion process (decline) may rise
(lower) the return on investment in the expanding (declining) country thus causing
further expansion (contraction) by capital accumulation. The empirical convergence
debate suggests, however, that income divergence is a possible, but not a general phe-
nomenon. Therefore, we built a model that explains income divergence in a poverty
trap regime, income convergence in a neoclassical regime, and a testable condition
under which a country is in one or the other regime. This condition depends on the
degree of integration in product markets. If trade barriers are high, income divergence
is likely to occur. If trade barriers are low, income convergence is the unique equilib-
rium. Thus, trade liberalization may trigger a catch-up process of countries that are
stuck in a poverty trap.
The interrelation of growth and agglomeration is described by circular causa-
tion. Countries grow faster (slower), because they have a lot of (a few) manufacturing
industries. Countries have a lot of (a few) manufacturing industries, because they have
grown faster (slower) in the past and thereby accumulated more (less) capital. The
circular causation relies on a terms-of-trade eﬀect that may or may not feed through
on real rental rates (spatial complementarity or substitutability of investment). The
countries stuck in the poverty trap experience slower growth, a lower investment-
to-GDP ratio, a worsening of their terms of trade, and a decline in manufacturing
industries. The countries that catch-up experience a higher growth rate, a higher
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investment-to-GDP ratio, an improvement of their terms of trade, and manufacturing
industries diﬀuse to the poor country.
The results in this paper have been derived in a specific model set-up - increas-
ing returns, and monopolistic competition. Following the same sort of argument as
Gali (1994) for a closed economy, the pitchfork-bifurcation property may also appear
in a set-up with Cournot oligopoly. Our analysis shows that divergence of income and
firm agglomeration emerge, whenever investment projects are complementary in the
neighborhood of a symmetric distribution of capital and firms.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1.
Taking the derivative of (62) yields:
dn
dp
=
−σpσ (q − p−σ)− (q − pσ) (q − (1− σ) p−σ)
p2 (q − p−σ)2
(76)
with 0 < n <∞. (a) Suppose p > 1, then q − pσ < 0. Therefore, q − p−σ < 0 for n to
be positive by inspection of (62). Then follows by inspection of (76) that dn/dp > 0,
because σ > 1 by assumption. (b) Suppose p < 1, then q − p−σ < 0. Therefore,
q−pσ < 0 for n to be positive by inspection of (62). Then follows by inspection of (76)
that dn/dp > 0, because σ > 1 by assumption. This implies that the invers function
p→ n exists in the positive range. From (63) follows that K and n are proportional.
Hence, we have that p (K) is an invertible function and dp/dK > 0. P (K) must then
be downward sloping from (64). From (65) follows that r (K) is bounded from below
by p (K). Finally, the limit with respect to complete agglomeration (K → 0) can be
taken from (65). Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1.
We will first show that there are at most 3 solutions to ρ (K) ≡ r (K) /P (K) = 1.
Using equations (64) and (65) yields:
r/P = pn
δ−1
δ p
σ
1−σ = 1. (77)
Plugging in the goods market equilibrium condition (62) yields:
p
1
1−σ
µ
q − pσ
p (q − p−σ)
¶ δ−1
δ
= 1. (78)
Multiplying out gives a power function of the form:
q − pσ − qp
1−σ+σδ
(1−σ)(1−δ) + p
(1−σ)2(1−δ)+δ
(1−σ)(1−δ) = 0. (79)
This expression has at most 3 solutions for p due to Descartes’ Rule of Sign. Because
there is a one-to-one mapping from p to n to K (Lemma 1), there correspond at
most three values for n and K. We conclude: one solution is K = 1 (The symmetry
solution is always true.); if there exists a second solution K∗ < 1, then the third must
be (1/K∗) > 1 because of the symmetry of the model.
Now, we will give a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of K∗ by
restricting our view on 0 < K ≤ 1. Recall from Lemma 1: lim
K→0
r (K) = ∞, whereas
P (0) is finite. Hence,
lim
K→0
ρ (K) ≡ lim
K→0
r (K)
P (K)
> 1. (80)
There will exist the interior solution K∗, if ρ (K) < 1 for K slightly below 1 (interme-
diate value theorem). This is not just a necessary condition for the existence of K∗,
but also a suﬃcient condition for K∗ to be the only interior solution (0 < K∗ < 1),
because ρ (1) = 1. (Suppose on the contrary that K∗ exists and ρ (K) > 1, when
K is slightly below 1, then there will exist at least two interior solutions (or none)
for 0 < K < 1 which contradicts our findings above.) From (63) follows that there
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corresponds a n∗ = K∗δ. We can formulate the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
an interior solution n∗ also in the following way:
dP (1)
dn
<
dr (1)
dn
. (81)
Evaluating the derivative of the relative price index yields:
dP (n)
dn
=
σ
1− σ
dp (n)
dn
. (82)
Evaluating this expression at n = 1 and using equation (76) gives us:
dP (1)
dn
=
σ
1− σ
q − 1
1− 2σ − q . (83)
Next, the derivative of relative rental rates is found:
dr (n)
dn
=
dp (n)
dn
n
δ−1
δ + p
µ
δ − 1
δ
¶
n−
1
δ . (84)
We evaluate this expression at n = 1 by using (76):
dr (1)
dn
=
q − 1
1− 2σ − q +
δ − 1
δ
. (85)
Using (83) and (85) in (81) yields an inequality
q − 1
1− q − 2σ
2σ − 1
1− σ <
δ − 1
δ
, (86)
which can be solved for q:
q < q∗ ≡ (2σ − 1) (δσ + 1− σ)
δσ − (1− σ) < 1. (87)
A similar argumentation holds for 1/n∗ and 1 ≤ n < ∞, i.e. 1/K∗ and 1 ≤ K < ∞,
by the symmetry property of the model.
Finally, the derivative in (i) follows from ρ (1) = 1; ρ (K) > 1, ifK < 1; and ρ (K) < 1,
if K > 1. Correspondingly, the derivatives in (ii) follow from ρ (1) = ρ (K∗) = 1; and
ρ (K) > 1, if K < K∗ or K > 1/K∗; ρ (K) < 1, if 1 > K > K∗ or 1/K∗ > K > 1.
(See Lemma 1). Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 2.
Let x ≡ (K1, C1,K2, C2) and the dynamical system (67)-(70) be written in matrix
notation as
.
x= f (x). Furthermore, let y ≡ (lnC, lnK,K1, C1) and
g (y) ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1 ln ρ (K)
a1
δ ln ρ (K)− a2 lnC + a2 lnKv
ρ1(K1,K)
δ K1 − C1³v
ρ1 (K1,K)− λ
´
C1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (88)
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where we use
ρ1 (K1,K2) =
∼
ρ1 (K1,K) ≡ δKδ−11
Ã
1
1 +Kδ
+
qp (K)1−σ
1 +K−δ
! 1
σ−1
, (89)
with ∂
h
ρ1 /∂K1 < 0, which follows from (51), (57), (58), and (59).115 Define the
invertible matrix h in the following way:
h ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 − 1
C1
0 1
C2
− 1
K1
0 1
K2
0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (90)
Then, we find for x and y in the neighborhood of x and y that
hx =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
C2−C2
C2
− C1−C1
C1
K2−K2
K2
− K1−K1
K1
K1
C1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ≈
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
lnC
lnK
K1
C1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ≡ y, (91)
where we used the first-order Taylor expansions
lnK2 − lnK1 ≈
1
K2
³
K2− K2
´
− 1
K1
³
K1− K1
´
(92)
lnC2 − lnC1 ≈
1
C2
³
C2− C2
´
− 1
C1
³
C1− C1
´
around the steady state vector x. Furthermore, we calculate the Jacobian Matrix
B ≡ dg(
y)
dx evaluated at the steady state vector y:
dg
¡
y
¢
dx
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
³
∂ρ2
∂K1
− ∂ρ1∂K1
´
0
³
∂ρ2
∂K2
− ∂ρ1∂K2
´
0
1
δ
³
∂ρ2
∂K1
− ∂ρ1∂K1
´
− C1
K
2
1
1
K1
1
δ
³
∂ρ2
∂K2
− ∂ρ1∂K2
´
− C2
K
2
2
− 1
K2
∂ρ1
∂K1
K1
δ +
ρ1
δ −1
∂ρ1
∂K2
K1
δ 0
C1 ∂
ρ1
∂K1
0 C1 ∂
ρ1
∂K2
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
, (93)
where we used the steady state conditions of (74), i.e.
ρ1 = ρ2, (94)
C1
K1
=
C2
K2
, (95)
and by the rules of diﬀerentiation and (89):
∂ ln ρ
∂Ki
=
1
ρ2
∂ ρ2
∂Ki
− 1
ρ1
∂ ρ1
∂Ki
, (96)
d
h
ρ1
dKi
=
∂ ρ1
∂Ki
, (97)
115Recall that bars denote steady state values of any steady state solution.
106
∂ ln K
∂K1
= − 1
K1
, (98)
∂ ln K
∂K2
= − 1
K2
, (99)
∂ ln C
∂C1
= − 1
C1
, (100)
∂ ln C
∂C2
=
1
C2
. (101)
Correspondingly, the Jacobian A ≡ df(x)dx can be found from the linnearization of the
dynamical system (67)-(70) around the steady state vectors x:
df
¡
x
¢
dx
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
K1
δ
∂ρ1
∂K1
+ ρ1δ −1 K1δ
∂ρ1
∂K2
0
C1 ∂
ρ1
∂K1
0 C1 ∂
ρ1
∂K2
0
∂ρ2
∂K1
K2
δ 0
K2
δ
∂ρ2
∂K2
+ ρ2δ −1
C2 ∂
ρ2
∂K1
0 C2 ∂
ρ2
∂K2
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (102)
It can be checked that
dg
¡
y
¢
dx
= h
df
¡
x
¢
dx
, (103)
where we used (96) and
Ci
Ki
=
ρi
δ
(104)
for i = 1, 2, which follows from the steady state conditions of (67) and (69).
Now, we show that the Jacobian A ≡ df(x)dx and the Jacobian B ≡
dg(y)
dy are similar
matrices.116 Therefore, we need one more preliminary calculation. From the chain
rule of matrix diﬀerentiation and (91) follows:
dg
¡
y
¢
dx
=
dg
¡
h x
¢
dx
=
dg
¡
y
¢
dy
h. (105)
Because h is invertible, we can write:
dg
¡
y
¢
dy
=
dg
¡
y
¢
dx
h−1. (106)
Then, we may rewrite the Jacobian B in the following way:
B ≡
dg
¡
y
¢
dy
=
dg
¡
y
¢
dx
h−1 = h
df
¡
x
¢
dx
h−1 ≡ hAh−1, (107)
where the first equality sign follows from (106), the second equality sign follows from
(103), and the second identity follows from the definition of A. Therefore, the matrices
A and B are similar. However, two similar square matrices A and B have the same
116Definition: If A and B are square matrices, we say that B is similar to A, if there is an invertible
matrix h such that B = hAh−1. (Brock and Malliaris, 1989, p.349)
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characteristic polynomials and eigenvalues (Theorem 4.1 in Brock and Malliaris, 1989,
p.349), i.e.
|A− ζI4| = |B − ζI4| = 0, (108)
where ζ denotes the eigenvector and I4 the 4× 4 identity matrix. This concludes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the Taylor linnearization of the system (75), (67), and (68), i.e.
.
y= B
¡
y− y
¢
, (109)
where y ≡ (lnC, lnK,K1, C1), B ≡
dg(y)
dy and g (y) is defined in equation (88) of
appendix 3. The characteristic polynomial of the matrix B is found:
|B − ζI4| =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
−ζ a1 dρdK K 0 0
−a2 a1δ
dρ
dK K +a2 − ζ 0 0
0 ∂
h
ρ1
∂K
K1
δ
∂
h
ρ1
∂K K1+ρ1
δ − ζ −1
0 C1 ∂
h
ρ1
∂K C1
∂
h
ρ1
∂K1
−ζ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ = 0, (110)
where ζ denotes the eigenvector and I4 the 4 × 4 identity matrix. Next, a Gauss-
transformation with the Pivotelements (1,1) and (3,4) is undertaken and the second
column is changed with the first to form a matrix in Gauss-form:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
a3 0 0 0
a1
δ
dρ
dK K +a2 − ζ −a2 0 0
0 a4 a5 0
0 C1 ∂
h
ρ1
∂K C1
∂
h
ρ1
∂K1
−ζ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯ = 0, (111)
where we defined
a3 ≡ a1
d ρ
dK K
− ζ
a2
µ
a1
δ
d ρ
dK K
+a2 − ζ
¶
,
a4 ≡ −
C1
ζ
∂
h
ρ1
∂K
+
∂
h
ρ1
∂K
K1
δ
,
a5 ≡
⎛
⎝
∂
h
ρ1
∂K K1 + ρ1
δ
− ζ
⎞
⎠− C1
ζ
∂
h
ρ1
∂K1
.
Because the determinant of a matrix in Gauss form is the product of its diagonal
elements, the characteristic polynomial may be written in the following way:
ζ2 − ζ
µ
a1
δ
d ρ
dK K
+a2
¶
+ a1a2
d ρ
dK K
= 0 (112)
or
ζ2 − ζ
δ
Ã
∂
h
ρ1
∂K K1
+ ρ1
!
− C1
∂
h
ρ1
∂K1
= 0. (113)
108
Correspondingly, the 4 eigenvalues are:
ζ1,2 = 0.5
µ
a1
δ
d ρ
dK K
+a2
¶
(114)
±0.5
Ãµ
a1
δ
d ρ
dK K
+a2
¶2
− 4a1a2
d ρ
dK K
!1/2
and
ζ3,4 =
1
2δ
Ã
∂
h
ρ1
∂K K1
+ ρ1
!
(115)
±
⎛
⎝ 1
4δ2
Ã
∂
h
ρ1
∂K K1
+ ρ1
!2
− 4 C1
∂
h
ρ1
∂K1
⎞
⎠
1/2
.
Because ∂
h
ρ1 /∂K1 < 0, the last two eigenvalues are real numbers and can be ranked
as follows:
ζ3 < 0 < ζ4. (116)
The first two eigenvalues are evaluated as follows:
ζ1 < 0 < ζ2, (117)
if
d ρ
dK
< 0, (118)
and
Re (ζ1) > 0, (119)
Re (ζ2) > 0,
if
d ρ
dK
> 0. (120)
Note that condition (118) is fulfilled in cases (i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 2, whereas
condition (120) is equivalent to the condition described in case (iv) of proposition 2
which follows from proposition 1.
Because the matrices A and B have the same characteristic polynomials (Lemma 2),
the qualitative local stability properties are preserved by the transformation from the
linnearization of system (109) to the linnearization of system (67)-(70). In particular,
there exist two positive and two negative eigenvalues for system (67)-(70) in the cases
(i), (ii), and (iii) of proposition 2 and 3 positive and 1 negative eigenvalue in case (iv).
There correspond stable (unstable) eigenvectors to the stable (unstable) eigenvalues.
By the stable manifold theorem, the local stable manifolds for the local steady states
x∗, x∗∗, and x∗∗∗ of cases (i), (ii), and (iii) are two-dimensional (i.e. a surface in R4),
whereas the local stable manifold for x∗ in case (iv) is one-dimensional.
Next, it follows from case 1 in Buiter (1984) that a unique solution to the boundary
value problem (67)-(72) exists and is stable in cases (i), (ii), and (iii), because the
number of positive eigenvalues is equal to the number of control (jump-) variables
(C1, C2).
The boundary value problem (67)-(72) does not have a solution in case (iv), unless
we give up one initial condition. Giving up the initial condition for K2 (0) = K20 and
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letting K2 “jump”, yields again a unique and stable solution. If we inspect (114), we
see that these are the eigenvalues of the dynamical subsystem (75) which determines
convergence/non-convergence of K towards the steady state K. If these eigenvalues
are both positive, there will not be convergence of K. Therefore we guess that the
system (67)-(72) must be restricted in K2 (0), such that relative capital ratios are in
their steady state right from the beginning. Formally, we guess that
K1 (0) = K2 (0) = κ (121)
will have to hold for any κ ∈ R+. For any time
∼
t , there exists a
∼
κ∈ R+ such that
K1
³∼
t
´
=
∼
κ . By the property of autonomous diﬀerential equation systems,
∼
t can be
normalized to zero. Therefore, (121) implies that
K1 (t) = K2 (t) (122)
for t ≥ 0. From the first equation of (74) follows then that
C1 (t) = C2 (t) (123)
for t ≥ 0. Furthermore, from (62), (63), and (122) follows that p (t) = 1 for t ≥ 0.
The system (67)-(70) collapses to the system of two independent neoclassical growth
models. Therefore, the guess in form of condition (121) is valid and yields indeed a
stable solution to the boundary value problem (67)-(72) without the initial condition
K2 (0) = K20. Q.E.D.
Appendix 5: Proof of proposition 3.
We start out with equations (67) and (69). They can be integrated taken Cj (0), and
ρj (t) to be well-defined (though unknown) functions of time t as given (Note: Cj (0)
is to be solved for.):
Cj (t) = Cj (0) e
tR
0
(ρj(s)−λ)ds
. (124)
Integrating in the same way (68) and (70) yields
Ki (0) =
∞Z
0
Ci (t) e
−
tR
0
1
δ ρi(s)dsdt, (125)
where we made use of the intitial condition (71) and the transversality condition (72).
Plugging (124) into (125) yields:
Cj (0) = μj (0)Kj (0) , (126)
where
μj (0) =
⎛
⎝
∞Z
0
e
−
tR
0
( 1−δδ )ρj(s)+λdsdt
⎞
⎠
−1
.
(The three steps are standard in the literature, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995),
p. 59ﬀ., in a similar model.) Suppose now:
(i) K10 = K20 =
∼
κ,
with any
∼
κ∈ R+. Suppose further that with this initial condition the steady state x∗∗
will be reached, i.e.:
(ii) K1>K2,
110
i.e. K= K∗ < 1. Finally, we assume without loss of generality that K (0) ≤ K (s) ≤
K∗ for 0 ≤ s ≤ ∞.117 From this assumption and proposition 1 follows that
ρ1 (s) ≥ ρ2 (s) (127)
for 0 ≤ s ≤ ∞ and a strict inequality for some s. Consequently,µ
1− δ
δ
¶
ρ1 (s) + λ ≥
µ
1− δ
δ
¶
ρ2 (s) + λ (128)
for 0 ≤ s ≤ ∞ and a strict inequality for some s. One may check that this implies
μ1 (0) =
⎛
⎝
∞Z
0
e
−
tR
0
( 1−δδ )ρ1(s)+λdsdt
⎞
⎠
−1
>
⎛
⎝
∞Z
0
e
−
tR
0
( 1−δδ )ρ2(s)+λdsdt
⎞
⎠
−1
= μ2 (0) (129)
and therefore by equation (126) and assumption (i)
C1 (0) > C2 (0) . (130)
However, then follows from (74) and assumption (i) that
.
K1 (0) <
.
K2 (0) , (131)
i.e.
.
K (0) > 0. Recall that K (0) = 1 (assumption i) and K∗ < 1. Therefore, the
direction of movement will always point away from the steady state K∗, if K (0) = 1.
By the properties of an autonomous diﬀerential equation system, the trajectory to the
steady state can never pass the thresholdK = 1 at any point in time in the direction of
the steady state and therefore not reach the steady state. This contradicts assumption
(ii). Therefore, there is no perfect foresight path from the initial condition K (0) ≥ 1
to the steady stateK∗. By the symmetry property of the model, there is also no perfect
foresight path from the initial condition K (0) ≤ 1 to the steady state (1/K∗) . From
proposition 2 case (iv) follows that there exists a one-dimensional stable manifold such
that K= 1 is reached, if K (0) = 1. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
117In other words: If K1 (s) = K2 (s) for s ∈ {s0, s00, ...}, and s0 ≥ s00 ≥ ... on the same trajectory
reaching x∗∗ (if it exists), then we normalize by the property of autonomous systems s0 = 0. Then
follows that K1 (s) > K2 (s) ,i.e. K (s) < 1, for s > 0, because s = 0 is the last point in time, where
K1 (s) = K2 (s) is sustained and before the steady state K∗ < 1 is reached. Furthermore, x∗∗ is a
stable node which follows from the proof of proposition 2. Therefore, the steady state value is not
“overshooted” (as would be the case for a stable focus), i.e. K (s) ≥ K∗ for s > 0.
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5 Convergence, Terms of Trade, and Cointegra-
tion: The Example Japan∗
Abstract
This paper tests indirectly the mechanics of Krugman’s (1991) economic geography
model in a growth context with time series methods. A reduced rank hypothesis of
cointegration in a vector error correction model is directly derived from a lineariza-
tion of the theoretical model: a stochastic, dynamic variant of the seminal economic
geography model. The model is tested for data on Japan and the US from 1957 until
1990 against its alternative - a stochastic Ak-model. We find that there is weak evi-
dence for the model. In the Bretton Woods era with fixed exchange rates, the model
is rejected and the US and Japanese economy grow independently from each other.
In the Post-Bretton Woods era, the model is significantly supported, if major shocks
such as the oil crises are expected to repeat themselves in the future.
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5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide an indirect test of the mechanics of Krugman’s
(1991) economic geography model in a growth context using time series methods.
The research shall be pursued by deriving the testing hypothesis directly from the
theoretical model and applying it to Japanese and US data. With this procedure we
account for Granger’s criticism:
“The classical research strategy of the model being provided by the theorists,
the parameter estimation by the econometrician, and the interpretation by the applied
economist often does not lead to acceptable models, with the suggested specification be-
ing rejected by the actual data. It follows that a new strategy is required, and this would
be easier to achieve if the gap between theorists and econometricians were reduced, or,
even better, removed.” (Granger, 1992, p. 3)
The mechanics of the seminal economic geography model with monopolistic
competition and increasing returns to scale relies on a terms-of-trade eﬀect. Suppose
2 regions are identical to begin with. Then, one worker moves from region 1 to region
2 accompanied by the movement of a firm. Assuming monopolistic competition every
firm produces a diﬀerent good. Hence, there are more goods produced in region 2 than
in region 1. Because transport cost have to be paid for foreign goods, demand is biased
towards domestic goods. Consequently, there is larger demand for goods produced in
region 2, because there are more workers in region 2 and income is higher. Therefore,
producer prices must ceteris paribus rise in the larger region 2 (income eﬀect). Higher
prices induce higher wages and the incentive for workers to move from the smaller
region to the bigger becomes stronger (cumulative process).
However, this agglomeration force may be oﬀset by a convergence force. If one
good more is produced domestically, then there is one good less for which transport
cost have to be paid for and the consumption basket becomes cheaper. Then, the
relative price of domestic goods and the ideal consumer price index rises, which reduces
demand for the products of the larger region (number of goods eﬀect). This has the
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opposite eﬀect on prices and wages. Summing up, the mechanics of the Krugman
(1991) model show a relation between firm agglomeration (relative number of firms)
and the terms of trade.
The mechanics of the Krugman (1991) model is not directly measurable in
a time series analysis. The number of firms is a valid meassure only, if firms are
symmetric with identical cost functions and identical firm size, as is assumed in the
Krugman (1991) model. In reality, firms are heterogeneous and production/income
may be the more appropriate meassure.118
To account for Granger’s criticism, we derive the testing procedure directly
from a theoretical model. Because non-stationarity is empirically hard to reject for
income/production119, we have to augment the Krugman (1991) model with an endoge-
nous growth framework to obtain the non-stationarity in the theoretical model. We
are careful in preserving the mechanics of the Krugman (1991) model - the terms-of-
trade eﬀect -, but we exchange the worker migration process by a capital accumulation
process as in Urban (1998a).120 This exchange of the transmission channel is justified,
since worker migration is not a likely channel of agglomeration among countries.121
The econometric model derived from the theoretical model is a vector error cor-
rection model. In particular, the terms-of-trade eﬀect of the Krugman (1991) model
causes cointegration of the income variables of a pair of countries in this vector er-
ror correction model. Therefore, the appropriate time series test of the Krugman
(1991) model is the cointegration technique as pioneered by Granger (1983), Engle
and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988,1991), and Johansen and Juselius (1992).
118The number of employees may be another meassure. In this aspect, the Krugman (1991) model
simplifies by assuming only one production factor: labour. If there are several production factors and
firms are heterogeneous, i.e. some firms work more capital intensive than others, then the indicator
number of employees suﬀers from the same deficiency as the indicator number of firms.
119Nelson and Plosser (1982) find that macroeconomic time series are diﬀerence stationary rather
than trend stationary. We find also non-stationarity in our data set.
120Other growth model variants of the Krugman (19991) are Baldwin (1998), Baldwin and Forslid
(1998), Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano (1998), and Martin and Ottaviano (1996).
121The Krugman (1991) model was designed to explain agglomeration among regions. An interna-
tional trade model (Krugman and Venables, 1995) with intersectoral instead of international mobility
of labour is used to explain agglomeration of manufacturing among countries. The mechanics - the
terms of trade eﬀect - is exactly the same in both models.
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The derivation of the cointegration hypothesis from a stochastic growth model
adds first to the economic interpretation of cointegration analysis and second to the
income convergence literature in growth theory.
First, the standard economic interpretation of cointegration analysis is an ad
hoc disequilibrium adjustment process without micro-foundation towards a long-run
equilibrium defined by some static economic model.122 Lau (1997) shows the link
between growth models and integrated, but not cointegrated stochastic processes of the
endogenous variables. Daniel (1997) obtains cointegration of the endogenous variables
in a growth model by assuming cointegrated stochastic shocks. Pesaran (1997), Ogaki
and Park (1997), and Rossana (1998) derive cointegrating relations from intertemporal
optimization problems by assuming non-stationary stochastic processes.
In contrast, we obtain cointegration in an intertemporal-optimizing growth
model with stationary stochastic shocks. The non-stationarity of the endogenous vari-
ables is caused by an endogenous growth module. Cointegration results directly from
the terms-of-trade eﬀect - the mechanics of the Krugman (1991) model. Whenever one
country falls behind, its terms of trade strengthen which in turn induces an increase
of savings and investment by a wealth eﬀect, until it has catched up to the country
that forged ahead. We test this model against a stochastic Ak-model which explains
income of a pair of countries as two independent random walks.123
Second, the income convergence with time series methods is defined by Leung
and Quah (1996) as convergence in distribution of an income variable time series
vector in the infinite time limit towards a well defined (random) variable regardless
of initial conditions.124 We operationalize this definition by a testing hypothesis of
cointegration, since this definition corresponds to the infinite adjustment process of
122See, e.g. Hansen (1993).
123Other than in Kelly (1992) or Leung and Quah (1995), we preserve the spirit of the endogenous
growth literature by modelling the Ak-model such that indeed income divergence occurs.
124The concept of convergence in form of β- and σ-convergence has been originally developed for a
deterministic growth model and for cross country data analysis. See Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995). Leung and Quah (1996) elaborate theoretically on the relation of the time series and
cross country analysis of the convergence hypothesis. A theoretical survey on the convergence debate
is given by Galor (1996).
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a vector error correction model with cointegration towards its cointegration space, if
the cointegration space is formed by the income variables. This operationalization
is useful for examining convergence forces in the presence of non-stationarity of an
income time series vector.
The empirical analysis is finally conducted using data for Japan and the US
from 1957-1990. It is found that the theoretical model is rejected during the Bretton
Woods era of fixed exchange rates. There is weak evidence in the Post-Bretton Woods
era. If one believes that the oil crisis was a unique event of the past, then the theoretical
model is rejected, although (almost all) the coeﬃcients of the dynamical system have
the correct sign. If one believes that major shocks such as the oil crises are repeating in
the future, then the model is accepted. This result does not contradict Daniel (1997)
who found that there is only one cointegrating relation between GDP of Japan, UK,
and the US. Our result on the mechanics of the Krugman (1991) model complements
the research of Davis and Weinstein (1997) who examine the trade flow predictions
of the Krugman (1991) model.125 Our findings that income and terms of trade are
(weakly) related to each other for Japanese and US time series data is in line with
cross country data analysis such as Spraos (1980) and Barro and Lee (1994).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lies out the theoretical
model. Section 3 derives the cointegration hypothesis from the theoretical model.
Section 4 conducts the empirical analysis for Japan and the US. Section 4.1 explores the
Bretton Woods era; section 4.2 shows the occurence of a structural break thereafter;
and section 4.3 studies the Post-Bretton Woods era. Section 5 concludes.
5.2 The Theoretical Model
We will first set up a stochastic endogenous growth model version of the economic
geography model (Krugman, 1991). Then, we will show that this model yields a
reduced rank hypothesis in the vector error correction form.
125Other indirect empirical evidence for the economic geography literature is reviewed in Amiti
(1998).
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There are two types of consumers i - farmers (F ) and capitalists (C) - in two
countries (j = 1, 2). There are two sectors - a perfectly competitive agricultural sector
(A) and a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector (M). The agricultural
sector employs (1− μ) /2 farmers126 in each country and the manufacturing sector
in each country j employs Kjt units of capital at a discrete period of time t. Only
capitalists save by mazimizing their expected-utility function Vj subject to a dynamic
budget constraint and some initial conditions127:
Vj =max
CCjt
E0
∞X
t=o
βt lnCCjt , (132)
where E0 is the expectation operator based on information on all variables until period
0 and β is a discount factor128. Both farmers and capitalists of country j have the same
Cobb-Douglas type consumption basket Cijt in a period t defined on the manufacturing
sub-basket CMijt , and an agricultural good CAijt :
Cijt =
¡
CMijt
¢μ ¡CAijt ¢1−μ , (133)
where μ is the income share spent on the manufacturing basket CMijt and i = {F,C}.
The manufacturing basket is defined as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type CES-subutility
function on njt domestic goods and nkt foreign goods:
CMijt =
⎛
⎝
njX
j=1
c
σ−1
σ
jjt
n1t + n2t
+
nkX
k=1
c
σ−1
σ
kjt
n1t + n2t
⎞
⎠
σ
σ−1
, (134)
where cjjt and ckjt, j, k = 1, 2, k 6= j, are consumer j’s consumption of the manufac-
turing goods j and k produced in country j and k in time period t, respectively.129
Farms employ one unit of labor each and produce one unit of output. Prices for
agricultural goods are taken as numeraire. Manufacturing firms diﬀer only by their
126We normalize total population in each country to 1. This normaization is chosen such that we
remain as close as possible to the seminal Krugman (1991) model.
127The consumer optimization problem including the constraints and initial conditions is stated in
appendix 2, equations (186)-(190).
128We assume β to be identical in both countries, because this implies that both countries have the
same long-run savings rates and growth path, after one country has catched up to the other. Yet,
this will appear to be relevant for our data set in the empirical analysis, because Japan and the US
seem to have roughly the same per capita income in 1990 (which will become obvious in figure 1).
129In monopolistically competitive markets every firm produces a diﬀerent good. Because we will
assume firms to be symmetric within a country j, the index j denotes a typical firm in country j.
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location. The production technology is of the Ak-type inducing endogenous growth
with fixed cost that gives rise to increasing returns to scale on plant level. In particular,
α units of capital kjt are used to install the production process every day (maintenance
work) and β units are used to produce each unit of goods for the domestic and the
foreign market xjt:
zjtkjt = α+ βxjt, (135)
where zjt is a stationary random shock of the production technology. We specify this
shock as an AR(1) process130 of the form:
ln zjt = bj ln zjt−1 + εjt, (136)
where |bj| < 1, and εjt is i.i.d. normally distributed with zero mean. Present shocks
are assumed to be perceived by all agents, but future shocks are not. In other words,
everybody knows that there is a recession today, but it is not certain, whether there
still will be a recession next year. Additionally, we assume free firm entry and exit
which keeps profits at zero. Production factors are immobile.
A unit of capital is assembled by all varieties of manufacturing goods. For
simplicity, we assume that capital takes the same CES form as does the consumption
basket on manufactured goods:
Ijt =
⎛
⎝
njX
j=1
ι
σ−1
σ
jjt
n1t + n2t
+
nkX
k=1
ι
σ−1
σ
kjt
n1t + n2t
⎞
⎠
σ
σ−1
, (137)
where Ijt is the investment aggregate used by the manufacturing firms in country j
and ιjjt and ιkjt, j, k = 1, 2, k 6= j, are demand of the firms in country j for investment
goods produced by a typical firm j and k in country j and k, respectively. We also
130The specification that productivity shocks drive a business cycle is taken from the Real Business
Cycle literature, e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982), and Long and Plosser (1983).
This particular autoregressive process of the technology shock is justified by the empirical data
employed in later sections. It can be thought as exogenously imposing the autocorrelation structure
explained, for example, by “time-to build” specifications (Kydland and Prescott, 1982) without
having to overburden the model with further microeconomic specifications.
The lag order of this stochastic process will determine the lag order of the vector error correction
model (Rossana, 1998). We choose arbitrarily lag one for illustrative purposes and leave it to the
empirical analysis to determine the actual lag length.
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assume a 100 per cent depreciation rate such that next period’s capital stock is equal
to this period’s investment (Kjt+1 = Ijt).131 (Note that Kjt = njtkjt).
Finally, there are trade costs of the Samuelson iceberg-type for manufacturing
goods, such that only a fraction τ of one produced unit of a good arrives at its foreign
destination (0 < τ < 1). There are no transport cost for agricultural goods. All
factors are immobile.
The within-period consumption maximization problem, firms’ optimization,
and the market clearing conditions are solved straight forwardly following closely chap-
ter 3 of this thesis. The corresponding ideal CES price index Pjt for manufacturing
goods is found to be:132
Pjt =
Ã
njtp1−σjt
n1t + n2t
+
nktp
ex(1−σ)
kt
n1t + n2t
! 1
1−σ
, (138)
where pjt and pexkt are the domestic producer prices and export prices of firms in country
j and k charged for consumers in country j, respectively. Firms optimize their profits
by the mark-up pricing rule:133
pjt =
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶
βrjt and pexjt = τ
−1
µ
σ
σ − 1
¶
βrjt, (139)
where rjt is the rental rate of capital in country j at time t. Foreign consumers fully
bear the transport cost. Because of free entry and exit of firms, profits are zero. This
condition yields an expression for income of capitalists yCjt in country j:
njtpjtxjt = Kjtrjt ≡ yCjt. (140)
From the zero profit condition follows that optimal firm output is a constant:
131It is well know that specific stochastic optimization problems with logarithmic functional forms
can easily be solved, if this depreciation assumption is employed. See for example Stokey and Lucas
(1989).
132Note that we take here the symmetry of firms within a country into account.
133See d’Aspremont et. al. (1996) for a discussion of this result. Note also that firms optimize
under certainty, because contemporary shocks are known and there is no link to the future.
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xjt =
α (σ − 1)
β
≡ 1, (141)
where we normalized without loss of generality ασ ≡ 1 and β ≡ 1−α. From the above
equation and the factor market clearing condition we obtain an equation relating the
number of firms to the capital stock and the technology shock:
njt = zjtKjt. (142)
Note that economy-wide technology shocks are fully absorbed in fluctuations of firm
entry and exit. Nominal income of a country yjt may then be written as follows:
yjt = rjtKjt +
1− μ
2
= njtpjt +
1− μ
2
(143)
Real per capita GDP yrjt measured by a Laspeyres-index can then be expressed as:
yrjt = njt pj +
1− μ
2
, (144)
where pj is a base year producer price in country j.
Finally, the goods market equilibrium condition for a typical manufacturing
firm in country 1 and the goods market equilibrium for agricultural goods are obtained:
μp−σ1t y1t
n1tp1−σ1t + qn2tp
1−σ
2t
+
qμp−σ1t y2t
qn1tp1−σ1t + n2tp
1−σ
2t
= 1 (145)
(y1t + y2t) (1− μ) = 1− μ,
where q ≡ τσ−1 for notational simplicity. Following again the steps in chapter 3 of this
thesis we summarize the goods market equilibrium conditions in the following excess
demand function:
h (pt, nt) =
1 + μ+ (1− μ)ntpt
2
¡
1 + qntp1−σt
¢ + q [1− μ+ (1 + μ)ntpt]
2
¡
q + ntp1−σt
¢ − 1 = 0, (146)
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where we conveniently define the terms of trade pt ≡ p2tp1t and the relative number of
firms nt ≡ n2tn1t . This equation can be solved for nt:
nt =
1− μ+ (1 + μ) q2 − 2qpσt
pt
£
1− μ+ (1 + μ) q2 − 2qp−σt
¤ . (147)
We define for future reference from h (pt, nt) = 0 the correspondence pt (nt). The
budget constraint for capitalists in country j may be written as follows:134
Pjt
¡
Ijt + CMCjt
¢
+ CACjt = y
C
jt. (148)
Using (140), (141), (142), the depreciation assumption, and the fact that a constant
fraction (1− μ) of income is spent on agricultural goods yields:
Kjt+1 = μπjtKjtzjt − CMCjt , (149)
where we define for convenience πjt ≡ (pjt/Pjt) . The definition of Pjt in equation (138)
is plugged into the definition of πjt to yield:
π1t = π1t (pt (nt) , nt) =
Ã
1
1 + nt
+
qpt (nt)
1−σ
1 + n−1t
! 1
σ−1
= π1t (ztKt) (150)
and
π2t = π2t (pt (nt) , nt) =
Ã
1
1 + n−1t
+
qpt (nt)
σ−1
1 + nt
! 1
σ−1
= π2t (ztKt) , (151)
where zt ≡ z2t/z1t, Kt ≡ K2t/K1t, the correspondence pt (nt) from (147), as well as
equation (142). Now we make a guess for a consumption function that optimizes
expected utility of capitalists around some steady state to be defined later:
CMjt = d0μπjtKjtzjt, (152)
134Note that the following relation holds by the definition of the ideal price index:
Pjt
¡
Ijt + CMCjt
¢
=
njX
j=1
pjt (cjjt + ιjjt)+
nkX
k=1
pexkt (cjkt + ιjkt) .
.
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where d0 is a parameter yet to be determined. We will later confirm this guess to be
valid. Inserting (150), (151), and (152) into (149) yields finally:
Kjt+1 = (1− d0)μπjt (Ktzt)Kjtzjt. (153)
This is the stochastic diﬀerence equation system summarizing the basic model under
the assumption that the guess (152) is valid.
5.3 Derivation of the Cointegration Hypothesis
Our final objective is the empirical test of the model (153). Before we can do this, we
need to transform the model into the vector error correction form which cointegration
tests are based on. We proceed in four steps: first, we show that the deterministic
counterpart of (153) yields steady state values for the relative capital stocksKt and the
terms of trade pt given the guess (152) for the consumption function and some further
condition. Then, we confirm the guess of the consumption function to be valid around
the so-found steady state values. These two results allow us to apply Campbell’s (1994)
logarithmic approximation method on (147), (150), and (151) around the steady states
of pt and Kt. Second, we derive the reduced rank hypothesis of cointegration from
the log-linearized system (153) in vector error correction form. Third, we extend the
basic model by adding exchange rate shocks. Finally, an alternative hypothesis based
on a stochastic Ak-model is formulated.
5.3.1 Basic Version
We proceed by taking the logarithm of the ratio of (153) for country 2 to (153) for
country 1:
lnKt+1 = lnπ2t (ztKt)− lnπ1t (ztKt) + lnKt + ln zt, (154)
where ln zt ≡ ln z2t − ln z1t is a stationary stochastic process. This stochastic diﬀer-
ence equation is suﬃcient to describe the behaviour of the relative capital stocks Kt
and terms of trade pt. We will next show that this stochastic diﬀerence equation is
stationary, even if (153) is not. Now, we shut oﬀ the stochastic process, i.e. we set
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zt = 1. The remaining deterministic equation can be depicted in figure 1 (see ap-
pendix). It depends obviously on the shape of lnπ2t (Kt) − lnπ1t (Kt) , whether this
diﬀerence equation has a unique stable fixed point. In general, this diﬀerence equation
has multiple fixed points. Under some condition, a unique stable fixed point can be
established in proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The deterministic counterpart to the stochastic diﬀerence equation
given by (154) with (147), (150), and (151) has a unique stable fixed point K= 1, and
p= 1, if
τμσ
£
(1 + μ) τσ−1 + (1− μ) τ 1−σ
¤
> 2 (155)
and the guess for the consumption function (152) is valid.
Proof: See appendix 1. Q.E.D.
The condition in proposition 1 is the same as the one for the “convergence
case” in Krugman (1991). There, manufacturing firms tend to spread evenly in space,
because producer prices and wages are highest in the smallest region. Here, the coun-
try with the most manufacturing has the lowest producer prices, lowest income and
savings, grows slowest in number of firms and manufacturing output allowing the
other country to catch up. We will assume that condition (155) is true for our data
sample135 and pay no further attention to it, because we want to focus on the empirical
investigation of the terms-of-trade eﬀect only.
After we have found that p=K= 1 is a stable fixed point of the deterministic
counterpart of the stochastic diﬀerence equation (154) conditional on our guess (152)
for the consumption function, we can confirm that the initial guess is indeed valid
around this steady state. Proposition 2 does exactly this.
Proposition 2: The linear guess for the consumption function (152) is the optimal
solution to the maximization problem of capitalists (132) subject to the ressource con-
135If this condition were not true, then the model would predict that income diverges which is
certainly not the case for our data sample. Also, the condition implies that transport cost shall be
suﬃciently large which is likely the case for our data sample US and Japan.
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straint (149) and the pricing equation (147) around the steady state K= 1 and zj= 1,
j = 1, 2, if d0 = 1− β is chosen.
Proof: See appendix 2. Q.E.D.
Since we have established that the steady state solution p=K= 1 is stable
(under some condition) and (136) is assumed to be a stationary stochastic process,
we can apply as in Campbell (1994) a logarithmic approximation around the steady
state values p=K= 1 to the equations (147), (150) and (151). Following this method
we obtain for (150) and (151):
lnπ1t = −
q
q + 1
ln pt +
q − 1
2 (σ − 1) (q + 1) lnnt, (156)
lnπ2t =
q
q + 1
ln pt −
q − 1
2 (σ − 1) (q + 1) lnnt.
We will exploit the symmetry of these two equations to derive the reduced rank hy-
pothesis of cointegration. Correspondingly, the goods market equilibrium condition
(147) is log-linnearized as follows:
lnnt = γ1 ln pt, (157)
where
γ1 ≡
−4σq − 1 + μ− (1 + μ) q2 + 2q
1− μ+ (1 + μ) q2 − 2q .
So far, we have a stochastic diﬀerence equation system in the endogenous vari-
able capital stocks of firms Kjt. Data on capital stocks are not very reliable, since they
depend on depreciation assumptions. Multiplying (153) with ln zjt+1 and substituting
njt = zjtKjt for all j, t transforms the system (153) into one with the endogenous
variable number of firms njt. This variable is sensitive to the symmetry assump-
tion imposed on firms. If firms were heterogeneous, firm size and number of firms
would interact in an unknown way. Therefore, it is not clear, how to meassure this
variable empirically. To circumvent this problem, one could use another variable: in-
dustrial production. However, the model assumes that all industrial production uses
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increasing returns technology and all industrial production is exportable. Therefore,
it is not clear, whether the data series of industrial production which may contain
non-increasing returns production and non-tradable goods is a good meassure. Addi-
tionally, industrial production data are highly volatile making it diﬃcult to establish
economic relations. Hence, we choose to express the theoretical model in terms of real
GDP as defined in (144).
Before we can do so, the following two relations have to be noted: First,
4 ln yrjt ≈ 4 lnnjt, (158)
where M denotes the diﬀerence operator; second
lnnjt ≈ ln yrjt − ln pj, (159)
if the manufacturing sector is suﬃciently large, because
lim
t−→∞
yrjt +
1− μ
2
= lim
t−→∞
yrjt. (160)
In other words, as the economy grows, the share of the agricultural sector in GDP
diminishes and GDP is well approximated by the output of all sectors without agri-
culture.
Now, we are ready to derive the vector error correction form of our theoretical
model. Taking the logarithm of (153), plugging in (156) and (157), using (158) and
(159), solving for the autoregressive process of the error term (136), and rearranging
terms yields: µ
M ln yr1t+1
M ln yr2t+1
¶
=
µ
b1 − γ2 γ2
γ2 b2 − γ2
¶µ
M ln yr1t
M ln yr2t
¶
(161)
+b0 +Π
µ
ln yr1t
ln yr2t
¶
+
µ
ε1t+1
ε2t+1
¶
,
where
Π = γ2
µ
− (1− b1) 1− b1
1− b2 − (1− b2)
¶
,
b0 =
µ
(1− b1)
¡
ln (μβ) + γ2 ln p1 −γ2 ln p2
¢
(1− b2)
¡
ln (μβ)− γ2 ln p1 +γ2 ln p2
¢ ¶ ,
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γ2 = −
(1− q) γ1 + 2q (σ − 1)
2 (σ − 1) (1 + q) γ1
.
The cointegration hypothesis is formulated as a reduced rank r < p of the p×p matrix
Π (here p = 2) which implies that it can be decomposed into Π = αβ0 with the p× r
matrices α and β of full rank (see Johansen 1988, 1995). It is easily seen that Π has
rank r = 1 and α and β are found to be (with an appropriate normalization):
αβ0 = γ2
µ
1− b1
− (1− b2)
¶¡
−1 1
¢
. (162)
Additionally, we note that the theoretical model requires that the intercept is not
restricted to the cointegrating relation, because there does not exist a 1× r vector ρ0
such that αρ00 = b0. This can be easily seen by comparing the α and the b0 vectors:µ
1− b1
− (1− b2)
¶
ρ
0
0 6=
µ
(1− b1)
¡
ln (μβ) + γ2 ln p1 −γ2 ln p2
¢
(1− b2)
¡
ln (μβ)− γ2 ln p1 +γ2 ln p2
¢ ¶ (163)
for every scalar ρ0. Therefore the appropriate model specification is the reduced rank
hypothesis H1(r) in the notation of Johansen (1995, p. 81ﬀ). We are able to obtain
this reduced rank hypothesis exactly because the stochastic diﬀerence equations (153)
are integrated of order 1, but the ratio of the two in equation (154) is stationary.
The empirical implication for economic growth is twofold. First, any two
economies grow indefinitely (since we assumed an endogenous growth model). Second,
income levels of any two economies fulfilling condition (155) converge to each other.
The terms of trade tie together the income levels of the two countries. Whenever one
country lags behind, its terms of trade strengthen and induce larger investment and
economic growth relative to the country that is ahead. In this way we have formulated
the convergence hypothesis as a cointegration hypothesis in time series analysis.
5.3.2 Extension
Our model may be tested as this cointegration hypothesis. However, this test has
no power with respect to mechanisms alternative to the terms-of-trade eﬀect of this
model that may also generate a cointegrating relation of the same kind, e.g. capital
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mobility, capital-labour substitutability, or technology spillovers. In other words we
can only find convergence, but not the source of convergence. Therefore, we choose
to extend the model by formulating an equation of motion for the terms of trade to
allow for testing the significance of the terms-of-trade eﬀect.
The simplest way to introduce an additional equation of motion into the model
is a tatonnement process augmented with an AR(1) stochastic process z3t as defined
by (136):
M ln pt+1 = δ ln [h (pt, nt) + 1] + ln z3t+1, (164)
where δ < 0 is an adjustment speed parameter and we have assumed that agricultural
goods markets clear instantly.136 Whenever there is excess demand for good 1 the
terms of trade pt = p2t/p1t will fall. The error term may be justified by “excess
volatility” in the nominal exchange rate. We apply the log-linearization to (164) and
obtain:
M ln pt+1 = δγ3 lnn1t − δγ3 lnn2t + δγ4 ln pt + ln z3t+1, (165)
where
γ3 =
1− μq2
(1 + q)2
> 0,
and
γ4 =
μq2 (2− σ)− μσ + σ (1 + q)2 + 2q (σ − 1)
(1 + q)2
> 0.
The vector error correction form of the extended three-dimensional system (153),
(164), and (136) can be derived in the same way as the two-dimensional system (161)
before:
⎛
⎝
M ln yr1t+1
M ln yr2t+1
M ln pt+1
⎞
⎠ = Γ
⎛
⎝
M ln yr1t
M ln yr2t
M ln pt
⎞
⎠+ b0 +Π
⎛
⎝
ln yr1t
ln yr2t
ln pt
⎞
⎠+
⎛
⎝
ε1t+1
ε2t+1
ε3t+1
⎞
⎠ , (166)
where
Γ =
⎛
⎝
b1 + 1−q2(σ−1)(1+q) −
1−q
2(σ−1)(1+q) −
q
1+q
− 1−q
2(σ−1)(1+q) b2 +
1−q
2(σ−1)(1+q)
q
1+q
δγ3 −δγ3 δγ4 − b3
⎞
⎠ ,
136This ad hoc adjustment process is comparable to Dornbusch (1976) in an exchange rate model.
He assumes that nominal price levels are sticky for some time, after a monetary shock has occured.
In this paper, we rather assume that the relative prices of foreign to domestic products are sticky,
after an exchange rate shock has occured.
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Π =
⎛
⎜⎝
(1−b1)(1−q)
2(σ−1)(1+q) −
(1−b1)(1−q)
2(σ−1)(1+q) −
(1−b1)q
1+q
− (1−b2)(1−q)
2(σ−1)(1+q)
(1−b2)(1−q)
2(σ−1)(1+q)
(1−b2)q
1+q
δγ3 (1− b3) −δγ3 (1− b3) δγ4 (1− b3)
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
and
b0 =
⎛
⎝
(1 + b1) ln (μβ)
(1 + b2) ln (μβ)
0
⎞
⎠−Π
⎛
⎝
ln p1
ln p2
0
⎞
⎠ .
This time the matrix Π has rank r = 2. Therefore, the matrices α and β are 3×2 and
can be found to be:
αβ0 =
⎛
⎜⎝
(1−b1)(1−q)
2(σ−1)(1+q) 0
− (1−b2)(1−q)
2(σ−1)(1+q) 0
0 −δγ3 (1− b3)
⎞
⎟⎠
Ã
1 −1 −2q(σ−1)
1−q
−1 +1 −γ4γ3
!
= Π. (167)
Note that row 1 of the β0-matrix is the income convergence relation and row 2 the
long run goods market equilibrium relation. Row 1 implies that income and the ratio
of factory-gate export to import prices shall be positively related for both countries
in the long-run. Row 2 mirrors the long run goods market equilibrium. Again, the
intercept cannot be restricted to the cointegrating relation. We summarize the results
of this section in the following null hypothesis.
Null Hypothesis: The vector error correction model (166) has a Π−matrix (167) of
reduced rank r = 2. The intercept b0 is not restricted to the cointegration space.
In the empirical part of this paper, we will test this null hypothesis.137
5.3.3 Alternative Hypothesis
We now formulate an alternative model against which we test the above model. Nat-
urally, we choose a stochastic Ak-model.138 In particular, we assume the following
137For (166) to comply with the Engle-Granger representation theorems of Johansen (1988), three
additional assumptions have to be made (see Johansen, 1995, theorem 4.2). First, the data generating
process of yrjt needs to be integrated of order 1. This follows from our assumption of an endogenous
growth model set-up. (See Lau (1997) for a general proof.) Second, the matrix Γ needs to have full
rank which is easily checked to be true. Third, an explosive growth path or a cyclical growth path
have to be excluded. The latter can only be checked empirically by calculating the moduli of the
eigenvalues of the companion matrix which have to be on or inside the unit circle (see Lu¨tkepohl
(1991), p. 11ﬀ). This assumption holds for our data sample.
138See Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, for a textbook introduction to the Ak-model. The stochastic
counterpart may be found in Lau (1997).
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production function:
yjt = zjtkjt, (168)
where yjt denotes income of country j at time t and zjt is defined in (136). For
simplicity, a constant savings function with savings rate s similar to Solow (1956) is
assumed such that:
kjt+1 = syjt. (169)
These two equations can be combined with (136) and manipulated to yield:
4 ln yjt+1 = −bj4 ln yjt + ln s+ εjt+1. (170)
This two dimensional diﬀerence equation system shows clearly no cointegration be-
tween income of the two countries.
Alternative Hypothesis: The vector error correction model (166) has a Π-matrix
(167) of reduced rank r = 0.139
In economic terms the Ak-model implies that there is no convergence in the
sense defined above. Two economies grow independently of each other. If the rank of
the Π-matrix is zero, then the terms-of-trade eﬀect is not present, either.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
We use quarterly data for per capita real GDP of Japan (GDPJP) and the US (GD-
PUS) from the first quarter 1957 until the fourth quarter 1990 in 1990 dollar prices.
Additionally, we use a real exchange rate variable (TOT) based on factory gate whole-
sale price indices. All variables are in logs. All data are from the International Finan-
cial Statistics of the IMF140. For more details see appendix 3. Summers and Heston
(1991) have shown that these income statistics lack comparability in absolute value
terms, because the law of one price does not hold in practice. Unfortunately, the
Summers and Heston (1991) data set is not applicable to a time series analysis, be-
cause it contains only annual data. The sample size would not be suﬃciently large.
139Of course, a matrix with rank 0 is 0 itself.
140However, note footnote 44 in appendix 3.
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However, the danger of a data error is limited for our research problem, since we are
not interested in absolute values, but in relative values and changes of variables in
time.
The three time series are depicted in figure 2 (see appendix). The data on
Japanese GDP show a declining positive time trend and a declining variance of GDP
over time. The oil crisis in 1974 appears as the only major disturbance of this trend.
Japanese GDP starts below the US level and catches-up quickly to US levels. However,
the data (until 1990) do not tell, whether US and Japanese GDP converge to some
constant ratio or whether Japanese GDP is just described by a faster growth path
than US GDP.
The real exchange rate shows on average a sharp real appreciation of the Yen
against the dollar, as is predicted by the theoretical model. However, the appreciation
trend is not present during the Bretton Woods era until 1970 and is interrupted by
larger depreciations accompanying the oil-price shocks. All time series cannot be
rejected to be integrated of order one, but can be rejected to be of order two according
to augmented Dickey-Fuller (1987) and Philips-Perron (1988) tests.141
In a monetary economics history of Japan, Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997)
describe four major phases of development: the high-growth period until 1971, the
wild-inflation years 1971-1975, 1975-1985, and the bubble economy from 1985 onwards.
The contemporary period is described as the “bursting bubble” economy both with
a major asset price slump and an ongoing meltdown of the financial system. This
period may describe an economy “oﬀ” the “eﬃcient frontier” of production which is
assumed in our growth models and may even indicate a change in regime from the
“neoclassical regime” to the “poverty trap regime” in terms of our growth model in
chapter 4 of this thesis. In both cases, the theoretical model would not apply to the
contemporary economic situation in Japan. Therefore, we cut oﬀ the sample in 1990,
fourth quarter.
141We do not report the results, since Hendry and Mizon (1993) argue that these tests can only be
rough indications for a vector time series process.
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Until 1971 a fixed exchange rate system vis a vis the dollar was kept. Because
goods prices appeared “sticky”, the real exchange rate was largely undervalued causing
large trade balance surplusses, while the Japanese economy grew faster than the US
in this time period. The break-down of the Bretton Woods system was accompanied
by four years of trials to “engineer” a nominal devaluation of the Yen which did
not succeed, but caused high inflation rates in Japan instead. Since 1975 a steadier
monetary policy approach was followed accompanied by a deregulation of the financial
system. In general, the Bank of Japan pursued a “leaning against the wind” exchange
rate policy with two major intervention periods in the beginning of the 70ies and the
end of the 80ies.
We conclude that the terms-of-trade eﬀect, if present, may be disturbed by two
major events not regarded in our theoretical model: 1.) considerable real appreciation
pressure of the Yen as suggested by the model was suppressed by the policy of fixed
exchange rate systems until 1971. 2.) Both oil crises weakened the Yen, although
Japan escaped at least the second oil crisis with a smaller real economic back-drop than
the US. (One may think of a “safe heaven” argument supporting the dollar in periods
of world economic crisis which may strengthen the dollar beyond its “fundamental”
value.)
For this reason - and statistical reasons reported later, we decided to use a
dummy variable for the first oil price shock. Additionally, we split the sample a priori
according to the two diﬀerent exchange rate regimes from 1957 first quarter until
1971 first quarter and from 1971 second quarter until 1990 fourth quarter. We will
first analyse the fixed exchange rate period of the Bretton Woods era, then test in a
recursive analysis for a structural break due to the change of the exchange rate regime
(which is indeed present), and finally analyse the second period of a flexible exchange
rate system in the Post-Bretton Woods era.
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5.4.1 The Bretton Woods Era
We proceed by testing a generalized version of the vector error correction form (166)
for the sample period 1957:1 until 1971:1:
M zt = Γ1 M zt−1 + ...+ Γk−1 M zt−k+1 +Πzt−1 +Dt + εt, (171)
where Dt is a deterministic term which includes optionally time trends and constants,
seasonal dummies, and other dummies. Johansen (1995, p. 81) provides five model
variants to be included in the deterministic part. Only, models 3 and 4 - i.e a non-
restricted constant, and a non-restricted constant plus a time trend restricted to the
cointegration space - imply a linear time trend in the data which comes closest to the
decreasing time trend observed in figure 2. Model 3 is required by the theory. Before
we can test for the appropriate model, we need to choose the lag-length k and check
the two models for the assumptions on the residuals. Table 1 reports the results (see
appendix).
Both models are tested for autocorrelation of residuals, heteroscedasticity of
residuals, and normality. Autocorrelation is tested by the Ljung-Box Test with 13 lags,
a Lagrange Multiplier Test for first order autocorrelation (LM(1)), and for fourth order
autocorrelation of the residuals (LM(4)). Heteroscedasticity is tested by an univariate
ARCH(2) test. For testing the assumption of a joint normal distribution of residuals,
the Doornik-Hansen test is used. Additionally, univariate normality is tested with
the Jarque-Bera test. The test statistics and the limiting distributions are reported
in Hansen and Juselius (1995) and the calculations are conducted with the procedure
CATS in RATS.
With a lag length k=2, none of the above statistics indicates any model misspecification.142,143
Additionally, we report the three autocorrelation functions for the three dimensional
system in figure 3 (see appendix). They confirm the absence of autocorrelation. Next,
142We do not apply any of the information criteria to determine the lag length, because our sample
period is extremely short. To preserve as many degrees of freedom as possible, we choose the smallest
lag length that is still compatible with the assumptions on the residuals.
143The test results are dependent on the cointegrating rank r. To economize on space, we report
only the case of r=1. This will correspond to our choice of the rank hypothesis later.
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we select the appropriate model from the options: model 3 and 4. Simultaneously, the
cointegrating rank is determined. Johansen (1995) suggests a Trace-Statistic which is
formulated for a jointly nested hypothesis of rank and model type to address this model
selection problem. The model selection then follows the Pantula (1989) principle. The
test results for the two models and the three ranks of at most r=0,1,2 are reported
in table 2 (see appendix). Since model i=3,4 on the one hand and model i with rank
r=0,1,2 on the other hand are successively less restrictive, and model 3 with rank 0
cannot be rejected at the 90 per cent significance level, we choose the latter model as
an appropriate data generating process for our sample.144 Model choice 3 is in line
with the theoretical model (166). However, rank r=0 contradicts the rank hypothesis
r=2. Instead, this rank hypothesis complies with our alternative theoretical model
(170) - the Ak-model. In other words, there is no cointegrating relation between US
and Japanese GDP. Income in the US and Japan develop independently of each other
following each their own drift. US and Japanese business cycles are independent.
To confirm the hypothesis of rank r=0, two additional tests - the lambda-max
test and the lambda-min test - are applied. See Johansen (1995) for a derivation of
the test statistic of the lambda-max test and Bierens (1997) for a derivation of the
non-parametric lambda-min cointegration rank test.145 The results are reported in
table 3 (see appendix). Both the lambda-max test and the lambda-min test suggest
that contrary to the trace statistic the cointegrating rank is r=1. We proceed our
analysis with this rank assumption and test for stationarity of any of the three variables
GDPJP, GDPUS, and TOT. The test is formulated as a restrictionHϕ on the β matrix
(see Johansen, 1995, p. 74). Whereas GDPJP and GDPUS appear non-stationary,
the hypothesis of stationarity of the exchange rate variable TOT cannot be rejected.
This reflects simply the fact that the Yen exchange rate was succesfully kept fixed to
the dollar within some bands during the sample period.146 However, this implies that
144Strictly speaking, model 4 and rank 0 is very weakly rejected again which contradicts the nested
hypothesis testing approach. However, we ignore this observation, because this “violation” is only
marginal and the hypothesis of model 4, rank 0, is identical to the hypothesis of model 3, rank 0.
145Calculations for the lamda-min test are performed with Bierens’ (1998) econometrics program
EASYREG, version 1.20. I claim sole responsibility for any calculation errors of this program.
146Although only the nominal exchange rate was announced fixed, real rigidities proved so strong
that also the real exchange rate was fixed in practice.
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the increase of the rank from 0 to 1 is entirely caused by the stationarity of TOT
(see Johansen, 1995, p. 72ﬀ). GDPUS and GDPJP are still not cointegrated and our
conclusion remains the same as above.
Next, we test for weak exogeneity of any of the three variables GDPJP, GD-
PUS, and TOT. This hypothesis is tested as restriction on the α-matrix (B0α).147
The results are also reported in table 3. We cannot reject the hypothesis that GDPJP
and GDPUS are weakly exogenous. Also the joint hypothesis of GDPJP and GDPUS
weakly exogenous and TOT stationary cannot be rejected (table 3). In other words,
the Π-matrix consists of 0 entries except for the third element on the third row indi-
cating the stationarity of TOT, which explains that the trace statistics finds rank 0,
which is a joint hypothesis for all entries of the Π-matrix to be zero.
We conclude our analysis for the Bretton Woods era by checking the signs of
the Π-matrix. The empirical values of this matrix are given by:
Π =
⎛
⎝
0.026 −0.082 0.020
−0.048 0.146 0.024
0.004 0.005 −0.243
⎞
⎠ . (172)
The empirical signs are compared to the theoretical signs of matrix (166). In total, 6
out of 9 coeﬃcients have the correct sign. However, the impact of the terms-of-trade
eﬀect has not the correct sign for the US economy (element (2,3) of matrix (172)).
Also, the assumed goods market equilibrium adjustment process (164) has two wrong
signs (elements (3,2) and (3,3) of matrix (172)).
5.4.2 Recursive Analysis
So far, we have assumed that there is a structural break after the Bretton Woods era.
Now, we are testing for this hypothesis using the recursive analysis batch procedure
in CATS.148 First, the constancy of the cointegrating rank choice is tested. The trace
statistic is calculated for rank at most r=0,1,2 for every sample recursively starting
147See Johansen (1995), p. 77f, and Hansen and Juselius (1995), p. 44ﬀ.
148The following analysis is originated by Hansen and Johansen (1992).
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from 1957:1-1971:2 until 1957:1-1990:4.149 Figure 4 reports the results (see appendix).
Any test statistic is normalized with its critical value at 90 per cent significance level.
Therefore, a value above 1 indicates that a statistics is rejecting the hypothesis of
rank at most r=0,1,2. One can infer from the figure that during the 70ies and 80ies
up to three cointegrating relations become significant indicating a structural break
after the Bretton Woods era. The statistics shows an upward trend at least for r=1
and r=2. For the rank hypothesis r=2 to consistently pertain over the entire sample
period 1957:1-1990:4, two of the three schedules should be persistently upward sloping
(as the schedules are showing the convergence behaviour of the trace statistics with
two roots approaching infinity and one root approaching zero under the hypothesis of
cointegrating rank r=2). This indicates that the data generating process may have
changed after the Bretton Woods era.
Second, we test for the constancy of the maximized value of the log-likelihood
function used for deriving the ML-estimators of β. The asymptotic distribution is
Gaussian and the confidence bands are at 95 per cent significance level. The test results
are reported in figure 5 (see appendix). The constancy of the log-likelihood function
is rejected in the beginning of the 70ies, but pops into the band again thereafter. This
again indicates a structural break after the end of the Bretton Woods era.
Third, we estimate the β (t) matrix that forms the cointegrating relation re-
cursively for each subsample t = {{1957 : 1− 1971 : 2} , ..., {1957 : 1− 1990 : 4}} and
test for constancy relative to the β coeﬃcient150 obtained from the Bretton Woods
era. The test statistic is chi-squared distributed with 2 degrees of freedom. The test
statistic is scaled by its 5 per cent critical value. Figure 6 depicts the results (see
appendix). The hypothesis of parameter constancy is clearly rejected.
Finally, one-step prediction errors are considered. For any of the sub-samples
a prediction one quarter ahead is made and compared to its actual value. This pro-
cedure is applied both to the cointegrating relation and the individual time series.
149Unless otherwise stated the recursive analysis is pursued under the hypothesis r=1 which is
obtained from the Bretton Woods era.
150β is calculated as 3 dimensional matrix, as if the rank hypothesis r=3 applied.
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The prediction errors are chi-squared distributed with 3 and 1 degree of freedom,
respectively.151 Figure 7 depicts the prediction errors scaled with their critical values
(see appendix). There are many prediction errors of the cointegrating relation (panel
a) outside the 95 per cent confidence band indicated by shadows which again hints at a
structural break. However, only few prediction errors appear for GDPUS and GDPJP
which are partially associated with the two oil crises (panel b).152 The parameter
instability is largely caused by and restricted to the real exchange rate TOT. This
again is not surprising, since we expect a much larger volatility in a flexible exchange
rate system as compared to the fixed exchange rate regime during the Bretton Woods
era. We explore the nature of the structural break now in a seperate analysis of the
Post-Bretton Woods era.
5.4.3 Post-Bretton Woods Era
We pursue a similar analysis for the Post-Bretton Woods era 1971:2 until 1990:4 as for
the Bretton Woods era. Table 4 provides the test results for model mis-specification
(see appendix). The error terms are less well behaved than in the Bretton Woods
era. There is one outlier representing the first oil crisis in 1974. We allow for the op-
tion to eliminate the outlier by using an additional dummy variable in Dt of (171)153.
With a lag length of k=3 and 1 additional dummy variable, neither autocorrelation,
nor heteroscedasticity, nor non-normality can be found.154 Additionally, we check the
autocorrelation functions of the residuals and do not find serious concern of autocor-
relation. If the dummy variable is left out, the assumption of normality of residuals
is violated.
Next, the trace test statistic is calculated. The results are reported in table 5
(see appendix). Additional to the results for the trace statistic with dummy variables,
we report the results without the dummy variables. Two interpretations are possible.
151See Lu¨tkepohl (1991, p. 33ﬀ) for a further elaboration on mean square errors.
152Lu¨tkepohl (1991, p.147) points out that a few predictions outside the confidence intervals do not
necessarily suﬃce to reject constancy. If a random event is repeated independently many times, it is
quite likely that the experiment ends up a few times in the 5 per cent region of rejection.
153The dummy variable is described in appendix 3.
154The results in the table are calculated for r=2. This corresponds to the hypothesis chosen later.
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If the oil shock outlier is thought to be a unique event that will not repeat in the future,
then the violation of the normality condition may be ignored and the usual testing
procedure applies without dummy. If the oil shock or similar events are thought to
repeat in the future, then the critical values for the trace test are invalid. The correct
critical values can be found by simulating them with the software DisCo of Johansen
and Nielsen (1993).155 We define for this program a step dummy which takes the value
1 in the intervall (0.15;0.16) and zero otherwise.
For the scenario without dummy, we choose model 3 and rank r=0 according
to the Pantula (1989) principle. Additionally, Bierens (1997) non-parametric lambda-
min test is performed for the case without dummies.156 The results are reported in
table 6 (see appendix). According to this statistic the correct rank is r=1. Again, both
tests do not support the theoretical model. The signs of the Π-matrix are checked in
the case without dummies:
Π =
⎛
⎝
0.072 −0.154 −0.001
−0.015 0.043 0.006
0.222 −0.595 −0.171
⎞
⎠ . (173)
Comparing with (166), we find that 8 out of 9 signs are correct. In particular, the
terms-of-trade eﬀect both for the US- and Japanese economy has the correct sign.
Only the assumed goods market disequilibrium adjustment process has one wrong
sign.
For the scenario with dummy, we choose model 3 and rank r=2. The Pantula
principle (1989) would suggest rather model 4 and rank r=1, but there is heteroscedas-
ticity and non-normality of residuals in this case. This choice supports the theoretical
model. Next, the beta matrix is checked for correctness of signs:
β0 =
µ
1 −2.263 −0.152
−0.325 1 0.439
¶
. (174)
In comparison to (167), we find that 5 out of 6 signs are correct. In particular, the
terms-of-trade eﬀect in the income convergence relation (row 1) is correct. However,
155See Beyer (1998) for an application of this program to find critical values for diﬀerent kinds of
dummies.
156This test does not require the assumption of normality of residuals.
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the sign of the terms of trade in the assumed goods market disequilibrium adjustment
process is wrong (element (2,3) of matrix (174)). This corresponds to our two obser-
vations of the data that the terms of trade have the expected trend, but there are wild
fluctuations around this trend.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper provides an indirect test of the mechanics of Krugman’s (1991) economic
geography model in a growth context using time series methods. In particular, it is
tested, whether terms-of-trade eﬀects increased the convergence speed of Japan to the
US from 1957 until 1990.
To pursue this test, the Krugman (1991) model is augmented with a stochas-
tic, endogenous growth model. It is shown that this model can be written (after
log-linearization) as a vector error correction model. Furthermore, the model is ap-
propriately tested as a reduced rank hypothesis of cointegration against its alternative
- a stochastic Ak-model.
This hypothesis is tested for data on Japan and the US from 1957-1990. There is
weak evidence in favour of the terms-of-trade eﬀect of the Krugman (1991) model. The
terms-of-trade eﬀect cannot be found for the period with fixed exchange rates (Bretton
Woods era), when exchange rate interventions may have caused the exchange rate to
deviate from its “fundamental” value. This implies that Japanese and US income grow
independently from each other following diﬀerent growth path and the terms-of-trade
eﬀect driving the Krugman (1991) model is not valid for the US and Japan during
this period. In the period with flexible exchange rates, the terms-of-trade eﬀect has
the correct sign, but is only significant if one believes that major shocks such as the
oil price shocks of the 70ies are repeating events. Still, the theoretical model requires
a better module to reflect strong exchange rate fluctuations.
There may not have been stronger evidence for the terms-of-trade eﬀect, be-
cause 1) data were insuﬃciently disaggregated, 2) improved terms of trade do not feed
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through on savings and capital accumulation, if capital markets are perfectly inte-
grated, 3) Japan and the US are too distant from each other and trade volume is too
small for agglomeration forces to become meassurable 4.) nominal exchange rates and
real exchange rates do not develop always in line with fundamentals spoiling thereby
the statistical significance of the terms-of-trade eﬀect.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1.
In the following we denote fixed points by bars. Since the stochastic process is shut
oﬀ, Kt = nt. We note from (150), (151), and (154) that a fixed point exists, whenever
π1=π2 (175)
or using the definition of πj:
p / P= 1. (176)
We follow Urban (1998b) in defining an implicit function k
¡
p, n
¢
by using (138) that
describes all combinations of n and p such that condition (176) is true:
k
¡
p, n
¢
: n=
q− p
1−σ
μ
p1−σ
h
q p
1−σ
μ −1
i . (177)
A second condition that has to hold is the goods market equilibrium condition (146):
h
¡
p, n
¢
. Whenever the graphs of h
¡
p, n
¢
= 0 and k
¡
p, n
¢
cross in p-n-space, there is
a fixed point. One solution is easily checked to be ln p= ln n= ln K= 0. There may
also exist other fixed points. However, Urban (1998b, proposition 2) proves that this
fixed point is unique, if
τμσ
£
(1 + μ) τσ−1 + (1− μ) τ 1−σ
¤
> 2. (178)
To show that this fixed point yields a stable solution to the diﬀerence equation (154),
it suﬃces to show that ∂(lnπ2−lnπ1+lnn)∂ lnn < 1 at the steady state or
∂ (lnπ2 − lnπ1)
∂ lnn
¯¯¯
p=1
n=1
< 0 (179)
which in turn requires
∂ ln p
∂ lnn
¯¯¯
p=1
n=1
<
∂ lnP
∂ lnn
¯¯¯
p=1
n=1
. (180)
For this to be true
ln p |n=1−ε > lnP |n=1−ε (181)
for ε > 0, but ε close to zero. In terms of h
¡
p, n
¢
and k
¡
p, n
¢
this inequality may be
rewritten as follows:
p
¯¯¯
h(p,n−ε) > p
¯¯¯
k(p,n−ε) (182)
This inequality is proven to be true by Urban (1998b, proposition 2) under assumption
(178) and n= 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2.157
First, we make some preliminary considerations. In particular, consumption for agri-
cultural products by capitalists of country j is well known to be:
CAjt = (1− μ) pjtnjt (183)
157The proof follows to some extend Chow (1997).
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given Cobb-Douglas functional forms for the sub-utility function. By using the second
equation of (145), eqations (141), (142), (143), and the definitions of pt, Kt, and zt in
(183), we obtain:
CAjt = 1 + ptKtzt. (184)
Second, we define for convenience:
f (Ktzt) ≡ lnπ2 (Ktzt)− lnπ1 (Ktzt) + lnKt + ln zt (185)
Now, the Consumer optimization problem can be stated as:
max
CMCjt
E0
∞X
t=o
£
μ lnCMCjt + (1− μ) lnCAjt
¤
(186)
s.t.:
Kjt+1 = μπjt (Ktzt) zjtKjt − CMCjt (187)
lnKt = f (Ktzt) (188)
ln zjt = b ln zjt−1 + εjt (189)
ln zt = b ln zt−1 + εt, (190)
together with (184) and initial conditions for the capital stocks. Note that (188)
replaces the goods market equilibrium condition. The first order conditions can be
found to be:
μ
CMCjt
= βEtλ1t+1 (191)
λ1t = βμπjt (Ktzt) zjtEtλ1t+1 (192)
λ2t = β
∂f
∂Kt
Etλ2t+1 + (1− μ)
∂pt
∂Kt
Kt + pt
1 + ptKtzt
+ βμzjtKjt
∂πjt
∂Kt
Etλ1t+1, (193)
where λ1t is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with constraint (187), λ2t is the Lagrange-
multiplier associated with constraint (188), and Et is the expectation operator based
on information available in period t. It must be shown that the first order conditions
(191)-(193) are fulfilled for the guess (152) at least around a steady state solution.
Combining (191) and (192), taking logarithm, and solving for lnλ1t yields:
lnλ1t = − lnCMCjt + 2 lnμ+ lnπjt + ln zjt. (194)
The logarithm is taken from (192) and equation (194) is inserted:
lnμ− lnβ − lnCMCjt = lnEt
∙
μ2πjt+1zjt+1
CMCjt+1
¸
. (195)
The guess (152) for CMCjt is forwarded one period and plugged into the right hand side
of (195) to yield:
lnEtλ1t+1 = lnEt
∙
μ2πjt+1zjt+1
CMCjt+1
¸
= lnEt
∙
μ
d0Kjt+1
¸
(196)
= − ln d0 − ln (1− d0)− lnKjt − lnπjt − ln zjt,
where the second line is obtained by inserting (187). The guess (152) is inserted into
the left hand side of (195) and equalized to (196):
lnβ = ln (1− d0) . (197)
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Since the parameter d0 is chosen to be d0 = 1 − β, the guess (152) fulfills the first
order conditions (191) and (192). It remains to be shown that the third first order
condition holds also at least around the steady state. Equation (196) is exponated
and inserted into (193):
λ2t = β
∂f
∂Kt
Etλ2t+1 + (1− μ)
∂pt
∂Kt
Kt + pt
1 + ptKtzt
+
μ
1− β
∂πjt
∂Kt
1
πjt
(198)
Note that the sub-system (188), (198), and the stochastic process (190) are suﬃcient
to describe the dynamic process of Kt, λ2t, and zt. Therefore, we make a guess for the
Lagrange multiplier as a log-linear function of Kt, and zt only:
λ2t = φ0 + φ1 lnKt + φ2 ln zt, (199)
where φi, i = 0, ..., 2, are parameters yet to be determined. Next, the conditions (188)
and (198) are log-linnearized around the candidate steady state K= 1, z= 1, λ2= φ0
as found in proposition 1:
δ0 + δ1 lnEt [λ2t+1] + λ2t + δ3 lnKt + δ4 ln zt = 0, (200)
lnKt+1 = Γ (lnKt + ln zt) , (201)
where δi, i = 0, ..., 4, are functions of all parameters of the model, and Γ ≡
∂f(K,z)
∂Kt
.158
Equation (200) can be transformed into:
δ0 + δ1φ0 + (δ1φ1Γ+ γ1 + δ3) lnKt + (δ1φ1Γ+ δ4 + (δ1 + 1)φ2) ln zt = 0, (202)
where (190), (199), and (201) have been used. If the parameters φi, i = 0, ..., 2, are
chosen such that
φ0 =
δ0
δ1
,
φ1 =
δ3
δ1Γ+ 1
,
φ2 =
δ1φ1Γ+ δ4
1 + δ1
,
then the left hand side of (202) vanishes and the third first order condition (193) is
also fulfilled approximately around the steady state K= 1, z= 1, λ2= δ0/δ1 given the
guess (152). Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: The Data
The following quarterly data are used from the International Financial Statistics of
the IMF from 1957:1 until 1990:4.
PPIUS: Wholesale price index of the US (farm gate prices and producer prices on the
first production stage) with base year 1990.
PPIJP: Wholesale price index of Japan (farm gate prices and producer prices on the
first production stage) with base year 1990.
POPUS: US population (quarterly linear expolation of annual data).
POPJP: Japanese population (quarterly linear expolation of annual data).
158We do not report these functions to economize on space, since they do not yield further insides.
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DOLYEN: Nominal dollar/yen exchange rate (quarterly averages).
From these raw data the following derived data are computed:
GDPUS (Real log per capita GDP of US): The logarithm is taken of GDP with base
year 1990 divided by population.
GDPJP (Real log per capita GDP of Japan): GDP in 1990 yen prices is divided by
population, converted into dollar terms for reasons of comparability using the 1990
first quarter nominal dollar-yen exchange rate, and the logarithm is taken from the
result.159,160
TOT: The logarithm is taken of the nominal yen-dollar exchange rate, after it is
divided by PPIJP and multiplied by PPIUS.
OIL741: Impulse dummy variable with a single entry at 1974:1.
159We do not convert Japanese GDP into dollar terms using the dollar-yen exchange rate time series
for two reasons:
1) Since we test the relation between GDP and terms of trade and the latter are highly correlated
with the nominal exchange rate, we would construct a correlation into the data.
2.) The idea of a Laspeyres index is to fix prices at a base year level to extract quantity changes.
Base year is 1990 for both GDP Japan and US. Consequently, we also use the exchange rate of 1990
to convert Japanese GDP into dollar terms.
160The time series 15899B.RZF (Gross Domestic Product of Japan in 1990 prices) contained in
the International Financial Statistics-CD of the IMF shows a large break in 1979:1. The otherwise
identical OECD Main Indicators data do not show this break. The OECD data appear more credible,
but they do not cover our entire sample period. Consequently, we rechain the IFS data such that the
growth rate of the OECD data from 1978:4 until 1979:1 is incorporated and base year 1990 keeps its
index number (which is identical for both data sources). We are greatly indebted to Koichi Nakajina
for pointing this out to us.
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Table 1: Mis-Specification Tests 1957:1-1971:1 
 Model 3  Model 4  
Equation ARCH(2) 
χ 2(2) 
Jarque
-Bera 
ARCH(2) 
χ2(2) 
Jarque 
-Bera  
∆GDPJP 0.875 2.973 0.938 2.637 
∆GDPUS 0.493 4.953 2.090 3.941 
∆TOT 0.009 2.262 0.476 0.972 
System     
L.-B. (13) χ 2(105)=111.434 [0.32] χ 2(105)=115.66 [0.22] 
LM (1) χ 2(9)=7.348 [0.60] χ 2(9)=12.296 [0.20] 
LM (4) χ 2(9)=6.140 [0.73] χ 2(9)=3.983 [0.91] 
D.-H. χ 2(6)=9.401 [0.15] χ 2(6)=8.728 [0.19] 
Notes: sample 1957:1-1971:1; k=2; r=1; 3 centered seasonal dummies; Numbers in square brackets are 
marginal significance levels; The critical value from a chi-square distribution for both the Jarque-Bera 
and the ARCH(2) Test is 5.99 at 5 per cent significance level. 
L.-B.(13): Ljung-Box Test with 13 lags; 
LM(i): Lagrange Multiplier Test for i’s order serial correlation; 
D.-H.: Doornik-Hansen Test for multivariate normality 
 
Table 2: Trace Test of Co-Integrating Rank 1957:1-1971:1 
 Model 3  Model 4  
r -2lnQ(Ή1(r)⏐Ή 1(p)) C(r)0.90 -2lnQ(Ή 1(r)⏐Ή 1(p)) C(r)0.90
0 22.399 26.699 39.517 39.077 
1 6.813 13.308 18.053 22.946 
2 0.000 2.706 4.936 10.558 
Note: sample 1957:1-1971:1; k=2; 3 centered seasonal dummies;  The critical values C(r)0.90 at 90 per 
cent significance level are taken from Johansen (1995), p. 214ff. 
 
Table 3: Lamda-Max/-Min, Stationarity, and Weak Exogeneity Tests 1957:1-1971:1 
Test  -2lnQ(Ή 1(r)⏐Ή 1(r+1)) C(r)0.90 
 r=0 15.59 13.39 
λmax r=1 6.81 10.60 
 r=2 0.0 2.71 
  ĝm(r) C(r)0.90 
 r=0 0.0105 (m=4) (0;0.017) 
λ*min r=1 0.0588 (m=3) (0;0.034) 
 r=2 126.7 (m=3) (0;0.111) 
 GDPJP χ 2(2)=15.36 [0.00]  
Hϕ GDPUS χ 2(2)=15.56 [0.00]  
 TOT χ 2(2)=2.80 [0.25]  
 GDPJP χ 2(2)=0.12 [0.73]  
B’α GDPUS χ 2(2)=0.61 [0.43]  
 TOT χ 2(2)=8.46 [0.00]  
Note: sample 1957:1-1971:1; k=2; 3 centered seasonal dummies; model 3; Numbers in square brackets 
are marginal significance levels; H, B are unit vectors with entry at position i=1,2,3 for  variable 
i=GDPJP, GDPUS, TOT; 
The joint test on GDPUS and GDPJP exogenous and TOT stationary is χ 2(4)=3.35 [0.50]. 
* The test statistic is derived in Bierens (1997). The rejection interval is from Bierens (1997), table 2. 
The discretization parameter m of the continuous weighting function is optimally chosen according to 
Bierens (1997), section 4.2 and table 1. The calculation is performed by EASYREG, version 1.20. 
Table 4: Mis-Specification Tests 1971:2-1990:4 
 Model 3  Model 4  
Equation ARCH(3) 
χ 2(3) 
Jarque 
-Bera 
ARCH(3) 
χ 2(3) 
Jarque
-Bera  
∆GDPJP 0782 4.863 0.570 4.141 
∆GDPUS 1.301 2.464 2.258 2.189 
∆TOT 0.524 0.236 0.434 0.273 
System     
L.-B. (19) χ 2(147)=159.61 [0.23] χ 2(147)=166.47 [0.13] 
LM (1) χ 2(9)=10.411 [0.32] χ 2(9)=10.36 [0.32] 
LM (4) χ 2(9)=3.364 [0.95] χ 2(9)=3.245 [0.95] 
D.-H. χ 2(6)=6.036 [0.42] χ 2(6)=4.979 [0.55] 
Notes: sample 1971:2-1990:4; k=3; r=2; 3 centered seasonal dummies; impulse dummy OIL741; 
Numbers in square brackets are marginal significance levels; The critical values from a chi-square 
distribution for the Jarque-Bera Test is 5.99 and for the ARCH(3) Test is 7.81 at 5 per cent 
significance level. 
L.-B.(19): Ljung-Box Test with 19 lags; 
LM(i): Lagrange Multiplier Test for i’s order serial correlation; 
D.-H.: Doornik-Hansen Test for multivariate normality; 
 
Table 5: Trace Test of Co-Integrating Rank 1971:2-1990:4 
   Model 3    Model 4  
r L.R. 
w/o dum. 
C(r)0.90 
w/o du. 
L.R. 
w. dum. 
C(r)0.90 
w. du. 
L.R. 
w/o dum. 
C(r)0.90 L.R. 
w. dum. 
C(r)0.90 
w. du. 
0 22.15 26.699 22.34 21.255 31.04 39.077 27.63 33.155 
1 9.05 13.308 8.80 7.783 13.29 22.946 9.53 17.485 
2 0.18 2.706 0.02  4.40 10.558 0.74  
Note: sample  1971:2-1990:4; k=3; 3 centered seasonal dummies; The critical values C(r)0.90 w/o dum. 
at 90 per cent significance level are taken from Johansen (1995), p. 214ff.; The critical values C(r)0.90 
w. du. are obtained from 50 000 repetitions of the simulation program DisCo of Johansen and Nielsen 
(1994) by using an impulse dummy which is 1 for the sample period interval (0.15;0.16) and zero 
otherwise, where the sample length is normalized to 1; There are no critical values obtainable for r=2. 
L.R. w. dum.: Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic for the sample with oil shock dummy; 
L.R. w/o dum.: Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic for the sample without oil shock dummy; 
Tabel 6: Bierens’ (1997) Non-parametric λmin–Test, 1971:2-1990:4 
 H0: ĝm(r) C(r)0.90 
 r=0 0.0105 (m=4) (0;0.017) 
λmin r=1 0.0588 (m=3) (0;0.034) 
 r=2 126.7 (m=3) (0;0.111) 
The test statistic is derived in Bierens (1997). The rejection interval is from Bierens (1997), table 2. 
The discretization parameter m of the continuous weighting function is optimally chosen according to 
Bierens (1997), section 4.2 and table 1. The calculation is performed by EASYREG, version 1.20. 
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Figure 2c: Terms of Trade 
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Figure 3a: Autocorrelogram for Residuals of Japanese GDP 
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Figure 3b: Autocorrelogram of the Residuals of US GDP 
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Figure 3c: Autocorrelogram of Residuals of Terms of Trade 
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Figure 4: Recursive Trace Test 
Z(t)
-ln(det(S00))
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
24.80
25.20
25.60
26.00
26.40
26.80
27.20
27.60
-Sum(ln(1-lambda))
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
-2/T*log-likelihood
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
19.2
20.8
22.4
24.0
25.6
27.2
28.8
30.4
R(t)
-ln(det(S00))
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
24.75
25.00
25.25
25.50
25.75
26.00
26.25
26.50
26.75
27.00
-Sum(ln(1-lambda))
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.40
-2/T*log-likelihood
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
19.2
20.8
22.4
24.0
25.6
27.2
28.8
30.4
Figure 5: Stability of Maximized Log-Likelihood Function 
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Figure 6: Stability of Beta-Coefficients 
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Figure 7a: 1-Step Prediction Error of System 
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Figure 7b: 1-Step prediction Error of Individual Time Series 
Denish Summary/ Resume på Dansk 
 
Denne Ph.D. afhandling søger af sammenknytte to nationaløkonomiske 
problemkredse: Økonomisk vækst og økonomisk geografi. Afhandlingens centrale 
spørgsmål er: Vil økonomisk vækst føre til industriel koncentration eller industriel 
spredning? Hvordan påvirker en ændring i industriens lokalisering regional og 
national vækst? Hvilken indflydelse har den stadig tættere integration på økonomisk 
vækst og industrikoncentration? 
 
Afhandlingen består af fem kapitler. Kapitlerne er nært forbundne, men kan læses 
uafhængigt af hinanden. 
 
Kapitel 1 er et introduktionskapitel. Det indeholder en oversigt over litteraturen på 
området og et resume af de i denne afhandling fremlagte forskningsbidrag. 
 
Udgangspunktet for min forskning har været Krugman’s banebrydende artikel 
“Economic Geography and Increasing Returns” fra 1991. Heri udvikler han en model, 
der kan forklare, under hvilke omstændigheder, industrier tenderer at koncentrere sig i 
en land eller en region. Artiklen mangler imidlertid en fulstændig analytisk løsning af 
modellen, og intuitionen bag dens centrale sammenhænge er uklar. 
 
Kapitel 2 tilstræber at råde bod på disse svagheder. Kapitlet indeholder dels en 
rigoristisk analytisk løsning, dels en simpel grafisk illustration af Krugman’s model. 
Det påpeges, at der er en nær analogi mellem Krugman’s model og neoklassisk 
udenrigshandelsteori baseret på antagelsen om heterogene agenter. 
 
I kapitel 3 vises, at Krugman’s model har en unik kortsigtet ligevægt, men multiple 
langsigtede ligevægte. Afhængig af industriens initiale fordeling vil en relativt mindre 
industrialiseret økonomi enten af-industrialiseres eller konvergere mod samme 
udviklingstrin som den mere industrialiserede økonomi. Den mulige eksistens af en 
“fattigdomsfælde”, hvoraf en økonomi ikke kan udvikle sig ved egen kraft, giver en 
teoretisk begrundelse for, at aftaler om fri bevægelse for varer og kapital (eksempelvis 
inden for EU) kædes sammen med aftaler om strukturstøtte til de mindre 
industrialiserede regioner. 
 
I kapitel 4 integreres økonomisk geografi og neoklassisk vækstteori i en model, der 
simultant forklarer økonomisk vækst og industriens fordeling. Det påvises, at der er to 
regimer: Et neoklassisk “catching-up” regime, hvor økonomierne gradvis 
konvergerer, og et fattigdomsregime”, hvor forskellen i økonomisk udvikling udvides. 
Det påvises, at afvikling af handelsbarrierer kan eliminere fattigdomsfælden, således 
at mere tilbagestående lande med tiden vil tilnærme sig de mere udviklede økonomier. 
 
Kapitel 5 er en empirisk test af den model, der udvikles i kapitel 4, mod data for USA 
og Japan. Testen viser, at modellen ikke kan afvises for så vidt angår perioden efter 
Bretton Woods fast-kurs systemets sammenbrud i 1972. Under Bretton Woods 
systemet synes de to økonomer at have udviklet sig uafhængigt af hinanden, hvorfor 
modellen må afvises for denne periode. 
